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1. Introduction
This thesis revolves around one question: why are people nice to each other? As with 
any scientific question, the answer depends on the way you look at it. Dutch ethologist 
Nikolaas Tinbergen (1907-1988) famously defined four questions one can ask about 
animal behavior (Bateson & Laland, 2013; Tinbergen, 1963). These four perspectives 
yield complementary explanations for the behavior by expanding the factors static/
dynamic and proximate/ultimate:
1.  The static-proximate question of causation: how does the behavior come about in 
the organism?
2.  The static-ultimate question of survival value: how does the behavior increase 
reproductive success in the current environment?
3.  The dynamic-proximate question of ontogeny: how does the behavior develop over 
the lifespan?
4.  The dynamic-ultimate question of evolution: how did the behavior develop over 
generations?
Scholars have attempted to answer the question why people are nice to each other from 
each of these angles, and the corresponding branches of research are all fascinating in 
their own right. Cognitive neuroscience, my field, tends towards question 1: causation. 
Cognitive neuroscientists generally aim to figure out how the biological substrate of the 
brain facilitates the cognitive behavior we care about: perception, memory, emotion, 
language, self-control, decision-making, and more. Accordingly, the research outlined 
in this thesis contributes mainly to the question how the human brain gives rise to nice 
behavior (or, to put it more academically: prosocial decisions). To answer this question 
of causation, I will build upon previous work from three disciplines: psychology, 
neuroscience, and economics. I will elicit social decision behavior from human 
experimental subjects using experimental approaches developed by psychologists and 
behavioral economists, quantitatively describe the observed behavior using economic 
models of utility, and map out the neural systems whose activity signatures correspond 
to components of those models.
 I will gladly refer those more interested in questions 2 through 4 to other literature. 
To understand the evolution of prosocial behavior, read the classics by Axelrod and 
Hamilton (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981), comparative research by De Waal (De Waal, 
2008), or modern genetics papers (Thompson, Hurd, & Crespi, 2013). The survival value 
of cooperation has been explored extensively by authors like Fehr (Fehr & Fischbacher, 
2003; Ernst Fehr & Gächter, 2002) and Nowak (Hauser, Hendriks, Rand, & Nowak, 
2016). For the ontogeny of prosocial choice, refer to Kohlberg (Kohlberg, 1969), Piaget 
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(Piaget, 1932) and Haidt (Haidt, 2001), or more recent experimental work (Cushman, 
Kumar, & Railton, 2017).
The Subway Hero of New York
In January 2007, Wesley Autrey and his two daughters are waiting on a subway platform 
in New York City’s 137th Street Station. Suddenly a young man nearby gets an epileptic 
seizure. Autrey rushes in to help, and together with some other passers-by he helps him 
recover and get back on his feet. But the story is not over yet. The man starts to stagger 
again, and this time falls onto the subway tracks. A train is approaching fast – what do 
you do? After some quick deliberation, Autrey jumps after the man and tries to lift him 
back onto the platform. But the body is too heavy, and time is running out. Autrey then 
switches to an unlikely plan B: he shoves the man into the narrow space between the 
tracks, lying down on top of him. And it works. The train grinds to a halt right above the 
two men, leaving them unharmed and making Autrey the Subway Hero of New York.
 What drove Autrey to his heroic act? In an interview with David Letterman, he retold 
his interior dialogue as follows: ‘I was like: this guy is gonna lose limbs or something, 
or his life, if somebody don’t help him. Fool, you gotta go in and help him. You know 
what I’m saying? Yeah, that’s exactly what I said to myself. [...] Yo, go help him, man. 
You can do it. That’s what my mind told me.’ Apparently, Autrey considered the likely 
outcomes of the various courses of action available to him. Below, we will see that this 
psychological strategy matches the way in which some economic models describe social 
choice behavior. Precisely how Autrey estimates and weighs the goodness or badness of 
various possible outcomes, such as the man losing a limb or Autrey himself losing his 
life, could be estimated if we had access to a greater data set of Autrey’s decisions. In this 
thesis, I will report on various experiments in which I produced such rich data sets by 
exposing my participants to a range of experimental conditions. In the case of Autrey, 
however, we will have to content ourselves with the conclusion that he is, indeed, a hero.
Methods in the neuroscience of social decision-making
While Autrey’s behavior is exceptional, it is certainly not unique. Autrey received the 
Carnegie Medal for his act, which is awarded by the Carnegie Hero Fund to North 
Americans who ‘risk their lives to an extraordinary degree while saving or attempting 
to save the lives of others’ (see www.carnegiehero.org). Since its inception in 1904, the 
fund has awarded 9,991 medals to ordinary people, of which 77 were awarded in 2017 
alone. Aside from such life-threatening heroism, however, prosociality permeates everyday 
life. Whenever you hold the door open for someone else, help a friend move into a new 
apartment, or give to charity, you contribute nice behavior to the world. How can we 
explain this high prevalence of prosocial behavior, from the mundane to the heroic?
 In a high-profile paper from 2014, Abigail Marsh and colleagues (Marsh et al., 
2014) described structural brain differences between 19 ‘extraordinary altruists’ and 20 
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matched controls. The altruists in this study were people who had voluntarily donated a 
kidney to save the life of a stranger. It turned out that their right amygdala, an important 
component of the emotional brain, was modestly (8%) but significantly larger than that 
of the controls. In addition, the responsiveness of this brain region to pictures of fearful 
faces was stronger for the extraordinary altruists, and they were better at recognizing 
fearful facial expressions on pictures. This neurobiological pattern contrasts that of 
psychopaths, who have exceptionally low concern for others’ well-being: psychopaths 
perform worse at recognizing emotional facial expressions (Dawel, O’Kearney, McKone, 
& Palermo, 2012), and have been found to have smaller amygdala volumes than controls 
(Pardini, Raine, Erickson, & Loeber, 2014; Yang, Raine, Narr, Colletti, & Toga, 2009).
 The structural differences observed by Marsh and others provide initial evidence for a 
causal link between the human brain and prosocial behavior. It is, however, correlational 
evidence, which means a shared third factor might underlie both structural brain changes 
and changes in altruistic behavior, or that frequent altruistic behavior might cause 
changes to the brain (just as frequent taxi driving is thought to affect the structure of the 
brain’s spatial memory hotspot, the hippocampus (Maguire et al., 2000)). It would be 
much more convincing to directly manipulate the function of specific parts of the brain, 
and then measure the effect this has on social choice behavior. This is the approach taken 
in several other highly cited papers in the neuroscience of social decision-making. For 
example, it has repeatedly been observed that temporarily disrupting the functioning 
of the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) using transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS) disrupts the ability of experimental participants to punish other 
people for violating a social norm (e.g. fairness) (Buckholtz et al., 2015; Knoch, Pascual-
Leone, Meyer, Treyer, & Fehr, 2006). Similarly, other researchers have observed that 
increasing neural excitability in the right lateral prefrontal cortex (the same region, but 
bigger) using transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) increased sharing behavior 
in experimental participants, but only if they could be punished by other participants 
for not sharing. Voluntary sharing behavior (i.e. when punishment was not possible) 
decreased with increased excitability in the right lateral PFC. The right (dorso)lateral 
prefrontal cortex, therefore, appears to play a crucial causal role in shaping social choice 
behavior based on social norms and punishment (Sanfey, Stallen, & Chang, 2014). It 
should be noted, however, that the efficacy of transcranial current stimulation methods 
is topic of debate (Underwood, 2016; Vöröslakos et al., 2018).
 Somewhere on the methodological spectrum between structural imaging and 
electromagnetic manipulation we find functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). 
With fMRI, one can track the flow of oxygenated and deoxygenated blood throughout 
the brain, from which the level of neuronal population activity can be inferred at a 
spatial scale of a few millimeters. Thanks to the ability of fMRI to non-invasively 
measure activity in deep subcortical brain structures, which are key components of the 
decision-making system, it is often used in the neuroscience of decision-making. The 
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neuroimaging work described in this thesis was all carried out using fMRI.
 One key drawback of fMRI is its low temporal resolution, which is caused by the slow 
response of blood flow to changes in neural activation. However, by using well-designed 
event-related fMRI experiments, it is still possible to precisely map the brain response 
to a given experimental condition. And although fMRI is correlational in nature, like 
structural brain imaging, converging strands of evidence and cross-validation techniques 
can provide strong evidence for the neural underpinnings of cognitive functions of 
interest.
 Before we can start fleshing out the neurocomputational mechanisms of social 
decision behavior, we need to define what such behavior entails and which psychological 
factors drive it. To do so, I will introduce several economic models for the motives that 
drive our social decisions.
Modeling social choice
When studying why people make decisions that benefit others, it is useful to characterize 
this behavior mathematically. Quantitative models make it easier to compare behavior 
across experiments, and facilitate the disentangling of various causes of the behavior 
of interest. Micro-economic choice models could be great candidates for modeling 
prosocial choice, since they are capable of capturing the choice behavior of individuals 
more generally. However, as Edgeworth wrote in 1881: “the first principle of Economics 
is that every agent is actuated only by self-interest” (Edgeworth, 1881). How can we 
reconcile this principle with the behavior of Wesley Autrey and the kidney-donating 
altruists? The solution is actually quite simple. We only need to assume that an agent’s 
‘self-interest’ can contain more than just his own material payoff. If we do so, an 
agent can act (or rather appear to act) selflessly, as long as his selfless behavior ends up 
maximally satisfying the things he cares about (his ‘preferences’). This solution assumes 
that people can have preferences concerning the distribution of goods, labor et cetera 
over other people, which is trivially true in domains like political decision-making.
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Following this line of reasoning, Kenneth Arrow earned the Nobel memorial prize in 
economics for showing how difficult it is to integrate people’s preferences over ‘social 
states’ (their ‘social preferences’) into appropriate group-level social choice. (Arrow, 1951, 
1977) But we can also use mathematical formulations of social preferences to account 
for the decisions of single individuals that affect only a small number of others. In social 
preference models, we write down mathematically how much subjective value (‘utility’) 
an agent derives from the well-being of other agents. Combining these preferences with 
homo economicus-style concern with one’s own welfare allows us to explain a wide range of 
real-world social behavior using micro-economic modeling tools. Specific assumptions 
about the ‘rationality’ of decision-makers come with these tools (Von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1947), but they lie beyond the scope of this introduction. 
 One famous other-regarding preference is ‘inequity aversion’, which codifies people’s 
preference for fair distributions of payoffs. The associated mathematical utility models 
(Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Rabin, 1993) share the following 
(simplified) structure:
U = M – a*I
That is, the utility (U) an individual derives from a decision that affects both his own 
and another person’s wealth is equal to the increase in his own wealth (M) that results 
from his decision, diminished by the inequity (I) between himself and the other that 
results from his decision. By manipulating the weight parameter a, we can adjust the 
importance of inequity relative to wealth for a decision-maker, which allows us to 
approximate the behavior of many different decision-makers within the framework of 
a single mathematical model. Inequity aversion is a very powerful model, and it can 
help us make sense of everyday prosocial choice. For example, why would you allow 
your little sister to eat her cookie herself, even though you could easily take it from her? 
Because taking her cookie for yourself would create an inequity unbearable for many 
older brothers.
 But wait a minute – is inequity aversion really the only driver of fair cookie divisions 
between siblings? What if your sister hates cookies, or is not hungry at the moment? In 
those cases, you would likely not feel bad eating her cookie in her place, since you account 
for your sister’s own preferences. On the other hand, if you promised your sister a cookie 
yesterday, you might feel worse taking her cookie than you would based on inequity 
aversion alone. That is, you take her expectations into account when making your own 
decisions. This way of thinking is captured in another other-regarding preference: guilt 
aversion (Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 2007). The guilt aversion model can be simplified to:
U = M – a*(E – G)
Chapter 1
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and formalizes the notion that utility may be derived from earning money (or cookies; 
M), but that it can be reduced by disappointing someone else (i.e., giving them (G) 
less than what they expect (E)). As with inequity aversion, we can adjust the weight 
parameter a such that we can best explain the idiosyncratic social interaction between 
your sister and you.
 Inequity aversion, guilt aversion, and greed are but three of the many possible 
psychological motives driving your decision to steal a cookie or not. Other models 
explicitly include the intentions of agents (Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2003; Rabin, 
1993), or simply assume that agents derive utility directly from satisfying another 
person’s preferences (which we might call ‘altruism’; Cox, Friedman, & Sadiraj, 2008). 
Importantly, reputation concerns strongly affect social decision-making too (Dunbar, 
2004; Gluckman, 1963; King-Casas et al., 2005; Knoch, Schunk, Hohmann, Fehr, & 
Knoch, 2009; Sommerfeld, Krambeck, Semmann, & Milinski, 2007). Put together, this 
portfolio of social preference models can explain many facets of real-life social behavior.
 By fitting a single model’s weight parameter(s) to a participant’s social choice 
behavior in a tailored experiment, we can estimate their personal level of a given other-
regarding preference, which helps us study it from a psychological and neural point of 
view. Correlating a unitary other-regarding preference to brain activity in this way has 
led to important insights into the neural underpinnings of social choice behavior (e.g. 
Cappelen et al., 2014; Chang, Smith, Dufwenberg, & Sanfey, 2011; Sanfey, Rilling, 
Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003; Tricomi, Rangel, Camerer, & O’Doherty, 2010). 
In this thesis, I took a different approach. Instead of studying one other-regarding 
preference in isolation, I report evidence that multiple social preferences are needed 
to capture the full range of social decision behavior in a simple laboratory paradigm 
(the Trust Game; Berg, Dickhaut, & Mccabe, 1995) (chapters 2 through 4). I integrate 
multiple other-regarding preferences in one utility model, which I use to map out 
categorical differences in social decision strategy between participants. This approach 
makes it possible to map the various brain systems underlying different social preferences, 
even when the choice outcome of those preferences is the same (chapter 3).
 Additionally, I here describe a well-known modulator of social choice: responsibility. 
Subjective responsibility modulates the degree to which an other-regarding preference 
influences our behavior, as evidenced by the different reparative responses we show to 
inequity that we caused (e.g. stealing a cookie from your sister) and inequity that simply 
exists out in the world (e.g. someone in Minsk stealing a cookie from his sister). This 
modulator can be modeled as a context-dependent change in weight parameter a in 
the utility models outlined above. In chapter 5, I study how ‘diffusion of responsibility’ 
in a group decision (Darley & Latané, 1968; Latane & Dabbs, 1975) affects social 
choice behavior, and extend an existing ‘social impact’ model (Latane, 1981) to help us 
understand it.
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Why do people reciprocate in the trust 
game?
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Abstract
A well-functioning society relies heavily on trust and reciprocity. Up to now, reciprocity 
behavior has been explained in behavioral economics by models that either incorporate 
an individual’s fairness norms (i.e. equity) or the individual’s beliefs about the 
other’s expectations (second-order expectations). Thus far it has been impossible to 
experimentally compare these two alternative explanations for reciprocity, as fairness 
norms are collinear to second-order expectations in the classic Trust Game. To resolve 
this impasse, we present a modified trust game, in which fairness norms and second-
order expectations sometimes prescribe different behavior. We find that both fairness 
norms and second-order expectations are needed to accurately describe the behavior 
across our sample. However, these two motivations differ in importance between 
participants. We propose a novel computational model of trust game reciprocity that 
takes into account both second-order expectations and the trustee’s own fairness norms. 
This model captures between-subjects variance that remains hidden from the commonly 
used social value orientation measure.
Trust Game Reciprocity
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Introduction
In everyday human life, it is nearly impossible to avoid placing some of your own 
future welfare into the hands of others. By the time you have reached your office in the 
morning, dozens of other road users have already refrained from driving into you. And by 
lunchtime, you have already relied on the friendly assistance of a handful of colleagues. 
A well-functioning society, therefore, depends on trust (placing one’s future welfare in 
the hands of others) and reciprocity (honoring others’ trust). This raises the important 
question why our fellow humans so often kindly reciprocate our trust. Imagine a writer 
in a coffee house who asks a stranger to keep an eye on her laptop while she takes a call 
outside. Why can she trust that the stranger will do her this favor? And why would most 
of us agree to reciprocate her trust by guarding her computer?
 Part of the answer to these questions lies in law: it is forbidden to steal a laptop, 
and doing so anyway can result in a loss of money or freedom by means of third-party 
punishment (Buckholtz et al., 2008). Reputation concerns can also drive reciprocity 
behavior: if we believe we will have to collaborate with the coffee house writer in the 
future, it would be unwise to steal her laptop now (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Trivers, 
1971). But in most everyday interactions, the threats of legal action and bad reputation 
are merely hypothetical. We often behave prosocially towards anonymous others, 
seemingly without any reason in particular. In these cases, being prosocial simply feels 
right (Harbaugh, Mayr, & Burghart, 2007). And this, in turn, implies that helping 
others can be intrinsically valuable to us (Camerer, 2003).
 Following this line of reasoning, economists have over the past decennia attempted 
to incorporate social preferences in utility functions describing human choice behavior. 
One class of social preference models posits that humans derive value from equity in 
outcomes between themselves and others, in addition to their own payoff (‘inequity 
aversion’; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). In such models, the 
definition of equity (or ‘fairness’) can be context-dependent (Almas, Cappelen, 
Sørensen, & Tungodden, 2010). Another class of models assumes that humans derive 
negative value from disappointing interaction partners (‘guilt aversion’; Battigalli & 
Dufwenberg, 2007), which drives decision-makers towards prosocial choice. Both 
model types are associated with distinct psychological decision processes: inequity 
aversion assumes that decision-makers focus on the distribution of decision outcomes, 
while guilt aversion revolves around the experience of interpersonal guilt (Baumeister, 
Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994).
 Although inequity aversion and guilt aversion have been well-described, both in 
behavioral work and in neuroimaging (Chang et al., 2011; Tricomi et al., 2010), it is at 
present still unknown what their relative contribution might be to the reciprocation of 
trust in social interactions. An important reason for this impasse lies in the experimental 
paradigm commonly used to study trust and reciprocity: the Trust Game (also known 
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as Investment Game; Berg et al., 1995). A brief description of this paradigm will 
demonstrate why it conflates inequity and guilt aversion.
 In a Trust Game there are two players. The first mover, or Investor, is endowed 
with a number of tokens, while the second mover, the Trustee, starts with nothing. The 
Investor can then decide to invest any number of tokens in the Trustee. This investment 
is multiplied by the experimenter (usually with a factor of 3 or 4) before being sent to the 
Trustee, and both players are aware of this. The Trustee, in turn, gets to decide how much 
of the multiplied investment, if anything, to return to the Investor. If both players in a 
single-shot Trust Game were completely selfish, the Trustee would not return any tokens 
and, foreseeing this, the Investor would never make an investment. In reality, however, 
Investors choose to invest more often than not and Trustees regularly reciprocate the 
Investor’s trust (Johnson & Mislin, 2011). In other words, the players in a Trust Game 
often forgo monetary payoff maximization in favor of trust and reciprocity, even in 
the absence of punishment or bad reputation, which demonstrates the role of social 
preferences.
 Both inequity aversion and guilt aversion can account for the Trustee’s reciprocity 
behavior: an inequity-averse Trustee would need to return a given number of tokens to 
yield equity in outcomes, and a guilt-averse Trustee would infer that the Investor likely 
expects to receive some number of tokens out of the multiplied Investment. In fact, 
since the Investor and the Trustee share all knowledge about the game, the Investor likely 
expects the Trustee to return the number of tokens needed to create equity in outcomes. 
Therefore, the prediction of the inequity aversion and guilt aversion models for Trustee 
reciprocity are very similar, which makes it impossible to deduce from the Trustee’s 
reciprocity behavior which of the two psychological processes drove his decisions.
 To solve this issue, we here introduce a new version of the Trust Game, the Hidden 
Multiplier Trust Game (HMTG; fig. 2.1), in which the Trustor’s expectations deviate 
from the Trustee’s beliefs about equity. In the HMTG, as in the original Trust Game, 
an Investor sends an investment out of a starting endowment to an anonymous Trustee, 
retaining the remainder. The Investor believes the investment will always be multiplied 
by x4. In 50% of the cases, however, the investment is actually multiplied by x2 (25%) or 
x6 (25%). The Trustee learns the true multiplier and is aware of the Investor’s ignorance. 
Thanks to this task structure, the Trustee can infer that the Investor’s expectations are no 
longer aligned with the Trustee’s own beliefs about fair (equitable) behavior. This allows 
us to gauge the motivations underlying the Trustee’s reciprocity behavior.
In this paper, we report on the first experiment using the Hidden Multiplier Trust 
Game. 41 participants played 60 single-shot HMTG trials in the role of Trustee. We first 
explore the participants’ self-reported beliefs about the Investors’ expectations (second-
order expectations) and fairness norms for each investment-multiplier combination, to 
test whether these are indeed conflated in the default x4 condition and separable in x2 
and x6. Next, using a novel computational model that integrates previous formulations 
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of inequity and guilt aversion, we estimate the degree to which our participants followed 
greed, inequity aversion or guilt aversion in their reciprocity decisions. We compare 
the results with those of a related task, the popular Social Value Orientation (SVO) 
task (Van Lange, 1999), which was designed to index prosocial versus proself decision 
tendencies, without specifying the psychological process behind prosocial preferences. 
Can the model describe decision variance not captured in the SVO? We additionally test 
whether responses on a questionnaire measuring trait-level guilt sensitivity (the Guilt 
Inventory; Jones, Schratter, & Kugler, 2000) can predict guilt-averse preferences, to 
better understand whether the ‘guilt’ indexed in economic guilt aversion models aligns 
with this psychological operationalization of guilt. Finally, we discuss our findings in 
light of previous work on social preferences, reciprocity, and social choice in general.
P1 P2
$42$3
Multiplication
x6 instead of x4
P2 has 
4x7=$28
P1 thinks 
I have $28
P1 P2
$30
$12
$3
Reciprocation
Here’s 
$12 back
P1 P2
$3
Investment
Here’s $7
(I keep $3)
$7
Figure 2.1. Schematic representation of the Hidden Multiplier Trust Game. 
10 tokens are endowed to P1, the Investor, who is anonymous to P2. P1 then invests any number of these 10 tokens 
in P2, the Trustee. After P2 learns the multiplier effective on the current trial, he gets the chance to return any number 
of tokens from the multiplied amount to P1, but does not have to. In the traditional Trust Game, the multiplier is 
always x4. In the Hidden Multiplier Trust Game, the multiplier is sometimes x2 (25% of trials) or x6 (25%). P2 in the 
schematic follows guilt aversion: he returns the number of tokens he believes P1 to expect.
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Methods
Participants
44 participants (mean age 22.7 y ± 2.6 y; 31 females) were recruited from the Nijmegen 
student body through an online platform. They participated in the experiment between 
February 18 and April 14, 2015. All participants were either born in the Netherlands or 
had moved there before the age of three. Their native language was Dutch, although two 
considered themselves multilingual with English or Turkish as their second language. 
None were dyslexic. The data of 3 participants had to be excluded from the analysis 
because they did not believe the other players were real, because they had learned about 
the Trust Game in an economics course, or because they had met the experimenter 
before. 41 participants remained in the final sample (mean age 22.5 y ± 2.3 y; 30 
females).
Procedure
All participants were brought to a behavioral lab space at the Donders Centre for 
Cognitive Neuroimaging. After having given written informed consent, the participants 
were seated behind a computer that ran the experiment. They read instructions, carried 
out tasks and completed questionnaires in the order specified below. At all times, they 
had the opportunity to ask questions for clarification. Participation took approximately 
75 minutes. The experimental setup was approved by the local ethics board (CMO 
Arnhem-Nijmegen).
 The participants started by reading the instructions of the main task: The Hidden 
Multiplier Trust Game. The first part of these instructions concerned just the standard 
Trust Game, as described in the Introduction of this paper. Once they understood the 
standard Trust Game, participants were asked about the decisions they would make in the 
role of Investor: how much would you invest in a single-shot game with an anonymous 
Trustee, and how many tokens would you expect back? The participants were informed 
that these answers might be used as real investments in future Trust Game experiments, 
and if so that they would receive additional payment based on their payoff in those 
future experiments. If they agreed with this proposal, the experimenter asked whether 
he could take the participants’ photo for use in future experiments, presentations and/
or publications. After this interaction with the experimenter, participants read the 
additional instructions needed to understand the specifics of the Hidden Multiplier 
Trust Game.
Task
The participants played 60 rounds of the Hidden Multiplier Trust Game (see Introduction) 
in the role of Trustee, with a different anonymous Investor each round. The Investors 
were participants in an earlier Trust Game experiment (single-shot, fully anonymous, x4 
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multiplier; Chang et al., 2011). 60 investments from that experiment, following roughly 
the same distribution from 0 to 10 tokens as the complete set of investments from that 
experiment, were used as investments in the current study. The 60 investments were 
distributed across the three multipliers as evenly as possible while still maintaining the 
original distribution of investments within each multiplier level (fig. 2.2). The resulting 
set of 60 investment-multiplier pairs was presented to each participant in random order. 
Due to a programming error the order in which the investment-multiplier pairs were 
presented was the same for 36 of the 41 participants. The 5 remaining participants saw 
the investment-multiplier pairs in a unique order. No order effects were detected when 
comparing the same-order group to the unique-order group.
 To strengthen the belief that the participants were playing with real people as 
Trustors, each trial started with a screen presenting the other player with a player number 
and a blurred photograph. The photographs were heavily blurred to avoid any effects of 
facial features on reciprocity behavior. The pictures were taken from the Radboud Faces 
Database (Langner et al., 2010). The Trustees indicated how much of the multiplied 
investment they wished to return to the Investor using a mouse-controlled slider, which 
was initialized at a random starting point on each trial.
 Several days after the experiment, one of the 60 game rounds was randomly selected 
for payment. The participant received the number of tokens earned in this round, 
converted to euro by an exchange rate of €0.40 per token, in addition to a €10 base fee. 
An administrator not involved in the study wired the total amount to the participant 
several weeks after the experiment. The participants were informed about the payment 
system at the start of the experiment. The participants believed that the Investor of 
the randomly selected game round would also receive a payment proportional to the 
number of tokens they had earned in that round, but in fact they had already been paid 
when they participated in the original experiment (Chang et al., 2011).
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Figure 2.2. Distribution of Trustor investments for the x2, x4 and x6 conditions.
Additional measures
After playing the HMTG, 40 of the HMTG trials in which the investment was non-
zero were sequentially presented to the participants in summary form, detailing the 
investment, multiplier, and amount returned by the Trustee. The participant was then 
asked to indicate, on mouse-controlled sliders, how satisfied they were about this trial 
(from ‘very dissatisfied’ to ‘very satisfied’), how guilty they felt about the trial (from 
‘not guilty at all’ to ‘very guilty’), and how guilty they would have felt if they had 
returned a randomly selected other amount (from ‘not guilty at all’ to ‘very guilty’). 
This ‘counterfactual amount returned’ was drawn from the range between [amount 
returned –  5] to [amount returned + 5]. After these guilt ratings, the participants 
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completed a questionnaire about their fairness norms and second-order expectations 
for each unique investment-multiplier combination in the HMTG (fig. 2.3). This 
questionnaire also elicited their beliefs about what other people would find fair and 
what other participants would do in the role of player B (Trustee). Next, the participants 
completed computerized versions of the Social Value Orientation questionnaire (slider 
version; based on Murphy, Ackermann, & Handgraaf (2011)) and the Guilt Inventory 
(Jones et al., 2000). Finally, they completed a demographics questionnaire on paper and 
answered several reflective questions about the experiment. One of these questions was 
“How happy do you think the other players would be with the tokens you sent back 
to them?” If at this point a participant did not express disbelief that the other players 
were real and instead gave a serious answer about the feelings of the other players, it was 
concluded that this participant believed that the other players were real. One participant 
was rejected from the analysis based on this question.
For a multiplier of 2: 
 
Investment 
Player A: 
Player 
B now 
has … 
tokens: 
Player A 
expects … 
tokens back: 
It is fair for 
Player B to 
return … 
tokens: 
Other people 
find it fair for 
Player B to 
return … tokens: 
Most other people 
would return … 
tokens in the role 
of Player B: 
1 2     
2 4     
3 6     
4 8     
5 10     
6 12     
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Excerpt from the questionnaire used to probe participants’ fairness norms and 
second-order expectations in the Hidden Multiplier Trust Game
Text translated from Dutch.
Analysis
Choice data from 41 participants was analyzed using Matlab 2013a (The Mathworks, 
Natrick, MA, United States), R version 3.2.3, and Python version 2.7.12. For the 
analysis of fairness norms, second-order expectations and reciprocity behavior, functions 
for descriptive statistics and regression analysis were taken from the Statistics Toolbox 
for Matlab.
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We developed a computational model to formalize the reciprocity motives of the second 
player in the game (the Trustee). Integrating previous models of fairness concerns, guilt 
aversion, and greed, our Motivational Mixture Model posits that the Trustee’s utility results 
from a trade-off between financial self-interest (payoff) and social preferences (Guilt/
Unfairness), weighted by a greed parameter (Theta; Θ). We defined the Trustee’s payoff as:
π2 = (I * M – S2) / (I * M)
where I is the Investor’s investment amount, M is the multiplier known only to the 
Trustee, and S describes the Trustee’s strategy (i.e., the amount of money to return in the 
game). We defined the Trustee’s experienced unfairness as:
Unfairness2 = ((F2(S2)) – S2) / (I * M))
2
where F2(S2)) refers to the Trustee’s beliefs about a fair Trustee strategy. By taking this 
fairness norm from self-reported data, and thus allowing it to vary between subjects, 
we follow Tungodden and colleagues (e.g. Almås, Cappelen, Sørensen, & Tungodden 
(2010); Cappelen, Hole, Sørensen, & Tungodden (2007)) rather than Fehr & Schmidt 
(1999) or Bolton & Ockenfels (2000). We used a nonlinear version of guilt aversion 
after (Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 2007):
Guilt2 = ((E2(E1(S2)) – S2) / (4 * I))
2
where E2(E1(S2)) refers to the Trustee’s second-order belief about the Investor’s 
expectations of the Trustee’s strategy. On each trial, the social preference term in the 
Motivational Mixture Model consists of a mix of guilt aversion and unfairness aversion, 
weighted by model parameter phi (Φ). The Trustee thus makes decisions that maximize 
the following utility function:
  
U2 = Θ * π2 – (1 – Θ) * (Φ * Guilt2 + (1 – Φ) * Unfairness2)
Best-fitting model parameters were estimated for each participant by minimizing the 
sum of squared error of the model prediction over the 60 trials using the least_squares 
function in the Optimize toolkit for Scipy version 0.19.1. Theta was bounded to [0, 0.5] 
and phi to [0, 1].
 We compared the performance of the Motivational Mixture Model to that of the 
two component models (guilt and unfairness) weighted relative to payoff, with all 
components defined as above. The two alternative models for this analysis were thus:
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Guilt aversion model:  U2 = Θ * π2 – (1 – Θ) * Guilt2
Unfairness aversion model: U2 = Θ * π2 – (1 – Θ) * Unfairness2
Results
Second-order expectations and fairness norms diverge in the x2 and x6 conditions
As a manipulation check, we fi rst tested whether self-reported fairness norms and second-
order expectations diverged in the two ‘hidden multiplier’ conditions of the HMTG: 
x2 and x6. Th is was indeed the case (fi g. 2.4). In the x4 condition, fairness norms and 
second-order expectations were not statistically distinguishable for investment amounts 
greater than 1 (paired-sample t-test Bonferroni-corrected p > 0.05). In x2, the two were 
always signifi cantly diff erent at Bonferroni-correct p < 0.001, and in x6 the same was true 
for investments greater than 3 (p < 0.001). Th e diff erences between fairness norms and 
second-order expectations were signifi cantly greater in x2 and x6 than in x4 (post-hoc 
paired-sample t-tests after one-way ANOVA, Bonferroni-corrected: x2 > x4 p < 0.001 
and x6 > x4 p < 0.001). Th is confi rms the added value of the hidden multiplier element 
of the HMTG: it elicits diverging fairness norms and second-order expectations, which 
allows us to measure which of the two is most predictive of reciprocity behavior.
Figure 2.4. Fairness norms and second-order expectations diverge in the x2 and x6 
conditions.
Fairness norms are slightly more selfi sh than inequity aversion theory
Next, we tested whether the participants’ self-reported fairness norms were similar to the 
predictions of the Fehr-Schmidt inequity aversion model (i.e., equality in payoff s). If this 
would be the case, we would fi rstly expect fairness norms to be higher in x6 and lower 
in x2 than in x4. Th is indeed turned out to be the case (mixed-eff ects multiple linear 
regression model with investment (mean-centered), multiplier and their interaction as 
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fi xed and random eff ects: x2 vs. x4 T = -18.58, p < 0.001; x6 vs. x4 T = 10.13, p < 
0.001). Secondly, self-reported fairness norms were strongly correlated with the inequity 
aversion prediction (overall Pearson r = 0.933, p < 0.001; mean r per subject = 0.960 +- 
0.045), suggesting that participants derive fairness norms from equity theory. However, 
fairness norms were not identical to the equity prediction. A simple regression of fairness 
norms onto trial-by-trial inequity aversion predictions yielded a signifi cant intercept at 
1.825 (p < 0.001) and a signifi cant slope of 0.791 (p < 0.001). Th e slope variable was 
signifi cantly lower than 1 (Student’s t-test, t(40) = –7.79, p < 0.001). Th is indicated 
that fairness norms started at a higher baseline than equity predictions yet increased on 
average with 0.791 game tokens per token increase of the equity prediction (fi g. 2.5). In 
other words, for an investment of 9 tokens and higher, what people fi nd fair in our study 
is on average slightly more selfi sh than the pure inequity aversion prediction.
Figure 2.5. Self-reported fairness norms follow pure inequity aversion predictions
Mult: multiplier.
Reciprocity decisions are aff ected by social preferences
Having characterized the self-reported fairness norms and second-order expectations 
of our participants, we moved to analyzing their game decisions. As a fi rst step, we 
tested whether the participants in our sample were at all motivated by social preferences 
(return amount > 0) in addition to simple greed (return amount = 0). To this end, 
we tested whether the money sent by Trustees to Trustors was greater than zero. As 
expected, the Trustees returned non-zero amounts to the Trustors: on average 31% (x2), 
27% (x4) and 24% (x6) of the multiplied Investment (one-sample t-test p < 0.001 for 
all three conditions). Th is fi nding was confi rmed using a mixed-eff ects multiple linear 
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regression model of amount returned with fixed and random effects for investment, 
multiplier (categorical) and their interaction. This model contained a significant 
intercept, significant positive slope for investment amount, and significant main effects 
for x2 (negative) and x6 (positive) (both dummy-coded relative to x4) (all p < 0.001). 
These findings indicate that participants return more money to Trustors that sent a 
greater investment, and that they return less in x2 and more in x6 compared to x4 (fig. 
2.6, left panel). Since second-order expectations (Trustee’s beliefs about the Trustor’s 
expectations) are the same between the three conditions, this latter finding is evidence 
that Trustees are sensitive to the total amount of money available in a game round, 
which is in line with the inequity aversion model and fairness concerns.
Figure 2.6. Hidden Multiplier Trust Game decisions by the Trustee
Left panel: box plots of amounts returned by Trustees. Mean amounts returned in each condition are significantly 
greater than zero (p < 0.001 for all conditions). Note that each box contains multiple subjects and investment levels. 
Right panel: share returned by Trustee (share = amount returned / (investment * multiplier)).
When transforming amount returned by Trustee into share returned by Trustee (share 
returned = amount returned / (investment * multiplier)), a large spread of observations 
appears in the x2 condition (fig 2.6, right panel). While part of this variance is likely 
explained by the different investment levels that are collapsed together in this plot, part 
of it may also be due to variation between subjects in their responses to the different 
multipliers. By plotting simple linear models for each subject’s behavior in each condition 
(investment against share returned), we can get more insight in these between-subject 
differences (fig. 2.7). It immediately becomes clear that there is an especially large spread 
of shares returned over subjects in the x2 condition. Some subjects return no money 
to the Investor at all; others return nothing when the investment is low but everything 
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when investment was high; others always return a large share (more than 50%) of what 
they received to the Investor. Note that the Y axis of this plot runs up to 1, indicating 
that some subjects sometimes sacrifi ced all the money they received (investment * 
multiplier) and sent it all back to the Investor. To understand why subjects show this 
behavior, it is useful to plot their behavior at the trial level and compare it with the 
theoretical predictions of guilt aversion, inequity aversion, and greed.
Figure 2.7. Hidden Multiplier Trust Game decisions, by subject.
Diff erent subjects appear to rely on diff erent social preferences
Figure 2.8 shows the behavior of four subjects on the HMTG (B), along with the mean 
self-reported second-order expectations and fairness norms (A). Th is representation 
shows that diff erent subjects behave in line with diff erent ‘moral guidelines’ in this task: 
some subjects follow second-order expectations (guilt aversion), some follow fairness 
norms (inequity aversion), some are greedy and return no money to the Investor, and 
some show an intermediate pattern of behavior. We used the Motivational Mixture 
Model to quantitatively capture these between-subject diff erences.
Motivational Mixture Model increases explained variance in behavior
We fi t the Motivational Mixture Model as described under Methods to the behavior of 
each subject. Overall model fi t was better for our motivational mixture model than for 
the component models of guilt aversion and unfairness aversion (diff erence in mean 
sum of squared error per subject for GA-mix: m = –363.7, t(40) = 13.19, p < 0.001; 
UA-mix: m = –293.3, t(40) = 3.94, p < 0.001). Th is is not surprising, since GA and UA 
are nested within the (more complex) Mixture model. When penalizing the model fi t 
for the number of free parameters by computing the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC), model fi t is still better for the Mixture model compared to both GA and UA, but 
only the diff erence with GA is signifi cant (GA-mix: p < 0.001; UA-mix: p = 0.23). At 
this point it is worth noting that we were not aiming to provide a new or better model 
for reciprocity decision-making than available in the literature. We merely attempted to 
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integrate existing models, and gauge what the infl uence of various motives on reciprocity 
behavior is. Th e fact that the model captures more of the variance in behavior (as indexed 
inversely by the sum of squared error, SSE) is therefore suffi  cient for our current goals.
A
B
Figure 2.8. Comparison between second-order expectations, fairness norms, and subject 
behavior 
A. Summary of mean self-reported second-order expectations and fairness norms, for comparison with single-subject 
data in B. Lines are regression lines, shaded zones are bootstrapped 95% confi dence intervals (1000 iterations). In left 
panel (second-order expectations), the three conditions overlap. B. Four example subjects in the Hidden Multiplier 
Trust Game. Subject 135 appears to follow second-order expectations; 144 follows fairness norms; 163 shows an 
intermediate pattern; 171 is greedy. Downward blue triangles: x2 condition; orange squares: x4; upward green triangles: 
x6. Shaded zones are bootstrapped 95% confi dence intervals around the regression line (1000 iterations).
Figure 2.9. Model fi t. 
Left: sum of squared error (SSE) of best model predictions from each model type. Right: Bayesian Information 
Criterion based on SSE, number of observations, and number of free parameters. Bars indicate means over subjects; 
error bars are bootstrapped 95% confi dence intervals (1000 iterations). GA: guilt aversion. UA: unfairness aversion. 
Mixture: Motivational Mixture Model.
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Model recovery test confi rms model identifi ability
To test whether the Motivational Mixture Model was uniquely identifi able throughout 
its parameter space, and thus test the robustness of fi tted parameters, we created 20 
pseudo-participants with random, known values for theta and phi. We then simulated 
their behavior in the HMTG and fi tted the motivational mix model 20 times to each 
pseudo-behavior set. Th is resulted in 20 sets of 20 best-fi tting parameter pairs, which we 
could then compare to the ground truth values for theta and phi. Th e result is plotted in 
fi gure 2.10. Model parameter theta was very precisely recovered from the simulations: 
the mean diff erence between the 20 recovered thetas and the true thetas was very small 
(m = 0.0000293) and statistically indistinguishable from zero (Student’s t(19) = 0.089, 
n.s.). Th e same was true for phi (m = 0.0054, Student’s t(19) = 1.08, n.s.). Model 
parameter phi becomes slightly less well estimable as theta goes up (linear regression of 
standard deviation of 20 recovered phis onto true theta: slope = 0.059, r(18) = 0.70, p 
< 0.001). Th is can be understood by considering that the infl uence of social preferences 
(guilt/unfairness aversion) on behavior is decreased as theta (greed) goes up; therefore, 
variation in phi at the high theta range is less easily detected in behavior than at the low 
theta range.
Figure 2.10. Parameter recovery results for the motivational mix model.
White squares with dark crosses: true theta-phi pairs. Grey dots: recovered theta-phi pairs. Estimability of phi drops 
slightly with increasing theta.
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Computational model reveals subject-specifi c social preferences
Figure 2.11 displays the same four subjects as in fi gure 2.8 above, together with the 
predictions of the best-fi tting mixture model. In these four, subject 135 is the most 
guilt-averse (highest phi), followed by 163, and fi nally 144 (lowest phi). Subject 171 is 
greedy (maximum theta at 0.5). Th e model parameters theta and phi thus formalize the 
intuition that diff erent subjects follow diff erent reciprocity motives to a diff erent degree.
 Th e best-fi tting theta-phi pair for each subject is plotted in fi gure 2.12. Th e spread of 
subjects throughout parameter space confi rms that the Hidden Multiplier Trust Game 
was an eff ective way to elicit behavioral diff erences from subjects with diff erent social 
preferences. From this plot it becomes clear that there were two brazenly greedy subjects 
(theta > 0.4), and among the others most subjects were on the guilt-averse side of the 
spectrum (high phi).
Figure 2.12. Best-fi tting motivational mixture model parameters for all subjects. 
Th e two greedy subjects end up at the rightmost end of the spectrum, at maximum theta (0.5).
Social value orientation predicts theta, not phi
A commonly used measure of social preferences is Social Value Orientation (SVO; Van 
Lange, 1999). Th is measure captures the motivational balance between egoistic (‘pro-
self ’) and altruistic (‘pro-social’) concerns. While it is a good measure of this balance, 
it is not informative of the diff erent social preferences that may give rise to prosocial 
tendencies, such as guilt aversion and inequity aversion. In line with this interpretation, 
we found in our sample that SVO score, as measured on a computerized ‘slider measure’ 
(Murphy et al., 2011), was predictive of theta (regression slope of SVO onto theta, B 
= –33.7, r(39) = –0.369, p = 0.018) but not of phi (B = –7.18, r(39) = –0.207, n.s.) 
(fi gure 2.13). As such, the parameter phi in our motivational mix model captures social 
preference information that was not measurable using the SVO.
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Figure 2.13. Relationship between model parameters and social value orientation (SVO). 
Social value orientation is informative of model parameter theta (greed; left panel) but not of phi (balance between 
guilt aversion and inequity aversion; right panel). Each point is a subject; solid line is regression line; shaded patches are 
95% confi dence intervals for regression line; red dotted horizontal line indicates the cutoff  between prosocials (SVO ≥ 
22.45 degrees) and individualists (SVO < 22.45 degrees).
No relationship between guilt inventory and model parameters
Th e Guilt Inventory consists of questions in three categories: state guilt, trait guilt, and 
moral standards. When correlating the category scores at the subject level with MMM 
parameters theta and phi, there was only a signifi cant positive relationship between 
moral standards and model parameter theta (p < 0.05, Bonferroni-corrected). However, 
this relationship was driven by the two subjects with theta > 0.4: when removing these 
subjects, the relationship was not signifi cant. Since the two subjects were outliers 
according to two common norms (two standard deviations from the mean, and 1.5 
times the interquartile range away from the 75th percentile), we conclude that we have 
no evidence that a subject’s theta should be related to his moral standards.
Discussion
In this paper, we presented a novel experimental paradigm that can be used to gauge 
the infl uence of various social preferences on reciprocity behavior. We showed that self-
reported fairness norms and second-order expectations – the inputs into the classic social 
preference models of inequity aversion and guilt aversion – are confl ated in the standard 
Trust Game, which makes it impossible to deduce which of the two motives drove 
Trustee reciprocity behavior. In the x2 and x6 conditions of the Hidden Multiplier Trust 
Game, however, inequity aversion and guilt aversion make clearly diff erent predictions. 
By fi tting the robustly identifi able Motivational Mixture Model to the observed Trustee 
behavior and comparing its performance to the unitary inequity and guilt aversion 
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models, we show that reciprocity behavior across a group of participants is best explained 
by allowing the relative influence of both motives to vary across participants. This is a 
key finding, since it demonstrates that studying the classic Trust Game through the lens 
of a single social preference can lead to false conclusions about the psychological drivers 
of human reciprocity behavior. 
 As expected, participant behavior on the commonly used Social Value Orientation 
task (Van Lange, 1999) was significantly correlated with the greed parameter derived 
from the Motivational Mixture Model: greedier participants were more pro-self on the 
SVO. This finding supports the construct validity of the greed parameter of our model. 
The second parameter of our model, however, which controls the relative influence of 
guilt and inequity aversion, did not correlate with participant scores on the SVO.
 Neither of the model parameters correlated with participant scores on the Guilt 
Inventory. This null finding can be interpreted in two ways. First, it is possible that our 
model falsely indexes the relative importance of guilt aversion for subject behavior. Second, 
it is possible that the meaning of the word ‘guilt’ in the economic guilt aversion model is 
different from the meaning of the word ‘guilt’ in the Guilt Inventory operationalization. 
Both explanations are supported by different arguments. The first explanation is supported 
by the observation that at intermediate levels of theta (0.1 <= theta <= 0.3) the behavior 
pattern predicted by the Motivational Mixture Model at phi > 0.5 is only guilt-averse 
in the x4 and x6 conditions, but not in x2 (fig. 2.S1). In the x2 condition, the behavior 
appears to be in line with inequity aversion. This switching behavioral pattern fits in the 
guilt aversion nor the inequity aversion framework completely. Future work will need 
to explore this possibility that a third type of social preference is at play in the Hidden 
Multiplier Trust Game, and we take a first step in this direction in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
 The second explanation is supported by the fact that guilt is defined differently in 
the economic guilt aversion model and the Guilt Inventory. The model-derived concept 
of guilt is decidedly interpersonal, following Baumeister et al. (1994) and Battigalli & 
Dufwenberg (2007). The trait guilt items in the Guilt Inventory, on the other hand, are 
not social in nature, and instead focus on general feelings of regret about one’s life (one 
example item of the questionnaire is ‘I have made a lot of mistakes in my life’). While 
the relationship between personality traits and trait guilt has been investigated (Jones & 
Kugler, 1993), there is no clear link with interpersonal guilt feelings. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that scores from the Guilt Inventory have no bearing on our operationalization 
of interpersonal guilt. More generally, it is unknown which personality traits, life 
experiences, and neural traits might play a role in shaping one’s moral motives, and 
how stable they might be when repeatedly playing the Hidden Multiplier Trust Game. 
Indeed, the observed between-subject differences in social preferences for reciprocity 
raise the critical questions what determines one’s moral decision strategy, and whether it 
is stable over time. In Chapter 4 of this thesis, we report on two experiments aimed at 
answering these questions.
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Naturally, a game with asymmetric information, such as the one presented here, is 
not the only situation in which different moral motives predict different outcomes. 
Many everyday moral decisions belong to this class. Consider political decisions, which 
often require trade-offs between conflicting moral goals: these may be settled in vastly 
different ways by persons with different social preferences. For example, a person who 
values fairness over guilt aversion might turn away a person in need if helping him 
would damage the greater good. As such, the variety in moral motives unearthed here 
may relate to the between-subject differences in ‘moral foundations’ described in social 
psychology (Graham et al., 2011) and to differences between types of moral reasoning 
(e.g. deontological versus utilitarian; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 
2001). Studying the connection between moral foundations, moral reasoning, and 
experimentally elicited moral strategies may prove to be a fruitful line of future research.
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Supplementary Figures
Figure 2.S1. Simulations of the Motivational Mixture Model at equidistant points throughout 
the theta-phi parameter space.
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substrates of moral strategies in social 
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1 Donders Institute, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
2 Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, USA
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Abstract
In society, different people might employ a unique set of moral principles to guide 
social decision-making, thus expressing a specific ‘moral strategy’. Which computations 
characterize different moral strategies, and how might they be instantiated in the human 
brain? We tackle these questions in the context of reciprocity decisions. We show that 
different participants spontaneously and consistently follow categorically different moral 
strategies when making reciprocity decisions in a modified Trust Game. We capitalize on 
this endogenous between-subject variation to identify the unique neural substrates of 
each strategy, by mapping an integrative computational model of reciprocity decisions 
directly onto the brain with inter-subject representational similarity analysis. This 
approach reveals markedly different neural substrates for guilt aversion and inequity 
aversion, even in a task condition where the two yield the same decision outcome. 
Moreover, we identify a new strategy, moral opportunism, by which participants 
adaptively switch between guilt aversion and inequity aversion in their behavior, and 
also switch between the corresponding multi-voxel activity patterns in the brain. These 
findings suggest that brains cluster together in their multivariate representation of social 
decision information when the subjective interpretation of this information is similar, 
which provides a valuable view into understanding how different people may utilize 
different moral principles.
Neural Substrates of Moral Strategies
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Introduction
“Do not do unto others as you would that they should do unto you. Their tastes may 
not be the same.” – George Bernard Shaw (Shaw, 1903)
It is an age-old moral adage that one should treat others as one would like to be treated 
(the ‘golden rule’). Heated political debates on issues like immigration and health care, 
however, demonstrate that one can easily infuriate others by treating them according to 
one’s own moral views. Often, the underlying theme of such debates is not policy, but 
rather the principle by which moral decisions are made (Greene, 2013; Haidt, 2001). 
For example, should we prioritize the principle of property or of equity; of solidarity or 
freedom? In diverse societies, different individuals may employ a different set of such 
fundamental priorities, thus expressing a particular ‘moral strategy’. Such a strategy 
likely shapes not just political decisions but also behavior in everyday social interactions. 
In the present study, we sought to computationally characterize several distinct moral 
strategies in the context of reciprocity decisions, and thereby understand how different 
strategies are instantiated in the human brain.
 Multiple moral motives have been proposed to explain reciprocity behavior, 
including preferences for consequentialism (Mill, 1863), in which people seek fairness 
in outcomes (inequity aversion (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), 
and sentimentalism (Smith, 1759), in which people are motivated by feelings such 
as guilt in order to avoid harming others (guilt aversion; Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 
2007) (Yu, Shen, Yin, Blue, & Chang, 2015). While previous neuroscientific 
investigations of these motivations have identified candidate brain regions involved 
in their computation, such as the anterior insula (AI), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(VMPFC) for inequity aversion (Haruno & Frith, 2010; Hsu, Anen, & Quartz, 2008; 
Sanfey et al., 2003; Tricomi et al., 2010), and AI, supplementary motor area (SMA), 
DLPFC, and temporoparietal junction (TPJ) for guilt aversion (Chang et al., 2011), 
several important questions remain open. Firstly, in most laboratory paradigms, guilt 
aversion and inequity aversion yield the same behavioral predictions, obfuscating 
which prosocial motivation was at play in the decision-maker’s mind (as noted by 
Hein, Morishima, Leiberg, Sul, & Fehr (2016) and Nihonsugi, Ihara, & Haruno 
(2015)). Therefore, an outstanding question is whether these two motivations can be 
uncoupled behaviorally. Secondly, the stability of moral strategies is largely unknown. 
Do people behave consistently across different instances of moral dilemmas, or is 
their decision-making a product of the particular context they are facing? Finally, 
and crucially, previous neuroimaging studies have averaged measurements across 
participants, potentially masking individual differences in implicit moral reasoning, 
and hence obscuring strategy-specific features of the moral brain. Can we identify 
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brain representations involved in processing computations specific to guilt aversion 
and inequity aversion? And can we use these to gain deeper insights into the nature of 
social decision-making?
 To address these questions, we designed the Hidden Multiplier Trust Game (HMTG; 
fig. 3.1), which can elicit behavioral differences in the decision to reciprocate trust 
contingent on an individual’s moral strategy. In addition, we developed a computational 
model that can identify distinct moral strategies, including behavior patterns that shift 
across moral strategies depending on the particular context. Finally, we sought to 
identify brain processes associated with different moral strategies using methods that 
leverage endogenous variation across participants.
 Fifty-seven participants played the HMTG while their brain activity was recorded 
using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). On each trial of the HMTG, 
an anonymous Investor can send any number of 10 game tokens to the Trustee (the 
participant in the scanner), retaining the remainder. As in traditional Trust Games (Berg 
et al., 1995), the Investor believes his investment will be multiplied by a fixed factor 
by the experimenter (here x4) before being transferred to the Trustee. However, in the 
HMTG, only the Trustee knows that the actual multiplier alternates between x6 (25% 
of trials), x4 (50% of trials) and x2 (25% of trials). Crucially, the Trustee is aware of the 
Investor’s ignorance as to the actual multiplier, and knows that the Investor believes the 
multiplier is x4 on every trial. Therefore, on 25% of trials (the x6 multiplier) the Trustee 
has more tokens than the Investor believes, and on 25% of trials (x2) they possess fewer 
tokens than the Investor thinks. Following the transfer, the Trustee now can choose 
to return any number of tokens from the multiplied investment to the Investor, but, 
importantly, does not have to do so. The tokens are redeemed for actual money at the 
end of the experiment (see Supplementary Methods).
 Due to the information asymmetry between the two players in the HMTG, different 
moral strategies predict different decisions for the Trustee when the multiplier is x2 
or x6. A guilt-averse Trustee, eager to match the Investor’s expectations (Battigalli & 
Dufwenberg, 2007), should always return the number of tokens that were expected 
based on the Investor’s belief in a fixed x4 multiplier, irrespective of the actual multiplier 
employed on that trial. An inequity-averse Trustee however, keen to ensure an even split 
(Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), will instead base his decision on 
the total number of tokens he receives – which depends on the actual multiplier used – 
and then pursue an equal division between the Investor and himself. A third expected 
moral strategy is greed, which simply predicts that one retains as many tokens as possible. 
And importantly, our game also allows for identification of a fourth, context-based 
moral strategy, which we term moral opportunism. Here, we predict a Trustee would be 
inequity-averse in the x2 condition but guilt-averse in x6, thus always following a moral 
rule, but one that is the most financially beneficial at any given time. At first glance, such 
an opportunistic strategy would appear peculiar, since it consistently minimizes neither 
guilt nor inequity, and indeed leaves the Trustee with fewer game tokens than a simple 
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Figure 3.1. Task.
A. Schematic representation of the Hidden Multiplier Trust Game. P1 is the investor; P2 is the Trustee. The 
participants in the current study always played as Trustee. B. Trial timeline. The participant was instructed to make his 
decision during the Decision screen, and to use the Response screen only for carrying out the behavioral response.
greed strategy. However, the moral opportunism prediction follows from the notion 
that some decision-makers might not follow context-independent moral heuristics, 
but rather decide flexibly which course of action in a given situation is both morally 
justifiable and maximally lucrative.
 To more clearly distinguish these various moral strategies, we developed a 
computational model to formalize the reciprocity motives of the second player (the 
Trustee) in the game. Integrating previous models of inequity aversion, guilt aversion, and 
greed, our Moral Strategy Model posits that the Trustee’s utility results from a trade-off 
between financial self-interest (monetary payoff) and social preferences (Guilt/Inequity), 
weighted by a greed parameter (Theta; Θ). We define the Trustee’s payoff  π2 = (I * M2 – 
S2) / (I * M2), where I is the Investor’s investment amount, M2 is the multiplier known 
only to the Trustee, and S2 describes the Trustee’s strategy (i.e., the amount of money to 
return in the game). We used previous formulations of inequity aversion, Inequity2 = ((I 
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* M2 – S2) / (10 – I + I * M2) - ½)
2 (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000), and a nonlinear version 
of guilt aversion, Guilt2 = ((E2(E1(S2)) – S2) / (E1(M1) * I))
2 (Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 
2007; Dufwenberg & Gneezy, 2000), where E2(E1(S2)) refers to the Trustee’s second-
order belief about the Investor’s expectations of the Trustee’s strategy and E1(M1) refers 
to the Investor’s belief about the multiplier (always x4). To maximize generalizability of 
our model, we kept these second-order expectations equal across participants by setting 
them to half the amount the Investor believes the Trustee has (E2(E1(S2)) = ½ * E1(M1) 
* I). Self-report data confirmed that this is a good representation of the Trustees’ average 
second-order expectations (see Supplementary Fig. 3.1), and so future work will be able 
to use the same proxy. On each trial, the social preference term in the Moral Strategy 
Model consists of either guilt aversion or inequity aversion, and by default (at Phi (Φ) 
= 0) the model selects whichever of the two motives yields the smallest loss in utility. As 
a consequence of this structure, the model can accommodate the contextual preferences 
found in moral opportunism, as it allows the Trustee to ignore guilt in the x2 condition 
and inequity in x6. If Φ deviates from 0, however, decisions are biased towards moral 
consistency in the guilt-averse (Φ < 0) or inequity-averse (Φ > 0) direction. The Trustee 
thus makes decisions that maximize the following utility function:
 U2 = Θ * π2 – (1 – Θ) * min(Guilt2
 
+ Φ, Inequity2
 
– Φ)               (1)
It is important to note that the Moral Strategy Model cannot be estimated from 
behavior in a traditional Trust Game, where the behavioral patterns of guilt aversion, 
inequity aversion, and moral opportunism are aligned (see the x4 condition simulations 
in Fig. 3.2A), which in turn makes the phi parameter unidentifiable. Determining a 
participant’s moral strategy therefore requires fitting the model to behavior throughout 
all conditions of the hidden multiplier task.
Results
Behavioral and modeling results
To demonstrate that the Moral Strategy Model can accurately characterize each of the 
four predicted moral strategies, we simulated Trustee behavior in our task by inputting 
the investment and multiplier amounts for each trial, and varying the two free parameters 
(theta and phi) within the parameter bounds. This yielded predicted behavior across all 
of the different contexts of the task for various parameters settings of the model, and fig. 
3.2A shows that all four predicted moral strategies are indeed represented at different 
points in this two-dimensional parameter space. To identify the boundaries that divide 
the parameter space into the four different strategies, we used hierarchical clustering to 
group the simulations based on similarity, as parameters that yield similar behavioral 
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predictions should be associated with the same strategy (fig. 3.2A, central plot, colored 
zones). Thus, the strategy clustering was defined solely from the model simulation, 
without relying on any experimental data, ensuring that the cluster boundaries are not 
biased by the distribution of strategies we observed in our sample of participants.
 After locating the cluster boundaries in the two-dimensional parameter space, we 
examined the variation in behavior exhibited by participants in the task by separately 
fitting the Moral Strategy Model to each participant’s full behavior set (details in 
Supplementary Methods). The resulting theta-phi pairs were distributed throughout the 
model’s parameter space, confirming the range of moral strategies in our sample (fig. 3.2A, 
central scatter plot). Each participant’s moral strategy was identified by their best-fitting 
model parameters’ relation to the theoretically defined strategy boundaries on the theta-
phi plane. This grouping method yielded 24 inequity-averse (IA), 5 guilt-averse (GA), 
21 morally opportunistic (MO) and 7 greedy (GR) players. Sample participants for each 
moral strategy can be found in figure 3.2B. The diversity of observed strategies resulted 
in the Moral Strategy Model better describing overall task behavior than the individual 
component models of guilt aversion (t(55) = 11.2, P < 0.001), inequity aversion (t(55) 
= 2.38, P = 0.021), and greed (t(55) = 25.4, P < 0.001) (see Supplementary Methods 
and Supplementary Figure 3.2). To ensure that our model was not overfitting the data, 
we performed 5-fold cross-validation holding out data from the same participants to 
determine the model performance using unbiased parameter estimates. Overall, we 
observed a high degree of model accuracy (mean squared error per trial = 5.37, mean r2 
= 0.86; one-sample t-test on r values: t(55) = 66.1, P < 0.001).  These results indicate 
that our model was able to strongly predict participant’s trial level behavior and suggests 
that participants were consistent in their moral strategy over all trials in the task.  This 
allows us to infer stable guilt-averse and inequity-averse preferences at the participant 
level, and thereby infer guilt and inequity aversion even in the task condition (x4) where 
the behavior of these two strategies was indistinguishable.
 The heterogeneity of moral motives observed here highlights the importance 
of studying inter-participant variation in moral decision-making: averaging neural 
measurements over these 57 participants would likely have obscured the strategy-specific 
brain processes we are interested in, and would have led to a bias towards inferring 
inequity-averse processes. Interestingly, a significant portion of players responded to 
different task conditions (multipliers) based on different moral rules, demonstrating 
context-dependent behavior consistent with the predicted moral opportunism strategy.
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Figure 3.2. The Moral Strategy Model.
A: Four simulations of reciprocity behavior predicted by the model show that the model is capable of capturing 
inequity aversion (top-left), guilt aversion (bottom-left), moral opportunism (top-right), and greed (bottom-right). 
Each colored zone in model parameter space represents the region where the moral strategy is best represented based on 
simulation. Each colored point represents a participant. B: Observed behavior of one example participant for each of 
the moral strategy groups.
Inter-subject differences in brain activity patterns reflect differences in moral 
strategy
Our primary goal was to identify brain regions that encode the different moral decision 
strategies observed across players in the game. We were particularly interested in 
examining brain responses when making decisions in the x4 multiplier condition of the 
HMTG, as in this case the predicted behavioral outcomes for guilt aversion, inequity 
aversion and moral opportunism are aligned, though the psychological computations 
involved in making these decisions might well differ. We expected that such psychological 
processing differences would be reflected in differentiable neural signals, even when the 
decision outputs were otherwise indistinguishable.
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Unfortunately, standard analytic approaches are not well suited for making this type of 
inference. Ideally, we could map the model predictions directly onto brain responses at the 
trial level using a model-based fMRI approach (O’Doherty, Hampton, & Kim, 2007). 
However, our model requires all of the decision behavior (i.e. across the three contexts) to 
identify a given participant’s moral strategy, and therefore moral strategy measurements 
only exist at the participant level. Moreover, standard contrast-based analyses of 
participant-level parameter estimates derived from general linear model (GLM) analyses 
are unable to reveal interpretable inferences about the brain when 4 different groups 
of varying sizes differ on two separate variables (i.e., the model parameters). Instead, 
we employed multivariate pattern analysis, where the measurement of spatial patterns 
of activation across multiple voxels has recently emerged as a promising approach in 
mapping specific psychological states or processes to respective brain regions (Chang, 
Gianaros, Manuck, Krishnan, & Wager, 2015; Huth, de Heer, Griffiths, Theunissen, 
& Gallant, 2016; Kamitani & Tong, 2005; Mitchell et al., 2008; Wager et al., 2013; 
Woo, Chang, Lindquist, & Wager, 2017). The second moment of the multivariate 
brain representations across stimuli can reflect meaningful differences in how stimuli 
are psychologically organized (e.g., category representations) (Haxby, Connolly, & 
Guntupalli, 2014; Kriegeskorte, Mur, & Bandettini, 2008; Zapala & Schork, 2012). 
These insights have recently been used to illustrate that the psychological organization 
of moral judgments (in this case, harm judgments versus impurity judgments) can be 
estimated from multivariate activity patterns in the mentalizing network (Wasserman, 
Chakroff, Saxe, & Young, 2017). Here, we extend these analytic advances and hypothesize 
that multi-voxel activity patterns associated with reciprocal decision-making should be 
comparable between participants that decide in a similar way, i.e. between participants 
with the same moral strategy.
 To test this prediction, we mapped variations in brain processes associated with 
decision-making in the HMTG directly onto our Moral Strategy Model using inter-
subject representational similarity analysis (IS-RSA; fig. 3.3). This method combines two 
developments in neuroimaging analysis: the geometric mapping of relationships between 
stimulus features, as proposed in representational similarity analysis (Kriegeskorte et al., 
2008), and the similarity of computations in a specific brain region across participants, 
as proposed in inter-subject connectivity (Hasson, Nir, Levy, Fuhrmann, & Malach, 
2004). This approach allowed us to leverage the variability in decision strategy across 
participants, in order to map multidimensional representations in the computational 
model space to multidimensional representations in brain space. To do this, we first 
created a geometric representation of the Moral Strategy Model’s parameter space by 
computing the Euclidean distance between each pair of participants. We then searched 
for brain regions that showed a similar representational geometry in the multi-voxel 
activity pattern correlations between each pair of participants during the decision 
screen of the HMTG in the x4 condition (see fig. 3.3 and Supplementary Methods). 
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Unlike traditional univariate analyses that rely on contrasts between conditions or 
participant groups, our IS-RSA can identify signal associated with processes captured 
in our computational model based on inter-subject differences in distance from other 
participants. Thus, even though the greedy participants behaved differently than the 
guilt-averse, inequity-averse, and morally opportunistic participants, they serve as a 
necessary reference point in this multidimensional space. To reduce the search space 
in the brain, we employed an a priori 200-parcel whole-brain parcellation based on 
meta-analytic functional co-activation of the Neurosynth database (de la Vega, Chang, 
Banich, Wager, & Yarkoni, 2016), and we identified parcels that survived Bonferroni 
correction (i.e., P < 0.00025).
 We observed significant inter-subject representational similarity effects in 26 brain 
parcels, including the ventral and dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), dorsal 
anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), bilateral anterior insula (rAI), bilateral putamen, 
bilateral premotor cortex, bilateral angular gyrus, and left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC) (fig. 3.3). These results indicate that decision-related activity patterns in these 
regions were more similar between participants that share a similar moral strategy than 
between participants who differed in their strategy. The degree of similarity is directly 
proportional to the distance between the participants in the model parameter space. 
Since decision behavior in the x4 condition is virtually indistinguishable between the 
different moral strategies (with the exception of the ‘Greed’ group), these regions are 
likely involved in psychological computations that differ between strategies. Importantly, 
some of the identified regions (e.g. AI, MPFC, SMA, and DLPFC) have previously 
been found in studies of reciprocal decision-making (Chang et al., 2011; Nihonsugi 
et al., 2015; Van den Bos, Van Dijk, Westenberg, Rombouts, & Crone, 2009, 2011). 
However, our paradigm additionally allows us to evaluate the degree to which these 
regions might be selectively processing computations relevant to a specific moral strategy, 
and we addressed this question in the next analysis step.
Activity patterns replicate over participants with the same moral strategy
The next question we sought to address is whether any particular moral strategy was 
being processed in a specific region. If this were true, we would expect this region to 
exhibit a specific multi-voxel activity pattern exclusively in the participants employing 
this strategy that is distinct from participants using other strategies. This intuition is 
precisely operationalized by a measure used to evaluate unsupervised machine learning 
models, which we call the ‘cluster strength score’ (Chang, Yarkoni, Khaw, & Sanfey, 
2013; Rousseeuw, 1987) (see Supplementary Methods). For each participant, this 
metric indexes the pattern similarity to other participants with the same strategy, relative 
to the pattern similarity to all other participants. We used a permutation sign test, which 
implicitly controls for the size of the group, to test whether a strategy was significantly 
associated with a given brain parcel. We limited this analysis to the x4 condition of the
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Figure 3.3. Inter-subject representational similarity analysis.
This analysis revealed twenty-six brain parcels where players with similar moral strategy had similar BOLD patterns in 
the Decision screen of the x4 condition. Since this condition yielded identical behavioral predictions for guilt-averse, 
inequity-averse and morally opportunistic participants, neural differences cannot be ascribed to motor confound or 
financial payoff.
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task, and excluded the greedy subjects, to maximally control for behavioral differences 
between the strategy groups.
 We found that the guilt-averse subjects shared a unique brain pattern in the bilateral 
anterior insula, bilateral putamen, DMPFC, and left DLPFC. In contrast, inequity-
averse subjects shared an exclusive pattern in bilateral anterior insula, VMPFC, dACC, 
supplementary motor area, and bilateral superior occipital cortex. Finally, moral 
opportunists shared a common pattern in bilateral superior parietal cortex and dACC 
(Fig. 3.4A). These findings indicate that information pertaining to how specific moral 
strategies are processed are encoded in unique patterns of multi-voxel activity in specific 
brain regions that are consistent across participants using the same strategy. This is 
particularly interesting as all three of these moral strategies return the same amount of 
money in this x4 context, suggesting that these regions are implementing computations 
unique to the underlying moral decision strategies.
Activity patterns replicate across task conditions within moral strategy groups
If the activity patterns observed to be exclusive to GA, IA and MO in the x4 condition 
indeed reflect neural computations meaningfully related to the associated decision 
strategies, we would also expect these activity patterns to be stable across contexts. That 
is, each participant’s activity pattern in x4 should be similar to the patterns of other 
subjects using the same strategy in x2 and x6, and not similar to the x2/x6 patterns 
of subjects using any other strategy. To test this, we calculated the degree to which 
the spatial pattern of the x4 pattern for a given participant was more similar to other 
participants using the same strategy in the x2 and x6 contexts compared to participants 
employing other strategies (see Supplementary Methods). The results of this analysis (in 
Fig. 3.4B for generalization to x2 and in Fig. 3.4C for generalization to x6) were largely 
consistent with the x4 pattern clustering results.
 Since we were specifically interested in finding brain parcels where activity patterns 
generalized across participants and conditions within a given moral strategy group, we 
identified regions where the conjunction was significant across analyses (Fig. 3.4D). These 
converging ‘strategy maps’ indicate that the guilt aversion strategy involved the ventral 
surface of the bilateral anterior insula, bilateral putamen, MPFC, and left DLPFC; 
inequity aversion involved bilateral AI, VMPFC, dACC, and bilateral superior occipital 
cortex; and moral opportunism involved bilateral superior parietal cortex (SPC) and 
dACC. These regions replicate earlier findings on the neural correlates of social preferences 
(Chang et al., 2011; Haruno & Frith, 2010; Hsu et al., 2008; Sanfey et al., 2003; 
Tricomi et al., 2010).  The insula, putamen, DLPFC, and vmPFC have previously been 
identified with guilt aversion (Chang et al., 2011; Krajbich, Adolphs, Tranel, Denburg, 
& Camerer, 2009; Nihonsugi et al., 2015) and the SMA and VMPFC have been found 
in previous studies examining inequity aversion (Chang & Sanfey (2013), Sanfey et 
al. (2003), and Tricomi et al. (2010), among many others). While both these moral
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Figure 3.4. Brain maps of parcels consistently associated with a specific moral strategy.
A: Multi-voxel activity patterns that replicate over subjects within moral strategy group in the x4 condition. B: Parcels 
where strategy-specific x4 activity patterns generalize to x2. C: Parcels where strategy-specific x4 activity patterns 
generalize to x6. D: Conjunction of A, B, and C. Activity patterns in these parcels clustered within the respective 
strategy group in the x4 condition, and generalized to x2 and x6.
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strategies engage the anterior insula via distinct multivariate patterns, guilt aversion does 
so more extensively at the ventral surface of this region. Interestingly, the only regions 
where moral opportunists showed consistent and exclusive activity patterns are regions 
associated with task difficulty and working memory (SPC and dACC), which may be 
related to the opportunists’ switching between competing strategies.
Moral opportunists shift between guilt-averse and inequity-averse brain 
representations
If decision-related activity patterns in the ‘strategy maps’ (Fig. 3.4D) indeed reflect the 
unique psychological computations involved in inequity aversion (IA) and guilt aversion 
(GA), then we should be able to predict participant strategies out of sample based solely 
on their brain activity. The morally opportunistic (MO) group are well-suited for this 
type of confirmatory analysis as their strategy shifts from IA to GA depending on the trial 
context. We hypothesized that the MO players should express the GA and IA patterns 
most strongly in the conditions where they selectively use the associated computations 
in their decision-making, that is, in the x2 condition for inequity aversion and the x6 
condition for guilt aversion.
 To test this prediction, we computed the similarity of the moral opportunists’ 
activity patterns to the GA-IA pattern difference map for each parcel and condition (see 
Supplementary Methods). A positive similarity score would indicate that an MO participant 
was more similar to GA than IA, and vice versa. Results showed that, across all parcels, 
the mean similarity of MO participants to the GA-IA difference map was significantly 
greater in the x6 condition than in x2 (mean correlation difference: Δr = 0.077; paired-
samples t-test: t(20) = 4.37, P < 0.001). This confirms our hypothesis that the morally 
opportunistic participants expressed the guilt-averse and inequity-averse activity patterns 
most strongly when they used the associated computations in their decision-making.
 To rule out the possibility that this effect was driven by just one of the two patterns’ 
being upregulated in the corresponding condition, we additionally tested the GA-IA 
pattern similarity in brain parcels uniquely associated with either guilt aversion or 
inequity aversion (i.e. the non-overlapping parcels of the GA and IA strategy maps 
from Fig. 3.4D). Importantly, we found that MO activity patterns in IA-specific parcels 
were more similar to IA than to GA in x2 (mean r = -0.071, one-sample t(20) = -4.30, 
P < 0.001), but not significantly so in x6 (mean r = 0.034, t(20) = 1.32, P = 0.20). In 
these parcels, GA-IA pattern similarity was significantly higher in x6 than in x2 (Δr = 
0.11, paired-samples t(20) = 4.31, P < 0.001). Conversely, MO activity patterns in GA-
specific parcels were more similar to GA than to IA (x2: mean r = 0.25, t(20) = 8.57, 
P < 0.001; x6: mean r = 0.30, t(20) = 12.9, P < 0.001), and more so in x6 than in x2 
(Δr = 0.05, t(20) = 2.15, P = 0.044). These results confirm that moral opportunists can 
express both the GA and IA activity patterns, alternating between the two depending on 
the condition of the task.
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The moral opportunists thus not only used different behavioral strategies according 
to the multiplier used; they also differentially expressed the activity pattern found in 
the associated moral strategy group (GA or IA) depending on the task condition. This 
provides strong evidence using an independent sample that the patterns we observed 
in the inequity-averse and guilt-averse participants directly reflect the moral strategy 
computations carried out in the corresponding strategy maps, confirming that these 
patterns capture meaningful signal related to the underlying psychological process.
Figure 3.5. Evidence for guilt aversion and inequity aversion computations in moral 
opportunists.
Analysis restricted to brain parcels consistently involved in only GA or only IA across task conditions. Moral 
opportunists most strongly expressed the guilt aversion pattern in the condition where they employed guilt aversion 
computations (x6), and vice versa for inequity aversion in x2. Bar height represents the mean over all moral 
opportunists; error bars represent bootstrapped 95% confidence interval. * P < 0.05; *** P < 0.001; n.s. not significant.
Discussion
In this paper, we have presented experimental evidence illustrating that there are several 
distinctive strategies for deciding whether to reciprocate another person’s trust. These 
variations in moral strategies were computationally characterized using a utility model 
that integrates previous formulations of guilt and inequity aversion. By leveraging the 
between-participant differences captured in the two-dimensional parameter space of this 
model, we mapped the psychological computations corresponding to guilt and inequity 
aversion to specific parts of the human brain.
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Importantly, our inferences on moral strategies required the use of a task in which different 
social preference models yield different behavioral predictions: The Hidden Multiplier 
Trust Game. This variant of the canonical Trust Game allowed us to disentangle neural 
processes related to different motivational signals, which would have been conflated in 
the traditional version of the task. Computationally characterizing moral strategies at the 
individual level allowed us to draw inferences about motivational differences even in the 
task condition where the behavioral predictions for guilt aversion, inequity aversion and 
moral opportunism were the same (the x4 condition). However, these participant-level 
inferences required a different analytical approach from traditional model-based fMRI. 
A standard contrast-based GLM analysis could not have probed our effects of interest, 
but inter-subject representational similarity analysis allowed us to map the complex 
geometry of participants in multi-dimensional model space onto individual differences 
in neural signals. By analyzing the clustering of participants in high-dimensional activity 
pattern space, we demonstrate that the psychological computations underlying guilt 
aversion and inequity aversion are implemented in different regions of the human brain.
 The stability of participants’ moral strategies observed here raises two interesting 
questions. First, how stable are moral strategies across tasks? If the same subjects use 
the same moral strategy throughout different contexts, tasks, and time points, this 
might reflect a trait-like ‘moral phenotype’ anchored in participants’ enduring social 
preferences. However, given that there are reports of low correspondence between 
laboratory and field behavior in the same participants (Galizzi & Navarro-Martinez, 
2018; but see Levitt & List, 2007), more work is needed to evaluate this possibility. 
Second, what causes a mix of moral strategies to arise in a population? In many human 
social interactions, moral opportunism may be the most adaptive strategy, since it 
allows participants to maximize payoff while still being able to justify each decision to 
others – a key goal of moral reasoning (Haidt, 2001, 2007; Tetlock, 2002). However, 
there may be psychological or cultural boundary conditions to this strategy that drive 
some individuals toward moral consistency. Interestingly, our findings speak to a related 
question in evolutionary biology: do evolutionarily stable mixed strategies take the form 
of conditional strategies (i.e. the same individual switching between strategies over 
time) or of strategy polymorphism (i.e. different individuals consistently using different 
strategies)? (Bergstrom & Godfrey-Smith, 1998; Tomkins & Hazel, 2007) Our data 
suggest that, in humans, both accounts may be true.
 One major strength of our approach is that participants could freely decide by which 
strategy they would make their reciprocity decisions, in contrast to prior research where 
participants were instructed to reason in a particular way (e.g. Hein et al., 2016). An 
obvious downside of our approach is that we could not control the prevalence of moral 
strategies in our dataset, which contained a relatively low number of purely guilt-averse 
participants. However, we accounted for this in our analytic approach in several ways. 
First, we defined the participant clustering based purely on the computational model, 
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which meant the relative prevalence of various strategies in our sample did not bias the 
clustering solution. Second, the inter-subject RSA and brain-space clustering analyses 
were based on measurements of pairwise similarity between pairs of participants, which 
strongly increases the number of observations even for small groups of participants. 
Third, we used within-group permutation tests to assess the statistical significance of 
brain activity pattern clustering, which implicitly controls for differences in group size. 
Fourth, we worked with several converging lines of evidence: for a brain parcel to be 
included in the guilt aversion ‘strategy map’, it had to show significant clustering of GA 
participants in the x4 condition, as well as significant generalizability of those patterns 
to the x2 and x6 conditions, which makes false positives unlikely. Finally, we used 
the moral opportunists to confirm that the activity patterns measured in guilt-averse 
participants were functionally linked to psychological computations underlying guilt 
aversion, as we did for inequity aversion. Therefore, we are confident that our findings 
for all the moral strategies are robust.
 The guilt-averse moral strategy was associated with anterior insula, putamen, 
MPFC and left DLPFC. These findings support the previously proposed idea that 
computations in the anterior insula facilitate a guilt response when not living up to 
the expectations of another person (Chang & Sanfey, 2013; Chang et al., 2011). Social 
expectations themselves may be computed in Theory of Mind regions such as MPFC 
(Denny, Kober, Wager, & Ochsner, 2012; Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009), where 
we also found evidence for guilt aversion-specific computations. In contrast, inequity 
aversion computations were mapped onto the anterior insula, VMPFC and dACC. AI 
(Sanfey et al., 2003) and VMPFC (Tricomi et al., 2010) have been linked to this social 
preference before, while the involvement of the dACC may relate to this region’s role in 
monitoring task performance (Wittmann et al., 2016) and tracking one’s position in a 
social hierarchy (Kumaran, Banino, Blundell, Hassabis, & Dayan, 2016). If the inequity 
aversion motive revolves around minimizing payoff differences between self and other, 
the medial frontal cortex (including VMPFC and dACC) is well suited to carry out this 
computation, due to its role in self-referential payoff processing (Civai, Crescentini, 
Rustichini, & Rumiati, 2012; Nakatani et al., 2017; Tricomi et al., 2010).
 We also demonstrated that some participants, namely moral opportunists, did 
not consistently apply one moral rule to their decisions, but rather appeared to choose 
which motivational trade-off to make depending on the particular trial structure. This 
opportunistic decision strategy entailed switching between the behavioral patterns of 
guilt-aversion and inequity-aversion, and allowed them to maximize their financial 
payoff while still always following a moral rule. Although it could have been the case 
that these opportunists merely resembled GA and IA in decision outcome, and not in 
the underlying psychological process, a confirmatory analysis showed that the moral 
opportunists did in fact switch between the neural representations of guilt and inequity 
aversion, and thus flexibly employed the respective psychological processes underlying 
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these two, quite different, social preferences. This further supports the notion that these 
activity patterns directly reflect guilt aversion and inequity aversion computations, 
and not a theoretically peripheral ‘third factor’ shared between GA or IA participants. 
Additionally, we found activity patterns specifically linked to moral opportunism in 
superior parietal cortex and dACC, which are strongly associated with task demands and 
working memory (Dosenbach et al., 2007; Koenigs, Barbey, Postle, & Grafman, 2009; 
Sheth et al., 2012). Possibly, the need to switch between strategies on a trial-by-trial 
basis caused moral opportunists to consistently recruit these areas of the brain.
 At the methodological level, our findings show that representational similarity analysis 
can be used to measure between-subject differences in neural function. An advantage of 
this method compared to traditional model-based fMRI is that IS-RSA does not require 
a strong prior about the algorithmic implementation of the psychological computation 
of interest (Hill et al., 2017; Mars, Shea, Kolling, & Rushworth, 2012). While IS-RSA 
does require that inter-subject similarity in psychological computation can be reliably 
probed, the actual neural algorithm does not need to be known, and so a biologically 
precise mathematical formulation of the computation of interest is no longer required. 
IS-RSA could therefore be of general use to researchers aiming to map psychological 
computations onto the brain while agnostic about the neural algorithm. More generally, 
our approach allowed us to leverage endogenous between-participant differences in 
psychological processing of the task at hand, while traditional analysis methods would 
have required us to average measurements across participants with potentially vast 
differences in task interpretation. As such, our methods open up the possibility of 
treating participant-level variation as signal instead of noise, to avoid averaging out key 
functional features of the human brain. In this way, IS-RSA can facilitate the use of 
more ecologically valid experimental paradigms, by allowing participants to vary in how 
they interpret the task.
 Together with other recent work on between-subject neural clustering (Yeshurun 
et al., 2017), our observations imply that different brains encode and transform 
social information similarly when they share a similar subjective interpretation of 
the information. Reflecting on the moral debates that divide our societies today, this 
remarkable property of the human brain suggests that our political adversaries are not 
obtuse, naïve, or ignorant, as we may be inclined to believe, but rather process moral 
dilemmas in a fundamentally different way.
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Supplementary Figures
Figure 3.S1. Second-order expectations are approximated by 2*investment.
In the guilt term of the guilt aversion model and the Moral Strategy Model, second-order expectations (Trustee’s belief 
about Investor’s expectations) were kept equal across participants and set to half the amount the Investor believes the 
Trustee has (i.e. E2(E1(S2)) = ½ * E1(M) * I). Self-report data plotted here confi rm that this is a good representation 
of the true second-order expectations of the Trustees. Note that since self-report was elicited for all investment levels 
at once, after the scanner experiment, these data points may be a noisy representation of the true second-order 
expectations during the Hidden Multiplier Trust Game.
Figure 3.S2. Model comparisons.
Comparison between Greed (GR), Guilt Aversion (GA), Inequity Aversion (IA), and Moral Strategy (MS) models. MS 
is signifi cantly better than the best competing model, IA (paired-samples t-test: t(55) = 2.38, P = 0.021). * P < 0.05.
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Figure 3.S3. Investment distributions in the three multiplier conditions of the Hidden  
Multiplier Trust Game.
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Figure 3.S4. Two examples of the utility curve described by the Moral Strategy Model.
Left: investment = 6 and multiplier = 2. Right: investment = 6 and multiplier = 6. Top three panels: the three 
components of the Moral Strategy Model, i.e. Own share of tokens on this trial (Payoff), Inequity, and Guilt, 
computed at each possible return amount. Bottom five panels: different combinations of theta and phi correspond 
to different behavioral predictions (‘Prediction’, vertical red dotted line). Greed is simulated at theta = 0.5; guilt 
aversion at theta = 0.05, phi = -0.1; inequity aversion at theta = 0.05, phi = 0.1; other parameter combinations yield 
intermediate strategies.
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Figure 3.S5. 200-parcel parcellation of grey matter in the human brain.
Numbers indicate Z coordinate of axial slice in MNI space. This map can be retrieved from http://neurovault.org/
images/39711/.
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Figure 3.S6. Illustration of the cluster strength metric for the left DLPFC in the x4 condition 
of the HMTG.
Left panel: left DLPFC parcel. Middle panel: multidimensional scaling (MDS) plot of all GA (stars), IA (squares) and 
MO (diamonds) participants in the 745-dimensional activity pattern space of this parcel. Between-participant distances 
(i.e. activity pattern differences) are conserved as much as possible by the MDS algorithm in this 2d representation. 
Right panel: silhouette plot indicating cluster strength scores for participants in this parcel and condition. In the 
silhouette plot, each participant is drawn as a (connected) bar indicating their cluster strength score (see Supplementary 
Methods), and participants are rank-ordered within strategy group (Rousseeuw, 1987). The silhouette plot shows that 
there is significant pattern clustering for guilt-averse participants in this parcel, which is corroborated by the spatial 
clustering of GA (but not IA or MO) participants in the MDS plot. Refer to Methods for more details. * P < 0.05.
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Supplementary Methods
Participants
Sixty-six participants were recruited from the Nijmegen student population through a 
web-based registration tool. Students of psychology or economics were excluded from 
participation, as they were potentially familiar with game theory or the Trust Game. 
All participants were screened for significant health or neurological problems and had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and all gave written, informed consent before the 
start of the experiment. Nine participants were excluded from the analysis because of 
excessive head movement in the MRI scanner, misunderstanding of the task, disbelief 
in the task, or technical issues. Fifty-seven participants (mean age = 21.3 ± 2.1 years, 
39 women and 18 men) remained. The experiment was approved by the local ethics 
committee (CMO Arnhem-Nijmegen, the Netherlands).
Experimental Procedures
The experiment consisted of a single session. The participant was first seated in a 
behavioral lab space to complete screening and informed consent forms and to read the 
task instructions. To avoid biasing game behavior, the Trust Game was always referred 
to as ‘Investment game’, the Investor as ‘player A’, and the Trustee as ‘player B’. The 
participant was informed that he/she would play 80 single-shot trials in the role of 
player B with 80 anonymous players A, each of whom had previously participated and 
consented to have their data used here. Participants were instructed that they would 
be paid based on their response to one randomly selected trial at the conclusion of 
the experiment, and that this trial would be financially consequential for the Investor 
too. The choice behavior of the Investors was drawn from an actual Trust Game data 
set previously collected with the same task parameters (multiplier always x4; Chang et 
al., 2011), but the randomly selected trial was only financially consequential for the 
participant. To enhance the plausibility of the task, participants were asked to make their 
own investment decision as player A to an anonymous player B, and were told that they 
would be contacted and paid if their investment decision was used in a similar future 
experiment. After the instructions, participants’ photos were taken for (blurred) use 
in the possible future Trust Game experiment. While undergoing functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) of the brain, participants played 80 trials of the Hidden 
Multiplier Trust Game (HMTG).
Task
The Hidden Multiplier Trust Game (HMTG; fig. 3.1) is a variant of the regular Trust 
Game (also known as Investment Game; Berg et al., 1995) with one important difference: 
the multiplier varies between x2 (25% of trials), x4 (50%) and x6 (25%). Only the 
Trustee knows the actual multiplier. The Investor believes the multiplier is always x4 and 
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the Trustee knows about the Investor’s ignorance. The resulting information asymmetry 
allows us to probe the Trustee’s motivations to reciprocate in the game: guilt aversion 
predicts that the amounts sent back by the Trustee do not differ between multiplier 
conditions, whereas inequity aversion predicts that Trustees are sensitive to the changing 
multiplier. Moral opportunism predicts that Trustees are guilt-averse in x6 and inequity-
averse in x2. The investments and multipliers were assigned to the 80 trials such that 
the distribution of investments was highly similar between the multiplier conditions 
(x2, x4 and x6; Supplementary Fig. 3.3) and identical across participants. In 4 out of 80 
trials (5% of each multiplier condition) the Investment was 0, so the Trustee could not 
respond. The trials were presented in a different random order to each participant. On 
the first screen of each trial, the Trustee was presented with the participant number of 
the Investor and a blurred picture of a face to strengthen the Trustee’s social experience 
in the task.
Stimulus presentation
The task was divided into two runs of 40 trials each. Each run lasted around 18 minutes 
with 30 additional TRs of fixation at the beginning, which were used to compute the 
combining weights for the four echoes in our multi-echo fMRI sequence. Before the 
first run, there was a left-handed finger tapping task and a calibration procedure for 
eye tracking. Between the runs, the participant was allowed to take a break for as long 
as he/she wanted. At the end of the scanner session, a T1-weighted anatomical scan 
was made (see ‘fMRI data acquisition’). All stimuli were presented using PsychToolBox 
3.0.11 (www.psychtoolbox.org) in Matlab 2013a (Mathworks, Natick, MA, USA) onto 
a screen at the back of the scanner bore, which the participant could view using a mirror 
mounted onto the head coil. The participant responded using the leftmost two buttons 
on a four-button curved response box (Current Designs, Philadelphia, PA, USA) in 
the right hand. These buttons moved the slider on the decision screen left and right in 
increments of 1 token or 10% of the slider range (whichever was greatest, to increase 
the speed of movement on the slider; Chang et al., 2011). The slider ranged from 0 
to [investment*multiplier]. The starting point of the slider was randomly selected on 
each trial, ensuring that the number of button presses was orthogonal to the number of 
tokens selected.
fMRI data acquisition
Functional magnetic resonance imaging was performed at the Donders Centre for 
Cognitive Neuroimaging in Nijmegen, The Netherlands, using a 3-Tesla head-dedicated 
MRI system (Skyra; Siemens Medical Systems). T2*-weighted functional MR images 
were acquired using a 32-channel head coil and a multi-echo pulse sequence (224 mm 
field of view (FOV); 64 x 64 matrix; 90° flip angle; 2250 ms repetition time (TR); 
echo times (TE) 9.4 ms, 20.6 ms, 32 ms, and 43 ms). Thirty-five ascending slices 
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were acquired (3.0 mm slice thickness; 0.5 mm slice gap; 3.5x3.5x3.0 mm voxel size), 
covering the whole brain except the cerebellum. A high-resolution T1-weighted image 
was acquired using an MPRAGE sequence (192 sagittal slices; TR 2300 ms, voxel size 
1x1x1 mm). To minimize head movement, soft adhesive tape was placed across the 
participant’s forehead immediately before image acquisition started. In accordance with 
safety regulations, the participant wore earplugs during the experiment and had access 
to an alarm button.
Additional measures
After the scanner session, the participants were brought into the behavioral lab to 
complete several computerized tasks and paper questionnaires. First, they were asked 
to rate, for each HMTG trial in the scanner, how guilty they felt about the number 
of tokens they had returned to the Investor, and how guilty they would have felt if 
they had returned a randomly selected alternative number of tokens. Ratings between 
1 and 7 were measured on a continuous, computer mouse-controlled slider. Next, the 
participants completed a questionnaire on their beliefs about the Investor’s expectations 
at each possible investment in the HMTG. We used these self-reported second-order 
expectations to check that the model we used as proxy for second-order expectations in 
our model (on each trial: 2 * investment) was accurate (see Supplementary Figure 3.1). 
The participant also completed computerized versions of the Social Value Orientation 
(SVO) task (slider version, incentivized; adapted from (Murphy et al., 2011)) and the 
Guilt Inventory (Jones et al., 2000). Finally, the participant completed a demographics 
questionnaire on paper and answered several reflective questions about the experiment. 
One of these questions was “Do you think that the participants with whom you played 
in Task 1 will be happy if the round you played with them is selected for payment?” 
We used the participant’s answer on this question to test (dis)belief in the financial 
consequentiality of the task for the Investors. Two participants were excluded from the 
analysis based on this question.
Participant Payment
Several days after the experiment, one of the 80 HMTG rounds was randomly selected 
for payment. The participant received the number of tokens earned (Investment * 
Multiplier – Amount Returned) in this round, converted to euro using an exchange 
rate of €0.40 per token. This amount was added to the earnings from the incentivized 
SVO task and a €29 base fee. An administrator not involved in the study electronically 
transferred the total amount to the participant several weeks after the experiment. 
The participants had been informed about the payment procedures at the start of the 
experiment.
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Behavioral data analysis
Behavioral analyses were carried out in Python version 2.7.12 (Python Software 
Foundation), using the Scipy package version 1.0.0.
Computational modelling
The Moral Strategy Model (eq. 1 in main text) was fit to each participant’s behavioral 
data by minimizing the sum of squared error between the model’s behavioral prediction 
and actual behavior over the 76 trials with non-zero investment using the least_squares 
routine in Scipy. To avoid ending the fitting procedure in a local minimum, the model 
fitting algorithm was initialized at 10000 random points in theta-phi parameter space for 
each participant. In case of a tie in model fit between two or more iterations of the fitting 
procedure, the first occurrence of the best model fit was selected as winning model.
We compared the predictive accuracy of our model to that of its component models, 
including greed (eq. 2), inequity aversion (eq. 3; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000), and guilt 
aversion (eq. 4; Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 2007). In each of the following formulations, 
U2 refers to the Trustee’s utility, and π2 is the Trustee’s payoff, defined as π2 = I * M2 – S2. 
I is the Investor’s investment amount, M2 is the multiplier known only to the Trustee, 
S2 describes the Trustee’s strategy (i.e., the amount of money to return in the game), 
E2E1(S2) refers to the Trustee’s second-order belief about the Investor’s expectations 
of the Trustee’s strategy, and E1(M1) refers to the Investor’s belief about the multiplier 
(always x4). Theta (Θ) is a greed parameter that weights social preference (inequity in 
eq. 3 and guilt in eq. 4) relative to financial self-interest (payoff).
 U2 = π2                   (2)
 U2 = π2 – Θ * (π2 / (10 – I + I * M2) – ½)
2               (3)
 U2 = π2 – Θ * ( (E2(E1(S2)) – S2) / (E1(M1) * I) )
2              (4)
Across all models, the predicted strategy for the Trustee was the strategy which yielded 
maximal utility:
	 Ŝ2=arg maxS2 U2(S2)                   (6)
Model performance was measured and compared using the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC; eq. 7) (Akaike, 1974; Hurvich & Tsai, 1989), which rewards model fit 
and penalizes model complexity (number of free parameters). We chose to use AIC over 
the alternative Bayesian Information Criterion, since AIC is superior to BIC if the true 
data-generating model is not in the model set (Wagenmakers & Farrell, 2004), which 
is likely true for the current experiment. Assuming that the model errors are normally 
distributed, AIC is defined as
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 AIC = n * ln(SSE/n) + k * 2                 (7)
where SSE represents the residual sum of squares (i.e. the sum over squared differences 
between model prediction and actual behavior), n represents the number of observations 
(trials), and k represents the number of free parameters in the model (theta and/or 
phi). Participants whose behavior was perfectly explained by any model were excluded 
from model comparisons, since the logarithm of 0 is undefined. We found that average 
model fit for the Moral Strategy Model was better than all three competing models 
(Supplementary Fig. 3.2). The difference with the best competing model, inequity 
aversion, was significant (paired-samples t-test: t(55) = 2.38, P = 0.021). Two examples 
of the utility curve described by the Moral Phenotype Model in an experimental trial are 
presented in Supplementary Fig. 3.4.
To ensure that our model was not overfitting the data, and to estimate the stability 
of decisions within subjects over time, we performed cross-validation on the model 
predictions. For this step, we divided the 76 trials with non-zero investment for each 
participant into five equal parts (5-fold cross-validation). For each fold, we fit the model 
to the remaining 4/5 of the data, and predicted the behavior in the held-out 1/5. We 
compared the model predictions to the true held-out data across all folds by computing 
the mean squared prediction error per trial, the Pearson correlation coefficient r, and 
r2. We tested prediction quality with a t-test on the r values against 0. In this test, we 
excluded one participant for whom both the model predictions and the actual behavior 
were always to return 0 tokens, which caused the correlation to be unidentifiable.
Clustering participants by moral strategy
We aimed to cluster our participants into moral strategy groups without being biased by 
the particular distribution of moral strategies in our sample. To this end, we first applied 
hierarchical clustering to simulations of our Moral Strategy Model, and then grouped 
our participants’ behavior by the cluster boundaries obtained from the simulations.
We created 10201 simulated Trustee behavior sets at evenly spaced points in the model’s 
parameter space, with theta ranging from 0 to 0.5 and phi from -0.1 to 0.1, for each 
combination of investment (0 to 10) and multiplier (2, 4, and 6). We computed the 
pairwise squared Euclidean distances between these simulations and used the hierarchical 
clustering algorithm from the Scipy package in Python to group the simulations into 
four parsimonious clusters. The simulations in these clusters broadly aligned with the 
theoretical predictions of the four moral strategies we aimed to capture. Finally, we assigned 
each participant to the cluster of the simulation to which that participant was nearest in 
parameter space (based on Euclidean distance), thus creating four moral strategy groups.
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fMRI data analysis
Pre-processing
Prior to pre-processing, the four read-outs acquired per TR in the multi-echo procedure 
were realigned and combined per run, using the echo weighting estimated from the first 
30 TRs acquired at the start of the run (Poser, Versluis, Hoogduin, & Norris, 2006). 
Motion parameters obtained during realignment were stored and added to the GLM 
analysis as nuisance regressors. Next, fMRI data pre-processing was carried out using 
SPM12 (Statistical Parametric Mapping; Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, 
London, UK) in Matlab version 2014a. Pre-processing of the functional images 
consisted of slice time correction to the middle slice, coregistration to the T1-weighted 
anatomical scan, normalization to MNI-space (Montreal Neurological Institute) using 
the deformation fields obtained by segmenting the anatomical scan, and smoothing 
with a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm full width at half maximum.
GLM analysis
We performed temporal data reduction using a standard first level general linear model 
(GLM) approach. A GLM was constructed for each participant using boxcar regressors 
for each task condition. All four screens of the task were taken as conditions, with 
the trials in the decision and response screens split by multiplier level. A parametric 
modulator for investment size was added during the investment screen. The two runs 
were modelled by separate regressors in the same GLM. We thus estimated a GLM for 
each participant with the following regressors per run:
 1  Investor identity screen
 2  Investment screen
 3   Parametric modulator: investment size
 4  Decision screen x2
 5  Decision screen x4
 6  Decision screen x6
 7  Response screen x2
 8  Response screen x4
 9  Response screen x6
 10–15 Realignment parameters
To account for residual variance, the temporal derivative of each condition regressor 
was added to the model as well as a constant regressor for each entire run. The resulting 
GLM was convolved with SPM’s canonical hemodynamic response function. The model 
was corrected for temporal autocorrelations using a first-order autoregressive model and 
a standard high-pass filter (cut-off at 128 s) was used to exclude low-frequency drifts. 
The parameter estimates obtained from the first level GLM were used in all subsequent 
analyses.
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Inter-subject representational similarity analysis (IS-RSA)
The inter-subject representational similarity analysis was carried out in Python 2.7.12 
using the NLTools package version 0.3.6 (http://github.com/ljchang/nltools). We first 
obtained each participant’s mean ‘Decision screen x4’ activity map by averaging over the 
corresponding GLM beta maps for the two runs. We then divided these subject-level beta 
maps into 200 parcels using a whole-brain parcellation based on meta-analytic functional 
co-activation of the Neurosynth database (de la Vega et al., 2016) (parcellation available at 
http://neurovault.org/images/39711/ and displayed in Supplementary Fig. 3.5).
 The use of a parcellation scheme has several advantages over the more conventional 
searchlight approach. First, it is several orders of magnitude less computationally 
expensive. Second, the parcels are non-overlapping and contain bilateral regions that 
reflect functional neuroanatomy, whereas a searchlight approach is limited to local 
spheres that do not adapt to different areas of cortex.
 Next, we created a dissimilarity matrix for each parcel (the ‘parcel dissimilarity 
matrices’) using pairwise correlation dissimilarity between each pair of participants. 
Correlation distance is a useful metric that can accommodate data that is on different 
scales, which is important when comparing different participants’ beta maps. We 
also created a dissimilarity matrix using the Euclidean distance between each pair of 
participants in the Moral Phenotype Model’s parameter space. This ‘model dissimilarity 
matrix’ captured the dissimilarity between participants in their motivations for 
reciprocity (moral strategy). We then computed the correlation between each parcel 
dissimilarity matrix and the model dissimilarity matrix using Spearman’s rank-order 
correlations on the lower triangle of the matrices. To obtain significance levels of the 
resulting Spearman’s rhos, we computed the same statistic after shuffling the order of 
the observations in one of the two matrices 10000 times, and calculated the proportion 
of instances in which the permuted rho exceeded the true rho. These Monte Carlo 
p-values were Bonferroni-corrected by multiplying them by the number of parcels 
(200). All p-values that remained below 0.05 after this correction were taken to indicate 
a significant association between model distance and parcel representation distance, and 
thus a significant relationship between moral strategy and multivariate brain activity 
patterns in a given parcel.
Cluster strength analysis
To evaluate the degree to which a given moral strategy exhibited a unique brain 
representation, we calculated the cluster strength metric. This metric (eq. 8) is similar to 
cluster validity metrics used in unsupervised machine learning applications (Chang et al., 
2013) and is a normalized metric between [-1,1] that is calculated by subtracting the mean 
representational dissimilarity (1 – correlation) of that participant to the other participants 
in the same moral strategy group (‘within’) from the mean dissimilarity to all participants 
in the other groups (‘between’) and normalizing by the greatest of the two:
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cluster strength = 
between – within
(between – within)maximum
              (8)
Positive cluster strength values indicate that the participant clusters together with others 
of the same moral strategy in the parcel’s n-dimensional representational space (n = 
number of voxels in the parcel) and away from other moral strategies.
 To provide an intuition for the cluster strength score, we visualized our approach in 
Supplementary Fig. 3.6 using a reduced dimensional space. In the middle panel of this 
figure, we plotted a 2-dimensional simplification of the left DLPFC’s 745-dimensional 
space (745 voxels; x4 condition) based on a multidimensional scaling (MDS) 
dimensionality reduction of activity patterns in this region. The MDS algorithm 
was applied using the Hypertools package version 0.4.2 for Python after z-scoring the 
patterns within each participant using the Scikit-learn package. The 2d projection shows 
that guilt-averse participants cluster together in the left DLPFC compared to the other 
participants. Therefore, guilt-averse participants have activity patterns that are more 
similar to one another than to the participants in the other moral strategy groups. 
The right panel summarizes this relationship in the form of the cluster strength score, 
with participants grouped by moral strategy and rank-ordered within each group, as is 
customary for silhouette plots (Rousseeuw, 1987).
 We tested whether a brain region was significantly associated with a given moral 
strategy by permuting the sign of the cluster strength scores for all participants in this 
phenotype group, and then evaluating whether this group’s average cluster strength 
was statistically distinguishable from zero (i.e., meaningful clustering). In this step, 
we permuted the sign of the observed cluster strength scores within a moral strategy 
group 5000 times and compared the actual mean cluster strength in the moral strategy 
group to the distribution of the permuted scores. The Monte Carlo P-value was the 
proportion of permuted scores exceeding the actual score. Though this metric accounts 
for differences in sample sizes for each moral strategy, it is important to note that smaller 
groups have less power.
 To test whether strategy-specific activity patterns in x4 condition generalize to x2 
and x6, we again used the cluster strength score, but now measured across conditions. 
For example, we tested whether an IA participant’s activity pattern in the x4 condition 
was more similar to other IA participants’ x2 patterns than to non-IA participants’ 
x2 patterns. We again tested the association between a strategy and a brain parcel by 
permuting the sign of the cluster strength scores of that strategy group in that parcel. 
The conjunction with the within-x4 clustering test yields the ‘strategy maps’ (Figure 
3.4D), which highlight regions where strategy groups clustered in x4, and where the 
associated activity patterns generalized to x2 and x6.
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Similarity analysis of Moral Opportunists to GA and IA
To find out whether the Moral Opportunists flexibly expressed the multi-voxel activity 
patterns that we found in the guilt-averse and inequity-averse participants, we computed 
the similarity of MO participants’ activity patterns to the GA-IA pattern difference 
map in each parcel and each condition. We created these GA-IA difference maps in the 
following way. We first extracted each GA and IA participant’s mean decision screen beta 
maps for the two conditions from the GLM results, and standardized (z-scored) them 
per participant, per condition, and per parcel. We then averaged the z-scored maps by 
group (GA/IA) per condition (x2/x6) per parcel, and computed the difference between 
the two group mean z-maps within each condition. This yielded, for each parcel, a GA-
IA pattern difference map with positive values for voxels that were commonly active in 
guilt-averse participants and not in inequity-averse participants, and negative values for 
the reverse. We measured the relative similarity of the MO participants to GA and IA 
by calculating the spatial similarity (Pearson correlation) of the MO activity patterns 
for each condition in each parcel to the corresponding GA-IA pattern difference maps.
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Abstract
Prosocial behavior in economic games has traditionally been explained by pitting self-
interest against a single social preference, such as inequity aversion or guilt aversion. 
Across two laboratory studies, we provide convergent behavioral evidence that different 
participants in fact draw upon categorically different moral motives when making social 
decisions in a simple economic game. We describe and validate a computational model 
of economic utility capable of describing moral strategy variation between subjects, and 
show that strategy is consistent over time within subjects and insensitive to contextual 
effects. The ‘greed’ dimension of our model captures variance also indexed by previously 
proposed metrics of prosociality and greed, but the ‘social preference’ dimension of the 
model captures variance not otherwise accounted for. Our model is capable of recovering 
the participants’ subjective experience of their own moral decision process from their 
choice behavior, which lends construct validity to the moral strategies described here. A 
significant proportion of participants follow a strategy of ‘moral opportunism’, switching 
between guilt aversion and inequity aversion by always choosing the cheaper of the two. 
These participants occupy a unique zone in self-reported social preference space, distinct 
from guilt and inequity aversion. Taken together, our findings strongly suggest that 
psychological models of social choice must do justice to the multidimensional nature of 
moral behavior, to better account for laboratory findings and better predict real-world 
social decisions.
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General introduction
When making decisions that affect the welfare of others, different people are driven 
by different moral principles. This becomes immediately clear in political debates on 
morally conflicting topics like government surveillance, where one politician might 
prioritize the principle of privacy while the other might care most about promoting 
safety in public spaces. In social psychology, inter-subject differences in moral principles 
have sometimes been studied through the lens of moral foundations theory (Haidt 
& Joseph, 2004), which postulates that there are five (potentially conflicting) moral 
principles on which all moral judgments are based (care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and 
purity; sometimes liberty is included as well; Graham et al., 2013). Using this framework, 
Graham, Haidt, & Nosek (2009) showed that there are significant differences in the 
relative relevance of moral foundations to the moral judgments of politically opposed 
groups of subjects. Specifically, they reported that politically conservative subjects care 
more about loyalty, authority, and sanctity than their progressive counterparts, while 
progressives assign more weight to care and fairness. This evidence suggests that political 
opponents not only disagree about factual details about policies, but also construe moral 
dilemmas in a fundamentally different way (Haidt, 2012).
 For behavioral scientists with a penchant for evolutionary thinking, it should 
come as no surprise that different individuals might reason about morality differently. 
A diverse portfolio of social decision-making strategies is often the starting point for 
evolutionary simulations, both when studying decision-making itself (Axelrod, 1980; 
Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Smith & Price, 1973) and when studying the response to 
others’ decisions (Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Santos, Santos, & Pacheco, 2018). In the 
long run, such simulations often predict a mix of strategies in the population (Arce, 
2000; Bergstrom & Godfrey-Smith, 1998; Feldman & Thomas, 1987; Taylor & Jonker, 
1978; Thomas, 1984), which is in line with the observation that many of the simulated 
games know multiple optimal strategies (such as the Hawk-Dove or ‘Chicken’ game) 
(Schaffer, 1988). It remains an open question whether strategy diversity might result 
from a complex society of simple individuals with varying stable strategies (strategy 
polymorphism) or a simple society of complex individuals who can all rely on mixed 
or conditional strategies, as formal models of evolutionary processes do not distinguish 
between these two explanations (Bergstrom & Godfrey-Smith, 1998; Tomkins & Hazel, 
2007). It is clear, however, that anyone who conducts an experiment on a social decision-
making problem should expect their participants to solve the problem in a number of 
different ways.
 Although inter-individual differences in moral decision-making are as evident in 
politics as in evolutionary biology, they have been underappreciated in laboratories for 
experimental economics. Participant behavior in economic games is often explained 
in terms of one of several categorically different moral motives, such as an aversion 
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to inequity between oneself and a game partner (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & 
Schmidt, 1999), or an aversion to not meeting a game partner’s expectations (known 
as ‘guilt aversion’; Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 2007). It has been argued that by varying 
the parametrization of the utility model accompanying one such moral motive (i.e. the 
utility weight of the moral motive relative to greed), much of everyday choice behavior 
can already be explained (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). In the same vein, the unidimensional 
balance between prosocial and selfish tendencies has been found to predict behavior in 
a range of laboratory tasks (Seuntjens, Zeelenberg, Van De Ven, & Breugelmans, 2015; 
Van Lange, 1999). These efforts, however, leave unanswered the question to which 
degree a set of multiple qualitatively differing motives can help to account for moral 
decision behavior. Do inequity aversion and guilt aversion each explain a unique share 
of variance in observed moral choice, or are they mutually redundant? Given the variety 
in moral reasoning suggested by political psychology and evolutionary modeling, the 
former hypothesis is likely, but it remains to date untested.
 A major bottleneck in tackling this important issue lies in the economic games we 
commonly use to study social decision-making. In the canonical Trust Game (Berg et 
al., 1995), for example, the inequity aversion and guilt aversion models yield the same 
predictions for Trustee behavior, and it is therefore impossible to deduce from behavior 
which of the two motives gave rise to a participant’s choice. To clear this impasse, we 
previously developed the Hidden Multiplier Trust Game (HMTG; see Chapters 2 
and 3), in which inequity aversion and guilt aversion make different predictions for 
Trustee behavior. We found that some Trustees’ behavior was best captured by the 
guilt aversion model, some by inequity aversion, some by pure greed, and some by 
a fourth moral strategy, moral opportunism, in which a participant switches between 
inequity aversion and guilt aversion, always selecting the one that is financially most 
beneficial in the current task condition. We additionally found unique patterns of brain 
activity associated with each moral phenotype, lending biological confirmation to the 
psychological hypothesis that different people may approach the same moral dilemma 
in categorically different ways.
 This previous work raised the critical question what determines the moral decision 
strategy by which one makes decisions that affect the welfare of others. Does moral 
strategy reflect a stable personal trait, or do participants construct a new strategy in 
the context of a specific laboratory paradigm, depending on momentary influences like 
the experimental instructions? We here aim to provide several converging answers to 
this question, while simultaneously testing the replicability of our previous results. In 
study 1, we administered the HMTG twice, with two varying sets of stimuli and with 
separate instructions in between. We primarily aimed to measure the stability of moral 
strategy over time within-subjects. In study 2, we modified the HMTG to test whether 
making a specific moral strategy more salient can influence Trustee behavior. If this 
were the case, this would support the interpretation that participants flexibly determine 
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their moral strategy in each new context based on currently salient information, rather 
than behaving in line with a stable personal trait. Across both studies, we collected 
individual difference measures on trait guilt, trait greed, social value orientation, 
and demographics. If these trait-level measures are predictive of moral strategy, this 
would support the interpretation that moral strategy is stable over time. To aid in the 
psychological interpretation of the observed moral strategies, we additionally test to 
which degree the participants’ self-reported psychological decision strategy aligned with 
the theoretical interpretations derived from micro-economic models of decision utility.
Study 1: Introduction
The goal of study 1 was threefold. First, we aimed to replicate the results of our prior 
research using the Hidden Multiplier Trust Game with multipliers x2, x4, and x6. Do we 
observe the same diversity in reciprocity decision strategies when presenting a new group 
of participants with the same task? Second, we aimed to control for a potential confound 
in our prior work, namely that one condition of the HMTG (the x2 multiplier) required 
guilt-averse Trustees to sacrifice all their money to meet the expectations of the Investor. 
This unusually great financial pressure may have driven guilt-averse subjects toward 
moral opportunism. We here relax this pressure by administering the HMTG a second 
time to the same participants, now with multipliers x4, x6, and x8, and measuring 
shifts from moral opportunism to guilt aversion between these two multiplier contexts. 
Third, and most importantly, we aimed to measure how stable our participants’ decision 
strategies were over time. If the participants are stable in their behavior over time, this 
supports the notion that moral strategy might reflect a stable personal trait.
Study 1: Methods
Participants
104 adult participants were recruited from the Nijmegen student population using an 
online recruitment tool. People were excluded from participation if they had taken part 
in an experiment on the Hidden Multiplier Trust Game before, if they were students of 
economics, if they were not native speakers of Dutch, if they were pregnant, and/or if 
they suffered from claustrophobia.
Main task
All participants played two blocks of the Hidden Multiplier Trust Game, with 80 trials 
each. In each trial of this game, an anonymous Investor gets the chance to invest any 
number of 10 game tokens in an anonymous Trustee, retaining the remainder. As in 
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a standard Trust Game (Berg et al., 1995), the invested amount is multiplied by a 
multiplier before being sent over to the Trustee. The Trustee then gets the chance to 
return any number of tokens from the multiplied amount to the Investor, but does not 
have to do so. The version of the Trust Game employed here is single-shot, meaning 
that the Trustee only interacts with each (anonymous) Investor once. This rules out 
reputation concerns and strategic behavior on the part of the Trustee (King-Casas et 
al., 2005). In the standard Trust Game, the multiplier is x4, and both the Investor 
and the Trustee have full knowledge of this. In the Hidden Multiplier Trust Game, 
however, the multiplier is sometimes x2 (25% of rounds) or x6 (25%) instead. Crucially, 
the Investor still believes the multiplier is always x4, and the Trustee knows about the 
Investor’s ignorance as to the actual multiplier. Since the expectations of the Investor 
are now uncoupled from the true amount received by the Trustee, the guilt aversion 
and inequity aversion models make different behavioral predictions. We can therefore 
deduce from game behavior which moral strategy a given participant employed when 
making reciprocity decisions in the role of Trustee.
 One of the two blocks of 80 rounds of the HMTG was played using this multiplier 
set of [x2, x4, x6], where the Investor believed the multiplier was always x4. The 
other block was played with multiplier set [x4, x6, x8], and here the participants were 
instructed that the Investors always believed the multiplier was x6. The order of the two 
blocks was counterbalanced across participants.
Procedure
The experiment consisted of a single session. Upon arrival at the laboratory, each 
participant was seated in a closed-off behavioral lab space, where they were screened for 
participation, were informed about the study, and gave written informed consent. Next, 
they received written general instructions about the standard Trust Game. To avoid biasing 
game behavior, the Trust Game was always referred to as ‘Investment game’, the Investor 
as ‘player A’, and the Trustee as ‘player B’. The multiplier in these standard instructions 
was the Investor-believed multiplier of the context in which the participant started (i.e. 
x4 for 2-4-6 first, and x6 for 4-6-8 first). Importantly, these instructions contained no 
information about the ‘hidden multiplier’ aspect of the task, and were meant to inform the 
participants about the general structure of this economic game. In these instructions, the 
participants were asked how many of 10 game tokens they would themselves invest in an 
anonymous Trustee, if they were the Investor (and the multiplier was the aforementioned 
x4 / x6). They were asked for consent to use this investment in a future experiment on 
the Trust Game, and were informed that if their investment were used in the future, they 
would receive additional payment based on the amount sent back to them by the future 
Trustee (‘player B’). We additionally asked for permission to take their portrait photo, 
which was to be used alongside their investment in the potential future experiment. All 
these questions were added to the instructions to ensure that the investments made here 
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by the participants were sincere, and to ensure that the participants believed that they were 
interacting with real investors (i.e. people who participated at an earlier time). In reality, 
the participants played with pre-recorded investment data from a single-shot Trust Game 
with multiplier x4. This instruction step additionally allowed us to build a new set of true 
investments for future experimental use.
 After reading the general Trust Game instructions, the participants read additional 
instructions pertaining to the ‘hidden multiplier’ element of the Hidden Multiplier Trust 
Game. Here, we informed them that the Investors they would encounter always believed 
that the multiplier was fixed (at x4 for participants who started with the 2-4-6 multiplier 
context, and at x6 for 4-6-8), but that the actual multiplier would sometimes be lower 
(x2 or x4) or higher (x6 or x8). After testing the participants on their understanding of 
these instructions in a short quiz, they played 80 single-shot, anonymous rounds of the 
Hidden Multiplier Trust Game, always in the role of Trustee, in the context they were 
assigned to first (2-4-6 or 4-6-8).
 On each round, the Investor’s participant number was presented alongside a blurred 
photo of a face, which was added to strengthen the belief that the Trustees were playing 
with real Investors. The photos were taken from the Radboud Faces Database (Langner 
et al., 2010) and blurred heavily in Matlab. On the next screen, the participants read how 
many tokens the Investor had invested in them, and by which factor this investment was 
multiplied. The participants were also reminded that the Investor always believed the 
multiplier was x4. On the final screen, the participants could indicate how much out of 
the multiplied amount they wanted to return to the Investor; crucially, they could also 
choose to keep it all. There was a short break after 40 trials.
 After playing the 80 rounds in the first context, the participants were allowed to take 
a self-paced break while remaining in the behavioral lab space, and received instructions 
for the second context. These short instructions highlighted the fact that the multiplier 
set would change, and that the new Investors for this second context always believed the 
multiplier was x6 (in 4-6-8) or x4 (in 2-4-6). Thus, all participants played 80 rounds 
of the HMTG twice, once in 2-4-6 and 4-6-8, with context order counterbalanced 
between participants, and they were informed that they played with a unique anonymous 
Investor on each of the 160 rounds of this experiment. The investment sets were identical 
between the two contexts. The participants were informed that one trial out of the 160 
would be randomly selected to be paid out both to them and to the corresponding 
Investor, with an exchange rate of €0.40 per game token.
 Since the multiplier in the HMTG determines with how many tokens the Trustee 
gets to play, it also determines the behavioral predictions of the inequity aversion model: 
under the highest multiplier (x6 or x8) the amount sent back to the Investor by the Trustee 
ought to be higher than under the medium (x4/x6) or lowest (x2/x4) multiplier. Since the 
Investor always believes the multiplier to take the medium value (x4 in 2-4-6 and x6 in 
4-6-8), however, the predictions of the guilt aversion model are identical across multiplier 
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conditions. This allows us to deduce from each Trustee’s behavior which moral strategy 
they followed in their reciprocity decisions (see Computational modeling).
 After finishing both contexts of the HMTG, the participants completed an extensive 
questionnaire about all combinations of investment, multiplier, and Investor-believed 
multiplier. They first indicated, for each investment and Investor-believed multiplier, 
how many game tokens they believed the Investor to expect back from the Trustee. Next, 
for each investment-multiplier combination (2-4-6 and 4-6-8), they indicated how 
many game tokens would be fair to return. We thus elicited second-order expectations 
(beliefs about Investor’s expectations) and fairness norms from each participant. The 
second-order expectations were used as input to the guilt aversion model in the analysis 
(see Computational modeling).
Additional measures
After finishing the HMTG and the accompanying questionnaire, the participants 
completed a computerized version of the social value orientation (SVO; Van Lange, 
1999) task, which was based on the ‘slider measure’ version of the SVO (Murphy et 
al., 2011). After, they completed the dispositional greed scale (Seuntjens et al., 2015), 
which measures greediness as a personality trait, and the guilt inventory (Jones et al., 
2000), which yields an individual difference measure of general sensitivity to guilt (trait 
guilt). Finally, they answered several questions about their own decision-making strategy 
in the HMTG, dividing 100 points over various descriptions of strategies:
-   Inequity aversion (“I wanted to divide the total number of tokens evenly over the 
Investor and myself ”)
-   Guilt aversion (“I wanted to give the number of tokens that the Investor expected to 
receive”)
-   Greed (“I wanted to keep as much of the investment as possible for myself ”)
-   Altruism (“I wanted to return as much as possible of the investment”)
-   Other (“Other, describe and indicate number of points”)
Finally, each participant was asked whether they believed an Investor would be happy 
to be paid based on the participant’s reciprocity decisions. If at this point, or at any 
other time, the participant indicated that they did not believe the Investors were real 
other participants, their data were excluded from the analysis. Based on these criteria, 2 
participants were excluded from analysis, leaving a total of 102 participants (50 with the 
2-4-6 context first, 52 with 4-6-8 first) (32 men; mean age 22.3 ± 2.7 y).
Computational modeling
We used the moral phenotype model (see Chapter 3) to infer the Trustees’ motives 
from their reciprocity behavior on the HMTG. This model (eq. 1) describes the utility 
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derived by the Trustee from their strategy S2 (i.e. the number of tokens sent back to the 
Investor) based on monetary gain, guilt, and inequity. Two free parameters (theta, Θ; 
and phi, Φ) balance the influence of these three sources of (dis)utility:
 U2(S2) = Θ * π2 – (1 – Θ) * min(Guilt2 + Φ, Inequity2 – Φ)             (1)
In this model, the Trustee’s monetary gain is defined as π2 = (I * M – S2) / (I * M), in which 
I represents the Investor’s investment, M represents the multiplier, and S2 represents the 
Trustee’s strategy (i.e. the number of tokens returned to the Investor). Inequity is defined 
Inequity2 = ((I * M – S2) / (10 – I + I * M) – ½)
2 (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000), and guilt 
is defined Guilt2 = ((E2(E1(S2)) – S2) / (ME1 * I))
2 (Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 2007; 
Dufwenberg & Gneezy, 2000) , where E2(E1(S2)) represents the Trustee’s belief about the 
Investor’s expectations of the Trustee’s strategy and ME1 represents the Investor’s belief 
about the multiplier. At each reciprocity decision, either guilt or inequity constitutes the 
social preference term of the Trustee’s utility function. By default, at Φ = 0, the model 
selects the weakest of the two. This structure accommodates for the ‘moral opportunism’ 
behavior pattern, since it allows the Trustee to disregard guilt (i.e. disappointing the 
Investor) in the x2 context, and to disregard inequity in the x6 context. As phi moves 
away from 0, however, the model’s optimal solution is biased towards the guilt aversion 
(phi < 0) or inequity aversion (phi > 0) prediction. Higher levels of theta (Θ) bias 
behavior towards greed. At different combinations of theta and phi, therefore, the model 
can accommodate guilt aversion, inequity aversion, moral opportunism, and greed.
In this experiment, we compared the performance of the moral phenotype model to that 
of simpler and previously proposed alternative models: greed (eq. 2), inequity aversion 
(eq. 3), and guilt aversion (eq. 4). In these models, monetary payoff, guilt, and inequity 
are defined as in the moral phenotype model.
 U2(S2) = π2                   (2)
 U2(S2) = π2 – Θ * Inequity2                 (3)
 U2(S2) = π2 – Θ * Guilt2                 (4)
Across all models, the predicted strategy for the Trustee was the strategy which yielded 
maximal utility:
 Ŝ2=arg maxS2 U2(S2)                  (5)
Model performance was measured and compared using the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC; eq. 6) (Akaike, 1974; Hurvich & Tsai, 1989), which rewards model fit 
and penalizes model complexity (number of free parameters). We chose to use AIC over 
the alternative Bayesian Information Criterion, since AIC is superior to BIC if the true 
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data-generating model is not in the model set (Wagenmakers & Farrell, 2004), which 
is likely true for the current experiment. Assuming that the model errors are normally 
distributed, AIC is defined as
 AIC = n * ln(SSE/n) + k * 2                (6)
where SSE represents the residual sum of squares (i.e. the sum over squared differences 
between model prediction and actual behavior), n represents the number of observations 
(trials), and k represents the number of free parameters in the model (theta and/or phi). 
Participants whose behavior was perfectly explained by any model were excluded from 
model comparisons, since the logarithm of 0 is undefined.
 To avoid obtaining a local rather than global optimum, the computational models 
were fit to each subject’s behavior 10000 times, each time with a different random 
parameter set as starting point for the optimizer. For each participant the best-fitting 
parameter set out of all solutions was selected.
 We used the moral phenotype model results to classify participants as greedy, guilt-
averse, inequity-averse, or morally opportunistic, using the same unbiased procedure 
as in earlier work (see Chapter 3 of this thesis). To this end, we first ran simulations of 
the moral phenotype model for all combinations of investment and multiplier at 10201 
(101 by 101) equidistant points in the model’s theta-phi parameter space (theta on the 
domain [0, 0.5] and phi on [-0.1, 0.1]), and applied hierarchical clustering to these 
simulations based on their pairwise Euclidean distance in reciprocity behavior. In the 
simulations, we used as second-order expectations half the amount the Investor believes 
the Trustee has. For the x2-x4-x6 context, we set the clustering distance cutoff such 
that five clusters were obtained, and then merged the two clusters whose simulations 
corresponded to the theoretical moral opportunism pattern. For the x4-x6-x8 context, 
we set the distance cutoff such that four clusters were immediately obtained. This method 
ensured that high phi corresponded to inequity aversion, low phi to guilt aversion, phi 
around zero to moral opportunism, and high theta to greed, all of which are line with the 
design of the moral phenotype model, while letting the objective clustering algorithm 
draw the precise boundaries between the corresponding zones of theta-phi coordinates 
in the model’s parameter space. We then located each participant in the parameter space 
by their best-fitting theta-phi parameter pair, and thus placed them into one of the four 
moral phenotype zones. This procedure yielded, for each participant and each context 
(2-4-6 and 4-6-8 for study 1, 2-4-6 for study 2), a label of moral phenotype: inequity-
averse, guilt-averse, morally opportunistic, and greedy.
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Software
Stimulus presentation was done using PsychToolBox 3.0.11 (www.psychtoolbox.org) 
for Matlab 2016a (Mathworks, Natick, MA, USA). Questionnaire data, screening, 
and debriefing were collected using Castor Electronic Data Capture (www.castoredc.
com). Data analysis was carried out in Python 2.7, using the optimize.least_squares 
routine in the Scipy package version 1.0.0 (Jones, Oliphant, Peterson, et al., 2001) for 
computational model fitting. Mixed-effects regression was done in R 3.4.3 using the 
lme4 and lmerTest packages.
Ethical approval
The experimental procedures of both studies were approved by the local ethics review 
board (CMO Arnhem-Nijmegen, The Netherlands).
Study 1: Results
Regression results
Figure 4.1A/C shows that the predictions of the inequity aversion and guilt aversion 
models are starkly different in the x2 and x6 conditions of this task, as intended. The 
guilt aversion model predicts that behavior should be the same between the three 
conditions, since the Investor believes the multiplier is always x4. If we would observe 
a significant difference in reciprocity behavior between the conditions, therefore, this 
would imply that guilt aversion alone is not sufficient to explain reciprocity in this 
game. We tested this using mixed-effects multiple linear regression, where we regressed 
the number of tokens returned by the Trustee to the Investor onto the investment, the 
multiplier, their interaction, and random subject intercepts. This analysis showed that in 
both contexts of study 1, all three fixed effects significantly predicted amount returned 
(context 2-4-6: investment effect F(1,8211) = 13286.2, p < 0.001; multiplier effect 
F(2,8211) = 1707.9, p < 0.001; investment by multiplier interaction F(2,8211) = 624.9, 
p < 0.001; context 4-6-8: investment effect F(1,8211) = 13286.2, p < 0.001; multiplier 
effect F(2,8211) = 1707.9, p < 0.001; investment by multiplier interaction F(2,8211) = 
624.9, p < 0.001) (fig. 4.1B/D). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons between multiplier levels 
revealed significant differences between all pairs of conditions (all p < 0.001, Holm-
Bonferroni corrected). This indicates that multiplier level affects reciprocity behavior in 
the Hidden Multiplier Trust Game, which is not predicted by the guilt aversion model 
(but is predicted by inequity aversion).
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Figure 4.1. Task predictions and experimental data for study 1.
Mean number of tokens sent back by Trustees to Investors is presented as a function of investment, multiplier, and 
multiplier context. A) Predictions of the inequity aversion and guilt aversion models in the x2-x4-x6 context. B) 
Experimental data in the x2-x4-x6 context. C) Model predictions in the x4-x6-x8 context. D) Experimental data in the 
x4-x6-x8 context. Error bars represent bootstrapped 95% confi dence interval.
Computational modeling results
Th e results of the regression analysis could mean that all subjects in study 1 consistently 
behaved in accordance with the inequity aversion model. Alternatively, the fi nding could 
be explained by participants’ showing noisy behavior or switching between various moral 
motives on a trial-by-trial basis. Th e third possible explanation is that diff erent subjects 
consistently following diff erent moral motives, as we hypothesized previously (see 
Chapter 3 of this thesis). We used computational modeling of the reciprocity decisions 
to arbitrate between these explanations. To this end, we fi rst fi t a utility model capable 
of capturing the hypothesized motivational diversity between subjects to the data (the 
‘moral phenotype model’, see Methods), and then compared the explanatory power 
of this model to that of the competing models of greed, guilt aversion and inequity 
aversion. In this analysis, we excluded subjects whose model fi t was so good that the 
resulting AIC score became a negative outlier (cutoff : sum of squared model error across 
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the subject’s 76 trials < 10). In the x2-x4-x6 context, model fi t was signifi cantly better 
for the Moral Phenotype Model than for the greed model, the guilt aversion model, 
and the inequity aversion model (paired-samples t-test on AIC, IA versus MP: t(93) 
= 2.85, P = 0.005; fi g. 4.2A). Although the improved model fi t for the MP model 
relative to IA was not signifi cant in the x4-x6-x8 context (IA versus MP: t(93) = 1.38, 
P = 0.172), mean model performance across the two contexts was signifi cantly better 
for MP (paired-samples t-test on mean subject AICs across contexts, IA versus MP: 
t(93) = 2.20, P = 0.030). Th ese results confi rm that a set of qualitatively diff erent moral 
strategies is better at explaining the behavior in the HMTG than the inequity aversion 
model by itself, even when penalizing for increased model complexity. Th e fact that 
we can derive this conclusion from a utility model fi t at the subject level suggests that 
diff erences in moral strategy play out between subjects rather than within subjects. As 
an additional test of this conclusion, we tested the consistency of a participant’s moral 
strategy over time in the next analysis.
Figure 4.2. Model comparisons.
Comparison between the moral phenotype (MP), inequity aversion (IA), guilt aversion (GA) and greed (GR) models. 
A) Model comparisons across the two contexts of study 1. B) Model comparisons in study 2. AIC: Akaike Information 
Criterion. **: P < 0.01 (uncorrected); n.s.: not signifi cant. Error bars represent bootstrapped 95% confi dence intervals.
Moral strategy consistency over time
To test the consistency of the participants’ moral strategy over time, we fi t our 
computational model to the fi rst 60 trials of each participant’s data within one context 
(x2-x4-x6 or x4-x6-x8). We then used the obtained model parameters of each participant 
to predict the same participant’s behavior on the held-out part of their data (the last 16 
trials; trials with 0 investment excluded), and compared the resulting model fi t with the 
fi t we would obtain if we predicted the held-out behavior using the fi tted parameters 
of a random participant. In practice, this means we shuffl  ed the participant labels of 
the fi tted model parameters 1000 times, computed the mean model fi t on the held-out 
data each time, and compared it to the mean model fi t on the held-out data using the 
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true model parameters. If participants are inconsistent in their strategy, the true cross-
validated model fi t (using the participant’s own parameters) should be equally bad as the 
shuffl  ed cross-validated model fi t. Contrary to this hypothesis, this analysis showed that 
the average model fi t obtained on held-out data using the participant’s own training data 
parameters was much better than the average fi t obtained using shuffl  ed parameters (p 
< 0.001 in both contexts; fi g. 4.3). Th is confi rms that our participants were consistent 
across trials in their strategy for reciprocity decisions, and together with the previous 
results implies that diff erent participants consistently follow diff erent decision strategies 
when playing as Trustee in the Hidden Multiplier Trust Game.
Figure 4.3. Cross-validation tests of moral strategy consistency in study 1.
Predicting a held-out set of trials using a computational model fi t to the held-in set of trials from the same participant 
(dotted line) always yields much better model fi t than using a computational model fi t to the held-in trials from 
random other participants (null distribution histogram). Cross-validation results are presented A) for context x2-x4-x6, 
B) for context x4-x6-x8, and C) between the two multiplier contexts of study 1.
Relative prevalence of moral strategies in study 1
Figure 4.4 displays the position of each participant in the theta-phi model parameter 
space in both multiplier contexts of study 1. We clustered our participants into the four 
hypothesized groups of guilt aversion, inequity aversion, moral opportunism, and greed, 
based on independently defi ned boundaries in the computational model’s parameter 
space (see Methods; fi g. 4.5; participant behavior in each cluster in Supplement). Th is 
method yielded relatively high prevalence of moral opportunism and inequity aversion 
in both contexts, as found previously.
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Figure 4.4. Model parameter space in study 1 (A) and 2 (B).
Th e space contains the four hypothesized moral strategies at diff erent zones of parameter combinations (shaded 
patches), with best-fi tting parameters added in for each participant (scattered points). Circles: greed; stars: guilt 
aversion; squares: inequity aversion; diamonds: moral opportunism.
Contextual determinants of moral strategies
Having deduced that diff erent participants consistently apply diff erent decision rules 
when playing as Trustees in the Hidden Multiplier Trust Game, we can now explore 
which factors might determine a participant’s stable decision strategy. In study 1, we fi rst 
aimed to test how stable the participants’ moral strategy was across the two contexts, 
which were separated by a break and new task instructions. To this end, we quantifi ed 
the test-retest reliability of model parameters theta and phi, as well as the pairwise inter-
subject distance in the theta-phi parameter space, by computing the Pearson correlation 
between these metrics between x2-x4-x6 and x4-x6-x8. All three metrics showed very 
high reliability across contexts (theta: r = 0.94, p < 0.001; phi: r = 0.69, p < 0.001; inter-
subject distance: r = 0.86, p < 0.001; fi g. 4.5A-C). Second, we specifi cally used study 1 to 
test whether the fi nancial pressure of the x2 condition of the HMTG pushed otherwise 
guilt-averse players toward a moral opportunism strategy. If this interpretation were 
true, we would expect participants who were MO in x2-x4-x6 to be GA in x4-x6-x8. 
We tested this prediction using a Stuart-Maxwell test for paired (repeated-measures) 
frequency sets, which revealed no signifi cantly diff erent distribution of strategies 
between the two multiplier contexts (X2(3) = 1.16, P = 0.76; fi g 4.5D). A more specifi c 
Stuart-Maxwell test for switching between MO and GA revealed no signifi cant change 
in relative frequency of these two strategies between the two contexts (X2(1) = 0.66, 
p = 0.41). On the contrary, as fi g. 4.5D shows, most participants were consistent in 
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their moral strategy between the contexts 2-4-6 and 4-6-8 (the highest values lie on 
the diagonal). Th is suggests that the fi nancial pressure imposed by the x2 condition did 
not specifi cally shape the distribution of moral strategies in the x2-x4-x6 context, and 
suggests that moral opportunism is a moral strategy in its own right, rather than just 
guilt aversion with a context-dependent adaptation.
 Finally, we applied the cross-validation analysis to the two contexts of study 1, 
testing how well a participant’s parameters fi t on the one context could capture their 
behavior in the other. As in the previous cross-validation analyses, this analysis showed 
that strategy consistency across contexts was much greater than predicted by chance (p < 
0.001; fi g. 4.5E). Taken together, the analyses presented so far suggest that participants 
consistently rely on diff erent strategies when making Trust Game reciprocity decisions, 
and that these strategies are not easily aff ected by time or changing task parameters.
Figure 5. Moral strategy is stable across the x2-x4-x6 and x4-x6-x8 context of study 1.
A-B) Test-retest reliability of model parameters theta and phi between the two contexts. C) Test-retest reliability of the 
inter-subject distance in the model parameter space. Inter-subject distance indexes the relative geometry of the 102 
participants in theta-phi space, which is useful since the parameter values may not be directly comparable between the 
two contexts (e.g. the boundary between GA and MO in 2/4/6 is not precisely the same as in 4/6/8). D) Categorical 
shifts in moral strategy between the two contexts are rare (highest values on the diagonal). E) Cross-validation results: 
predicting behavior in x4-x6-x8 using the parameters from x2-x4-x6 and vice versa.
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Study 1: Discussion
In study 1, we replicated our earlier observation that different subjects rely on different 
decision strategies when making decisions as Trustee in a Trust Game. Regression 
showed that guilt aversion is not a sufficient explanation for the behavior observed; and 
computational modeling showed that the Moral Phenotype Model, which allows for 
decision strategy to categorically differ between subjects, is more appropriate for these 
data than any unitary social preference model on its own. Further analyses showed that 
moral decision strategy was stable over time and across contexts, suggesting that the 
strategy derived from each participant’s model might reflect a relatively stable personal 
trait. We tested an additional boundary condition on this interpretation in study 2: the 
influence of task salience on moral strategy.
Study 2: Introduction
In study 2, we aimed to test how strong the influence of task salience is on the decision 
strategy employed by our participants. Specifically, we tested the interpretation that the 
high prevalence of inequity aversion in study 1 might be due to the fact that in study 
1, the true multiplier is manipulated, which directly feeds into the inequity aversion 
model (since the multiplier determines the total amount of money to be divided). In 
study 2, therefore, we presented new participants with a ‘flipped’ version of the Hidden 
Multiplier Trust Game: the False-Belief Multiplier Trust Game (FBMTG). In this task, 
the Investor believes the multiplier is x2, x4, or x6 (with complete belief in one of the 
three on each trial); but the Trustee learns that the investment will actually always be 
multiplied by x4, and learns about the Investor’s belief. In this task, the salient element 
is the changing belief of the Investor, which feeds directly into the guilt aversion model. 
Will this change of manipulation induce lower prevalence of IA and higher prevalence 
of GA?
Study 2: Methods
Participants
57 participants were recruited from the Nijmegen student body using an online 
recruitment tool. Exclusion criteria were identical to those of study 1 and 2 participants 
were excluded due to disbelief in the task, leaving 55 participants (14 men; mean age 
21.8 ± 2.8 y).
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Main task
In this study, participants played an ‘inverted’ version of the Hidden Multiplier Trust 
Game, the False-Belief Multiplier Trust Game (FBMTG), always in the role of Trustee. 
In this variant, the multiplier by which the Investment is multiplied is always x4, but the 
Investors have varying beliefs about the multiplier. 50% of the 80 Investors encountered 
by the Trustee (in single-shot interactions) believed their investment would be multiplied 
by x4, 25% believe in x2, and 25% in x6. As in study 1, the number of tokens sent to 
the Trustee differs from the number of tokens the Investor believes the Trustee has in 
50% of the trials, which means the reciprocity behavior predicted by the guilt aversion 
and inequity aversion models diverges. This design also allows for morally opportunistic 
behavior: a morally opportunistic Trustee could return the Investor’s expectation in x2 
(GA), keeping the surplus; and create an even split in x6 (IA), thereby disappointing 
the Investor.
Procedure
After arriving at the laboratory, the participants were seated in a closed-off behavioral 
lab space, where they were screened for participation and gave written, informed 
consent. They then read the general instructions about the task. In these instructions, 
the participants were informed that anonymous other participants (‘Player A’) had made 
‘Investment Game’ investments in them under varying multipliers (x2, x4 and x6). They 
learned that they would respond to these investments in the role of Trustee (‘Player B’) 
and would be free to choose the number of tokens they wished to send back to each 
anonymous investor. They were also instructed that one of the 80 interactions would be 
randomly selected to be actually paid out to them and the corresponding Investor. In 
reality, the investment decisions were pre-programmed identically to study 1, and the 
selected trial was only financially consequential for the Trustee participant.
 After reading these instructions, the participants reported how many of 10 game 
tokens they would invest if they were the Investor, under each of the three multipliers x2, 
x4 and x6. For each of these investments, they also reported how many tokens they would 
expect back from an anonymous Trustee. Next, as in study 1, we asked permission to take 
the participant’s portrait photo and use this alongside their investment(s) in a potential 
future study. Finally, the participants were given a page with extra instructions for this 
experiment, which stated that although the Investors believed in varying multipliers (x2, 
x4 and x6), the multiplier would in fact always be x4. The participants were quizzed on 
these instructions, and once they understood started playing 80 rounds of the FBMTG.
On each game round, the participants were presented with the Investor’s participant 
number and a blurred photo of their face, as in study 1. They next read how much the 
Investor had invested in them, and by how much the Investor believed their investment 
would be multiplied. They were also reminded that the investment would in fact be 
multiplied by 4. On the final task screen, the participants indicated how many of the 
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multiplied game tokens they wished to return to the Investor, with the option of keeping 
all. Halfway through the task, after 40 trials, the participants could take a self-paced break.
Additional measures
After the main task, we took the same additional measures as in study 1: the participants 
completed an extensive questionnaire about their second-order expectations (i.e. beliefs 
about the Investor’s expectations) and fairness norms in the FBMTG; they completed 
a computerized version of the Social Value Orientation ‘slider measure’ task; and filled 
out the Guilt Inventory, the Dispositional Greed Scale, and a debriefing questionnaire. 
In this final step, they self-reported how they made their decisions in the main task by 
dividing 100 points over various candidate strategies (see study 1). The same measures 
as in study 1 were taken to ensure and check that the participants believed the Investors 
were real. 2 participants indicated that they did not believe the Investors were real other 
participants; their data were excluded from analysis.
 Computational modeling, software use and ethical approval were identical to study 1.
Study 2: Results
Regression results
Study 1, as well as our prior work, clearly shows that the guilt aversion model is 
insufficient to explain reciprocity behavior in the Hidden Multiplier Trust Game. We 
used study 2 to test the converse claim that the inequity aversion model is insufficient to 
explain observed reciprocity behavior. In study 2, the Investor sometimes believes that 
the investment will be multiplied by x2, sometimes by x4, and sometimes by x6 (on each 
trial, the Investor has complete belief in one of the three), but the actual multiplier is 
always x4. The inequity aversion model would predict that Trustee reciprocity does not 
differ between the three conditions, since the actual amount of money in the game is 
identical between the three Investor-belief conditions (fig. 4.6A). If Trustee behavior is 
found to differ significantly between the three Investor-belief conditions, this is evidence 
that inequity aversion alone cannot account for Trustee reciprocity.
 We tested this prediction using mixed-effects multiple linear regression, where 
we regressed the number of tokens returned by the Trustee to the Investor onto the 
investment, the believed multiplier, their interaction, and random subject intercepts. 
This analysis showed that all three fixed effects significantly predicted amount returned 
(investment effect F(1,4044) = 9007.2, p < 0.001; believed multiplier effect F(2,4044) 
= 128.7, p < 0.001; investment by believed multiplier interaction F(2,4044) = 51.6, 
p < 0.001). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons between Investor-believed multiplier levels 
revealed significant differences between all condition pairs (all p < 0.001, Holm-
Bonferroni corrected; fig. 4.6B). This indicates that Investor-believed multiplier level 
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aff ects reciprocity behavior in the False-Belief Multiplier Trust Game, which is not 
predicted by the inequity aversion model (but is predicted by guilt aversion). Together 
with the regression results of study 1, this shows that neither guilt aversion nor inequity 
aversion is suffi  cient to explain Trustee reciprocity.
Figure 4.6. Task predictions and experimental data for study 2.
Mean number of tokens sent back by Trustees to Investors is presented as a function of investment, multiplier, and 
multiplier context. A) Predictions of the inequity aversion and guilt aversion models. B) Experimental data. Error bars 
represent bootstrapped 95% confi dence interval.
Computational modeling results
As in study 1, we fi rst aimed to confi rm that reciprocity motives diff er between subjects, 
not between trials, using computational modeling. As in study 1, in study 2 model fi t 
was signifi cantly better for the Moral Phenotype Model than for the greed model, the 
guilt aversion model, and the inequity aversion model (fi g. 4.2B) (paired-samples t-test 
on AIC between IA and MP models: t(52) = 3.38, P = 0.001). Additionally, cross-
validation on the model showed that each participant’s last 16 trials are signifi cantly 
better explained by the model fi t to their own fi rst 60 trials than by the model fi t to 
random others’ fi rst 60 trials (p < 0.001). Th ese results, as before, imply that diff erent 
subjects consistently follow diff erent decision rules for Trust Game reciprocity. Th e 
model’s parameter space for study 2 is displayed in fi gure 4.4B; we will use the strategy 
clustering derived from this space in the subsequent analyses.
Relative prevalence of moral strategies between study 1 and 2
We compared the prevalence of the four moral strategies between the 2-4-6 context of 
study 1 and study 2 (where Investor-believed multipliers were also 2-4-6). Study 2, in 
which the beliefs of the Investor are manipulated while the true amount of money in 
the game is equal between conditions, was designed to make guilt aversion more salient 
than in study 1. Accordingly, if moral strategy is constructed on-the-fl y in an experiment 
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based on currently salient aspects of the task instructions, we would predict to fi nd 
higher prevalence of guilt aversion and lower prevalence of inequity aversion in study 2 
than in study 1. To test this prediction, we compared the relative prevalence of the four 
moral strategies between these two studies using a chi-square test. While the measured 
prevalence of GA was greater in study 1 than in study 2 (see fi gure 7), the between-study 
diff erence in relative prevalence of the four strategies was not signifi cant (chi-square 
across the four groups: X2(3) = 7.55, P = 0.056). Additionally, the prevalence of IA was 
not smaller in study 2 than in study 1, as we had predicted. Indeed, when testing the 
between-study diff erence in relative prevalence of each combination of two strategies, 
the only signifi cant change was in the relative prevalence of GA and GR (X2(1) = 6.28, 
P (uncorrected) = 0.012), although this eff ect disappeared when correcting for multiple 
comparisons. IA and MO were as dominant in study 2 as in study 1. In other words, 
the saliency manipulation did not induce the expected strategy shift from IA to GA, 
which suggests that the manipulation-based salience of moral strategies is not suffi  cient 
to shape their relative prevalence.
Figure 4.7. The relative prevalence of the four moral strategies in study 1 (x2-x4-x6 context) 
and study 2.
While GA is more prevalent in study 2, the diff erence in relative prevalence of the four strategies is not signifi cant, and 
there is no decrease in IA between study 1 and 2.
Study 2: Discussion
In study 2, we replicated our earlier fi ndings that a variety of moral strategies, as included 
in the Moral Phenotype Model, is a better explanation of Trustee reciprocity behavior 
than one strategy by itself. Additionally, we showed that the salience of a given element 
of our experimental tasks – be it the true multiplier or the multiplier believed by the 
Investor – has no notable eff ect on the relative prevalence of the four moral strategies 
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described here. This is somewhat surprising, as the common fear of demand effects in 
social psychology (Klein et al., 2012; Zizzo, 2010) would suggest that participants are 
eager to track the most clearly manipulated component of a task in their behavior.
 While the results presented so far are in line with the interpretation that moral 
decision strategy reflects a stable personal trait, they are not conclusive in this regard. 
As additional evidence toward this question, we now present analyses carried out on the 
combined data of study 1 and 2.
Combined data: Introduction
In the last analyses of this paper, we aimed to find potential links between common 
individual difference measures and moral strategy exhibited in our Trust Game tasks. If 
there are significant relationships between traits assumed to be stable within a person, 
this suggests that moral strategy might be a stable trait as well. Additionally, we aimed 
to test whether our model-based interpretations of moral strategy (i.e. ‘inequity-averse’ 
subjects caring about splitting the money 50-50) aligned with the subjects’ own subjective 
experience of their psychological decision process, by studying self-reported reciprocity 
motives. For these analyses, we pooled the data of study 1 and 2, but only kept the 75 
subjects from study 1 who exhibited the same categorical moral strategy across the two 
multiplier contexts of this study. The total pooled n was therefore 75 + 55 = 130.
Combined data: Results
Subject-level determinants of moral strategy
If the model parameter theta (the ‘greed parameter’) accurately captures the greed aspect 
of moral strategy, we would predict that this parameter is negatively correlated to the 
social value orientation (SVO) score, which is known to predict prosociality in a range 
of laboratory tasks (Van Lange, 1999; Murphy, Ackermann, & Handgraaf, 2011). 
In line with this expectation, we found a strong and significant negative correlation 
between theta and SVO (r = -0.68, p < 0.001; fig. 4.8). We also found a weaker but 
significant positive correlation between theta and dispositional greed (DG) (r = 0.24, p 
= 0.0053). Theta was not correlated to trait guilt, as expected. To our surprise, model 
parameter phi also correlated with SVO, but in the opposite direction from the theta 
relationships (phi with SVO: r = 0.32, P < 0.01). However, this could be explained by 
the negative correlation between phi and theta (r = -0.38, P < 0.001). To control for 
this potential confound, we residualized phi with respect to theta (i.e. used the distance 
of each phi point to the theta-phi linear regression line). The resulting phi-controlled-
for-theta was not significantly correlated with either SVO (P = 0.83) or DG (P = 0.45). 
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These results suggest that previously proposed measures of social preference (social value 
orientation and greed) capture the same trait as our model’s theta parameter, but that 
parameter phi captures previously unexplained variance in social choice behavior. This 
conclusion matches our earlier observation that qualitative differences in moral motives 
(e.g. between inequity and guilt aversion) are understudied in experimental psychology, 
while the quantitative gradient of prosocial-proself has already received much attention.
 To further characterize the relationship between moral strategy and social value 
orientation, we additionally compared SVO score between the four moral strategy 
groups GR, GA, IA and MO. A one-way ANOVA between these four groups of SVO 
scores revealed a significant categorical difference (F(3,126) = 28.42, P < 0.001; fig. 
4.8). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed significant differences between GR and GA 
(t(30) = -4.44, P < 0.001), GR and IA (t(56) = -12.56, P < 0.001), GR and MO (t(71) = 
-4.89, P < 0.001), IA and MO (t(98) = 5.64, P < 0.001), and GA and IA (t(55) = -3.58, 
P = 0.004) (all p-values Bonferroni-corrected). These results yield the more fine-grained 
interpretation that greedy subjects are more proself than the other strategy groups, and 
that both guilt-averse and morally opportunistic participants are more proself than 
inequity-averse participants. Dispositional greed and trait guilt were not significantly 
different across the four groups.
 Contrary to previous findings (Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997), 
age was not predictive of any of the individual difference measures (SVO, DG or 
TG) (all p > 0.1). However, there was a mild difference in age between the four moral 
strategy groups (F(3,126) = 2.98, P = 0.033). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed 
that IA subjects were significantly older than MO subjects (t(98) = 2.75, P(Bonferroni-
corrected) = 0.043; other comparisons n.s.). Males were greedier on average than 
females, as measured by model parameter theta (mean difference = 0.08, t(129) = 2.88, 
P = 0.005), DG (mean diff. = 2.30, t(129) = 2.70, P = 0.008), and SVO (mean diff. = 
-7.87, t(129) = -4.67, P < 0.001). Accordingly, the relative prevalence of moral strategies 
between was significantly different between men and women (X2(3) = 13.36, P = 0.004). 
Post-hoc chi-square tests between all pairs of model-derived strategy groups revealed 
that increased greed in men was accompanied by decreased inequity aversion (GR versus 
IA on men versus women, X2(1) = 9.18, P = 0.015) and moral opportunism (GR versus 
MO on men versus women, X2(1) = 9.15, P = 0.015).
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Figure 4.8. Relationships between moral strategy and individual diﬀ erence measures.
Relationships between moral strategy (as measured by model parameters theta (top row) and phi (middle row; 
residualized with respect to theta), and the model-based strategy grouping (bottom row)) and other individual 
diff erence measures (social value orientation, left column; dispositional greed, middle column; trait guilt, right 
column). Signifi cant eff ects are indicated by solid regression lines (theta and phi) and opaque bars (strategy groups). 
P-values from post-hoc pairwise comparisons between strategy groups (bottom row) are Bonferroni-corrected: *** p < 
0.001; ** p < 0.01.
Self-report of moral strategy
We have so far established that, across two experiments, participants appear to use 
consistently varying moral strategies for Trustee reciprocity decisions. Th ese diff erent 
strategies are relatively insensitive to contextual factors, and are instead linked to 
individual diff erences. But our interpretation of these strategies so far has been based 
on theoretical models from experimental economics, which assume that participants are 
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‘averse’ to (derive negative utility from) a given type of event (inequity or a disappointed 
game partner). In a final analysis, we therefore aimed to find out whether our theory-
based interpretations of moral strategies aligned with our participants’ own self-reported 
interpretation of their strategy. As a secondary goal, we here aimed to find out whether 
the four moral strategy groups are driven by a distinct motivational profile, which would 
support the notion that these groups draw upon different psychological processes in 
their social decision-making.
 After the experimental tasks, we asked all participants to rate how important several 
possible moral strategies had been to their decision-making in the HMTG, using a 
computerized questionnaire. We suggested four potential strategies: ‘I wanted to divide 
the total number of tokens equally over the Investor and myself ’ (i.e. this statement 
represented our interpretation of inequity aversion, and is described further as ’50-50’), ‘I 
wanted to return the number of tokens the Investor expected’ (guilt aversion; described as 
‘Expectation’), ‘I wanted to keep as much of the Investment as possible’ (greed; described 
further as ‘Keep’), and ‘I wanted to return as much as possible of the Investment’ 
(altruism). Additionally, the participants were allowed to describe any other strategies in 
an open-ended answer box. The participants were asked to divide a total of 100 ‘points’ 
proportionally over all strategies they found relevant to their own decision-making in the 
HMTG.
 As expected, there were significant differences in the weight the four groups (GR, 
GA, IA, MO) assigned to the first three suggested strategies (Keep: F(3,126) = 51.44, p 
< 0.001; 50-50: F(3,126) = 28.46, P < 0.001; Expectation: F(3,126) = 13.81, p < 0.001) 
(fig. 4.9). The IA and GR groups are both easy to delineate in this three-dimensional 
motivation space: they assign significantly higher weight than the other three groups to 
50-50 (IA-GA: P = 0.006; other IA pairs P < 0.001) and Keep (all GR pairs: P < 0.001), 
respectively. The difference between GA and MO subjects is less clear. Although GA 
participants assigned more weight than the other groups to the Expectation motive, the 
difference with MO was not significant when correcting for multiple comparisons (P 
= 0.093). Similarly, the MO participants rated higher on the ‘Keep’ motive than GA, 
but not significantly so (P = 0.058, both P-values with Holm-Bonferroni correction for 
multiple Tukey contrasts). To test whether moral opportunism was still distinguishable 
from guilt aversion in the multi-dimensional motivation space, we built a linear support 
vector classifier for GA versus MO with the three motives 50-50, Keep and Expectation 
as features. In the classifier, the class weight was balanced such that misclassifying 
guilt-averse subjects was penalized in proportion to their rarity. Leave-one-subject-out 
cross-validation revealed that this classifier was able to recover each participant’s moral 
strategy (GA or MO) from their position in self-reported motive space with 74.0% 
accuracy (54 out of 73 participants correct), which is significantly better than the chance 
performance of 50% (binomial test P < 0.001).
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Figure 4.9. Self-reported importance of diﬀ erent decision strategies for participants in the 
four model-derived moral strategy groups.
Points are mean over group; lines represent standard error of the mean.
Combined data: Discussion
Our fi ndings linking moral strategy in the Trust Game to other individual diff erence 
measures and demographic metrics support the interpretation that moral strategy is 
linked to the person in a trait-like manner. Th e self-reported motive results imply 
that moral opportunists occupy a unique zone in the multi-dimensional motivational 
space explored here, just as the GA, IA and GR participants do. Th is supports the 
interpretation that moral opportunism is a social preference in its own right, distinct 
from guilt and inequity aversion both in behavior on the tasks employed here and in 
the subjective experience of the participants. Furthermore, these results show, to our 
knowledge for the fi rst time, that the moral strategies we derived from computational 
utility models grounded in economics in fact align with participants’ own experience of 
their psychological decision process.
General discussion
Across two behavioral laboratory studies, we here replicated our previous observation 
that diff erent subjects follow qualitatively diff erent moral strategies when making Trustee 
reciprocity decisions in a modifi ed Trust Game. Using computational utility modeling, 
we showed that these strategies are stable over time within subjects, and that the salience 
of a specifi c moral strategy did not aff ect the prevalence of that strategy in the data. 
Widely used metrics of greed and prosociality strongly predicted the greed parameter of 
our computational model, which lends measurement validity to the model. Th e variance 
explained by the social preference dimension of our model (parameter phi), on the other 
hand, was not captured by any other measure included here, which illustrates the added 
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value of our model in accounting for social choice behavior. Finally, moral strategy as 
indexed by our computational model aligned with self-report of the participants’ motives, 
which lends construct validity to our theoretical interpretations of the observed behavior.
 In these experiments, moral strategy was consistent over time, and the distribution 
of moral strategies was nearly identical across two very differently framed instantiations 
of the Hidden Multiplier Trust Game. This suggests that moral strategy might reflect 
an individual’s ‘moral phenotype’, i.e. the specific set of moral principles driving their 
social choice behavior. This interpretation is in line with other evidence suggesting 
that social value orientation is linked to developmental factors (number of siblings 
and attachment style; Van Lange et al., 1997), and that moral foundations are linked 
to political preference (Graham et al., 2009), which we know to be relatively stable 
over time (Sears & Funk, 1999). Future work could examine the development and 
stability of moral phenotypes, for example by exposing the same group of participants to 
different social decision tasks separated by long time intervals (in the order of months) 
and measuring cross-task predictive power. Future work should also consider testing 
explicitly for reciprocity motives (Falk et al., 2003), which affected the decisions of 
several of our participants according to self-report.
 In our data, the individual difference measure of ‘trait guilt’ (part of the Guilt 
Inventory as described by Jones et al. (2000)) did not predict guilt-averse preferences 
in the HMTG. This lack of relationship can be understood by investigating what is 
meant by ‘guilt’ in these two different contexts. The Guilt Inventory questionnaire items 
loading on ‘trait guilt’ relate to the guilt one feels internally when thinking back to a 
past misdeed (e.g. one item reads “I have made a lot of mistakes in my life“) as well 
as guilt related to disappointing an authority (e.g. “My parents were very strict with 
me”). Guilt aversion as defined here and by (Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 2007), on the 
other hand, describes an interpersonal emotion (Baumeister et al., 1994) that results 
from disappointing an equal interaction. These two types of guilt thus point to distinct 
psychological experiences. Future work should better tease apart the two, perhaps by 
developing a questionnaire measure for interpersonal guilt, and clarify the relationship 
between these types of guilt on the one hand and regret and shame on the other.
 Taken together, our findings warn against interpreting social choice behavior 
through the lens of a single moral motive. The traditional Trust Game could not have 
uncovered the moral strategy variance observed here: in the x4 condition of the HMTG 
the behavior predicted by guilt aversion, inequity aversion, and moral opportunism 
is the same. Interpreting neural activity recorded during Trust Game reciprocity 
decisions through the lens of a unitary social preference model can thus lead to false 
interpretations (as argued in Chapter 3 of this thesis). In general, we argue for more fine-
grained analysis of the moral motives underlying the social choice behavior. By formally 
modeling different motives and teasing them apart using innovative experimental tasks, 
we can begin to better understand idiosyncratic laboratory behavior as well as the social 
decisions that define our societies.
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Abstract
Many socially impactful decisions are made in groups. How does the group composition 
affect a decision-maker’s subjective responsibility for the decision outcome? And how 
does this affect amends-making if the decision outcome is harmful? We tackled these 
questions in an fMRI experiment using a novel social decision-making task. We found 
that subjective responsibility for a harmful group decision decreases as the group gets 
larger, with the exception of a case in which there was internal disagreement within the 
deciding group. Amends-making behavior followed the same pattern, and we propose 
a modified version of Latané’s (1981) classic social impact model to account for these 
findings. In the brain, the left temporoparietal junction tracked own-responsibility-
for-harm in line with our proposed model, and predicted subsequent amends-making 
behavior. These results provide a neural basis for the diffusion of responsibility in 
group decision-making, and suggest that disagreement within a group can lead to more 
responsible decision-making.
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Introduction
In daily life, we commonly make decisions that affect the welfare of others, from helping 
a friend move to donating money to charity. Such social decisions are governed by social 
norms including fairness concerns (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; 
Sanfey et al., 2003; Tricomi et al., 2010), as well as by social emotions such as guilt 
(Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 2007; Chang et al., 2011). These social emotions, which can 
steer our behavior towards prosociality, are often driven by personal responsibility (Ederer 
& Stremitzer, 2017). For example, if I damage your car, I feel more guilty and am more 
likely to reimburse you for the damage than if a stranger damages your car. In other words, 
we commonly evaluate our own responsibility for harming someone else, and based on this 
responsibility evaluation we subsequently make amends with them. This type of behavior 
is important for long-term social relationships in humans and other primates (Silk, 1998).
 In modern society, however, many socially impactful decisions are made in a group, 
such as a parliament, a medical team, or a corporate board. This raises the crucial 
question to which degree each member of a group feels responsible for harmful decisions 
made by the entire group, and how this affects the likelihood of individual amends-
making. For example, if a company board decide to sell risky financial products to 
unsuspecting small-time investors, who end up losing their life savings, does each board 
member feel as responsible for that harmful outcome as a sole decision-maker would? 
How does their subjective responsibility affect their willingness to make amends with 
the victims by compensating them for the harm caused? And how is the link between 
subjective responsibility and compensation implemented in the human brain? Despite 
the ubiquity of group decision-making, these questions remain to date unanswered.
 Previous behavioral work has elucidated the effect of group size on the social 
behavior of each member of the group. In the canonical ‘bystander effect’, for example, 
responsibility for helping a stranger in need is said to diffuse over all members of the 
group of onlookers (Darley & Latané, 1968; Kassin, 2017; Latane & Dabbs, 1975). 
The more people are present, the less likely each person is to help. Similarly, it has been 
reported that the effort put into a group task by a group member drops as a function 
of group size (social loafing; Karau & Williams, 1993; Latané, Williams, & Harkins, 
1979). Both phenomena are captured in the framework of social impact theory (Latane, 
1981), which postulates that the influence of a social event on individual members 
of a group is proportional to N-t, where N represents group size and t lies around 0.5 
(Lewenstein, Nowak, & Latané, 1992). However, it is unclear whether social impact 
theory generalizes to subjective responsibility after a harmful group decision, for two 
reasons. Firstly, in these prior studies, the participants were never causally involved in 
the observed harm – they were mere bystanders. Does responsibility also diffuse over a 
group of people who caused harm? Secondly, in a democratic decision process that leads 
to a harmful decision, there may be decision-makers who voted against the decision that 
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was taken, and who therefore did not cause its harmful effect. Does responsibility diffuse 
equally over all agents involved in a group decision, in a manner conceptually similar to 
‘guilt by association’ (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Iyer, Leach, & 
Crosby, 2003; Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006); or is there differential diffusion between 
those who voted for and those who voted against the eventually harmful course of action?
 For the latter question, multiple hypotheses can be derived from Latané’s (1981) social 
impact theory. One option is that responsibility diffuses equally over all agents involved 
in the decision. The responsibility felt by each of them would then be proportional 
to a power of the number of decision-makers (agents), which we can formalize in the 
following relationship: responsibility ∝ agents-t = 1/agentst (diffusion of responsibility over 
agents). Alternatively, only agents who voted in favor of the harmful decision (which we 
call ‘errors’) might feel responsible, in proportion to the number of errors: responsibility ∝ 
1/errorst (diffusion of responsibility over errors). A third prediction can be derived from the 
notion that one’s responsibility for a harmful event can be inferred through counterfactual 
thought about one’s past decisions (Byrne, 2002; Coricelli et al., 2005). Following this 
model, a decision-maker would only feel responsible for a harmful group decision to the 
extent that he could have changed the outcome of the decision by altering his own vote 
(counterfactual responsibility). For example, after a unanimous decision by a group of 10 
people, none of them feel would responsible for the decision outcome, since none of them 
could have swayed the democratic decision by voting in the opposite way. In the current 
study, we aimed to arbitrate between these three hypotheses (the three models’ predictions 
in the current experimental paradigm are represented visually in Fig. 5.1B).
 Prior work also yields potential insights into the neural basis of subjective 
responsibility for harmful group decisions, but the full picture remains unclear. It is 
plausible that the brain’s theory of mind (ToM) network (Molenberghs, Johnson, Henry, 
& Mattingley, 2016; Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009) processes one’s responsibility 
for a group decision, given that this network tracks other people’s mental states (Saxe 
& Kanwisher, 2003) as well as one’s influence over others (Hampton, Bossaerts, & 
O’Doherty, 2008), and is involved in self-referential thought (Wagner, Haxby, & 
Heatherton, 2012). When specifically processing one’s own responsibility for a harmful 
group decision, the integration of subjective responsibility with harm information might 
take place in harm-sensitive brain regions such as anterior insula (AI) and dorsal anterior 
cingulate cortex (dACC), as two studies found increased activity in response to vicarious 
pain in these regions if the participant was maximally responsible for causing that pain 
(Koban, Corradi-Dell’Acqua, & Vuilleumier, 2013; Hongbo Yu, Hu, Hu, & Zhou, 
2014). Other work has implicated bilateral temporoparietal junction (TPJ) (Buckholtz 
et al., 2008) and lateral prefrontal regions (Buckholtz et al., 2015; Crockett, Siegel, 
Kurth-Nelson, Dayan, & Dolan, 2017) in the integration of responsibility and harm 
information. A similar integrative process might play a role in compensation behavior, 
but this has not been tested.
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Here, we developed a task in which participants make perceptual decisions in a group 
of varying composition. Since a wrong decision causes financial harm to a third party 
(the ‘partner’), the composition of the group determines the participant’s responsibility 
for this harm. We tested how well each of the three responsibility models outlined above 
could describe the participants’ self-reported responsibility for each group composition 
condition; their willingness to compensate the partner for their financial loss in each 
condition; and the associated responsibility representation in the brain.
Methods
Participants
53 participants between the ages of 18 and 28 (17 men and 36 women, mean age 21.7 y) 
were recruited from the Nijmegen student population using an online recruitment tool. 
Students of psychology and economics were excluded from participation, since they 
likely have prior knowledge about experimental economic games, which might affect 
task behavior. All participants either had normal vision or their vision was corrected 
to normal with scanner-compatible glasses. Five participants were excluded from the 
analysis for excessive head motion (1), because they did not understand the task (1), 
because they fell asleep during the experiment (1), or because their brain structure could 
not be normalized due to anatomical abnormalities (2), leaving 48 included participants 
(15 men and 33 women, mean age 21.8 y).
Task
We tested amends-making behavior after a harmful group decision, as well as the 
associated brain activity, in a highly controlled but financially consequential laboratory 
experiment. All participants played the Reparations Game (fig. 5.1A) while undergoing 
3-Tesla fMRI. On each trial of this paradigm, the participant carries out a binary-choice 
perceptual decision-making task together with a varying number (0-2) of pre-recorded 
other participants. The outcome (correct or incorrect) of this perceptual group decision 
determines the payoff (bonus or deduction) of the next participant in the experiment 
(called the ‘partner’ of the current participant), who is not involved in the perceptual 
decision task. Since the perceptual decision is made democratically through voting, 
the composition of the group on a given trial determines the degree of responsibility 
the participant carries for the perceptual decision and its potentially harmful result 
(responsibility manipulation). If the perceptual group decision is correct, the partner 
receives a €20 bonus. If the perceptual group decision is incorrect, however, between 
€1 and €10 is deducted from the partner’s account (harm manipulation, orthogonal 
to responsibility manipulation). The participant can then compensate the partner 
for this harm by transferring some of his own constant €20 bonus, knowing that the 
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earlier participants who voted in the group decision cannot pay compensations. After 
the scanner task, the participant rates their subjective responsibility for each group 
composition condition in the perceptual decision task. Throughout the experiment, the 
participant knows that one randomly chosen trial will be financially consequential to 
them and their partner.
 The Reparations Game has six conditions of the responsibility manipulation, 
corresponding to all possible distributions of 1 to 3 votes on the perceptual decision 
task: 1-0, 1-1, 2-0, 2-1, 1-2, and 3-0. In these condition labels, the participant’s own 
vote is always on the left (e.g. 1-2 means there were two votes opposing the participant). 
4 conditions have 40 trials each (20 with harmful error) and are designed to elicit 
gradually diffusing subjective responsibility for the participant: 1-0, 2-0, 2-1, and 3-0 
(Fig. 5.1A). The remaining 2 conditions have fewer trials: 8 for 1-1 and 2 for 1-2. 
In 1-1, one of the two votes is randomly selected as decisive, splitting this condition 
into two: 1-1 Self (participant’s answer is decisive) and 1-1 Other. 1-1 Other and 1-2 
are ‘responsibility control conditions’, in which the participant is not responsible at all 
for the harmful group decision (since the participant’s vote was correct) but harm is 
done anyway. Unbeknownst to the participants, the votes and performance (correct/
incorrect) of the perceptual task were preprogrammed to control the number of trials 
per condition.
Procedure
The experimental procedures were approved by the local ethics board (CMO Arnhem-
Nijmegen, approval code CMO2014/288). The participants were brought to the lab 
one-by-one for a single experimental session at the Donders Centre for Cognitive 
Neuroimaging. They were first seated in a behavioral lab space, screened for MRI 
compatibility, and informed about the study. After giving informed consent, they 
received instructions about the Reparations Game on paper, and practiced several rounds 
of the task on a computer to acquaint themselves with the different task conditions 
and the response method. They were then taken to the MRI lab, where they played 
the Reparations Game in two runs of 85 trials each. The voting on and outcome of 
the perceptual decision task was pre-programmed to achieve a uniform distribution 
of trial types both between participants and between conditions. Both answers were 
always wrong on the perceptual tasks, although the participants were unaware of this (as 
questioned in debriefing).
 Diﬀ usion of Responsibility in Amends-Making
C
ha
pt
er
 5
111
Figure 5.1. The Reparations Game.
A: Trial timeline. Gray lines: condition transitions. ‘Ptnr.’: partner. Th e four conditions visualized here (1-0, 2-0, 
2-1, 3-0) constitute 160 of 170 trials (23.5% each); the remaining 10 are 1-1 or 1-2. B: Task predictions of the three 
responsibility models for 1-0, 2-0, 2-1, and 3-0. Th e power t in the two diff usion models is set to 0.5 (Lewenstein et 
al., 1992).
To minimize head movement, soft adhesive tape was placed across the participant’s 
forehead immediately before image acquisition started. In accordance with safety 
regulations, the participant wore earplugs during the experiment and had access to an 
alarm button. At the start of the fi rst run we administered a left-handed fi nger tapping 
task, which we used to check the temporal synchronization of the logged task events 
with the logged scanner pulses. Th e contrast ‘tapping versus rest’ revealed strong and 
signifi cant activation in the right motor cortex (peak at MNI [40, -14, 56]).
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After the fMRI session, participants were brought back into the behavioral lab, where 
they were presented with 24 of their 170 trials from the fMRI Reparations Game. 
About each of these trials, they were asked to what degree they felt responsible for 
its outcome (using the mouse on a continuous slider from ‘not at all responsible’ to 
‘completely responsible’), and how satisfied they were with the outcome (using a mouse-
controlled continuous slider from ‘completely dissatisfied’ to ‘completely satisfied’). 
They next completed two personal difference measures: social value orientation (SVO; 
computerized and financially incentivized slider version after (Murphy et al., 2011) 
and used before in Chapter 3 of this thesis; 1 token is €0.10) and the guilt inventory 
(Jones et al., 2000). We collected these measures because we had used them before in 
social decision-making studies, but did not analyze the data for this paper since there 
were no between-subject hypotheses. Finally, the participants completed a debriefing 
questionnaire and were sent home.
 Several days after the experiment, the financial reward for participation was 
computed by adding a €27 base fee to three bonuses: the amount received by being the 
partner of the previous participant (€20 in case that previous participant’s trial-selected-
for-payout was ‘correct’, otherwise harm + compensatory payment), the amount kept 
on the trial-selected-for-payout of the participant’s own Reparations Game (€20 in case 
that trial was ‘correct’, otherwise €20 – compensatory payment), and the amount earned 
from one randomly selected SVO trial. For the first and the last participant, the two 
missing bonuses were set to €20. Total earnings ranged from €36 to €77 with the mean 
at €63.27.
Stimulus presentation
The stimuli were presented with PsychToolBox 3.0.11 (www.psychtoolbox.org) for 
Matlab 2013a (Mathworks) onto a screen at the back of the scanner bore, which the 
participant could view using a mirror mounted onto the head coil. The participant 
responded to the perceptual decision task and moved the compensation slider with the 
left two buttons on a four-button curved response box (Current Designs, Philadelphia, 
PA, USA) in the right hand, while using the rightmost button to confirm their choice 
of reparative payment. Jitter periods were implemented using a black screen, so the 
preceding stimulus screens were always presented equally long (2 seconds).
Behavioral data analysis
Behavioral data analysis was carried out in R version 3.4.3 (Kite-Eating Tree) running 
on R Studio 1.1.383 for Mac OS X 10.13.2. For mixed-effects regression, we used the 
packages lme4 1.1-15 (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) and lmerTest 2.0-36 
(Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2017). For all mixed models, type 3 ANOVA 
tests are reported with Satterthwaite degrees of freedom. Explained variance of mixed 
models was computed using the MuMIn package version 1.40.4 (https://cran.r-project.
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org/package=MuMIn). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons between factor levels were carried 
out using the multcomp package 1.4-8 (Hothorn, Bretz, & Westfall, 2008) with Holm-
Bonferroni correction for the associated p-values (Holm, 1979).
fMRI acquisition
T2*-weighted functional MR images were acquired on a 3-Tesla head-dedicated MRI 
scanner (Skyra; Siemens Medical Systems) using a 32-channel head coil and a multi-
echo pulse sequence (224 mm field of view (FOV); 64 x 64 matrix; 90° flip angle; 
2250 ms repetition time (TR); echo times (TE) 9.4 ms, 20.6 ms, 32 ms, and 43 ms). 
Thirty-five ascending slices were acquired (3.0 mm slice thickness; 0.5 mm slice gap; 
3.5x3.5x3.0 mm voxel size), covering the whole brain except the cerebellum. At the 
start of both runs, the participant waited while 30 volumes were acquired, which were 
used to estimate the combining weights for each of the four echoes. A high-resolution 
T1-weighted image was acquired using an MPRAGE sequence (192 sagittal slices; TR 
2300 ms, voxel size 1x1x1 mm).
fMRI preprocessing
All MR image processing was carried out in SPM12 (7219) on Matlab version 2016a 
(Mathworks). The functional images were converted from DICOM to Nifti format, 
checked for signal spikes, and realigned within-run. The six realignment parameters (x, 
y, z, roll, pitch, yaw) of the first echo were added to the GLM as nuisance regressors, 
along with the first derivative of each, the volume-wise change in motion (Dmovementt 
= movementt – movementt-1), and the change in each of the six derivatives, for a total 
of 24 nuisance regressors per run. Volumes with a volume-wise translation greater than 
half the voxel size (i.e. greater than 1.75 mm) were rejected. Next, the four echoes of 
each volume were combined using the combining weights obtained from the first 30 
volumes of each run, following the procedure described by (Poser et al., 2006). The 
combined images were then slice-time corrected to the center slice and coregistered to 
the structural image. The T1-weighted structural scan was segmented into six tissue types 
(gray matter, white matter, cerebrospinal fluid, bone, soft tissue, and air/background) 
and normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) standard space. The 
deformation fields obtained here were then applied to the functional images (7th degree 
B-spline interpolation, voxel size kept at [3.5, 3.5, 3.5]). Finally, the functional images 
were smoothed using a kernel of 8 mm full width at half maximum.
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fMRI statistical analysis
The preprocessed functional images were entered in a first-level general linear model 
(GLM) for each subject individually. The design matrix was convolved with the 
canonical hemodynamic response function before fitting the parameters to the 
observed data. A high-pass filter at 128 seconds was used to eliminate slow signal drifts. 
Separate regressors were added for the introduction screen (‘round X: dot counting’), 
the perceptual task screen, the participant response screen for the perceptual task, the 
responsibility manipulation screen, the feedback (error/no error) screen, the outcome 
(harm magnitude) screen, and the compensation screen. For the responsibility, 
feedback, and outcome screens, eight separate regressors were added: one for each 
combination of feedback (correct/incorrect) and responsibility (1-0, 2-0, 2-1 and 3-0). 
A parametric modulator for harm magnitude was added to the outcome screen. Since 
the compensation screen only occurred in ‘incorrect’ trials, four separate regressors were 
added for this screen (1 per responsibility condition). Adding the 24 nuisance regressors, 
this yields a total of 90 regressors per run.
 We created a contrast map for each of the eight regressors on the feedback screen, 
with the regressor set to 1 in both runs and all other regressors set to 0. These 8 contrast 
maps represent the sum over the two beta maps of each regressor across the two runs. 
We entered these contrast maps into a 2-way repeated measures ANOVA at second level 
(SPM model specification: main effect for subject, and interaction effect for feedback 
by responsibility), where we tested the interaction between feedback and responsibility 
on the feedback screen across participants using an F-contrast. The resulting statistical 
parametric map was corrected for multiple testing by applying a voxel-wise cluster-
forming threshold of p < 0.001 and a cluster-level extent threshold of p < 0.05 (familywise 
error-corrected).
Data and code availability
All data and code will be made publicly available upon publication of this paper.
Results
Participants compensate partners even in the absence of responsibility
In the Reparations Game, experimental participants made perceptual decisions in a 
group of varying composition, which, if incorrect, harmed a third party. We aimed to 
find out what motivated participants to compensate the third party, the ‘partner’, for 
their loss. One possibility is that participants did not care about the partner’s loss at all, 
meaning they would always keep their €20 for themselves. The cleanest way to test this 
prediction would be to look at the 1-2 condition of the task, in which the participants 
were not at all responsible for the decision outcome (since they were overruled by 2 
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other votes), but the partner was still harmed. In this condition, however, the mean 
number of euros sent to the partner was signifi cantly greater than zero (Fig. 2A; t(47) = 
8.90, P < 0.001). Th is indicates that participants cared about their partner’s loss, as they 
were willing to sacrifi ce some of their own payoff  to compensate their partner, even if 
they were not responsible for their loss.
Participants compensate partners more if they are responsible
Th e main assumption of this paper is that responsibility for harm drives the compensation 
of the victim. To test this assumption, we compared amounts sent in the 1-1 S condition 
of the task, in which the participants were responsible for the partner’s harm, to amounts 
sent in the 1-1 O condition, where the participant was not responsible but which was 
otherwise identical to 1-1 S. Both these conditions had two trials per participant; one 
with the partner losing €3 and one with €8. We found that, when controlling for this 
harm level, amount sent was indeed greater when the participant was responsible (1-1 S) 
than not (1-1 O) (Fig. 5.2B; repeated-measures ANOVA, responsibility eff ect: F(1,141) 
= 8.76, P = 0.004; harm eff ect: F(1,141) = 57.64, P < 0.001; interaction not signifi cant). 
Similarly, amounts sent were greater in the 2-1 condition (in which the participant 
was responsible) than the 1-2 condition (in which the participant was not) (Fig. 5.2C; 
repeated-measures ANOVA, responsibility eff ect: F(95,1) = 11.28, P = 0.0011). Th is 
confi rms our assumption that responsibility for harm drives compensation.
Figure 5.2. Behavioral results.
A: Histogram of amount sent per participant in the 1-2 condition, in which the participant was not responsible for 
the partner’s harm. Partner’s harm was €5 for each participant. B: 1-1 Self versus 1-1 Other, controlling for harm level. 
C: 2-1 versus 1-2. Compensatory payment amounts in B and C are corrected for harm level and for random subject 
intercepts. Error bars represent bootstrapped 95% confi dence intervals. ** P < 0.01.
Group composition aff ects compensations
We have now established that responsibility predicts compensation in a binary fashion: 
being responsible for a harmful decision engenders more compensation than not 
being responsible at all. Beyond this fi nding, we aimed to test whether the willingness 
to compensate for a harmful group decision (by sending money to the partner) was 
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affected by the precise composition of the group. The three models discussed in the 
introduction (diffusion of responsibility over agents, diffusion of responsibility over errors, and 
counterfactual responsibility) all predict that responsibility should be different depending 
on group composition, but they differ on the predicted shape of responsibility as a 
function of group composition. To arbitrate between the three models, we compared the 
four conditions of the task in which the participant was always somewhat responsible 
for harm, but had varying influence on the group decision: 1-0, 2-0, 2-1 and 3-0 (see 
Fig. 5.1B for a visualization of model predictions in these four conditions).
 Within these conditions, a mixed-effects regression model of compensation amount 
onto partner’s loss and condition with random subject intercepts revealed a significant 
main effect of both partner’s loss (F(1,3737) = 1855.05, p < 0.001) and responsibility 
condition (F(3,3737) = 8.90, p < 0.001). This confirms our earlier observation that the 
magnitude of harm suffered by the partner is predictive of compensations. Additionally, 
it suggests that the participant’s precise level of responsibility for this harm also drives 
compensations. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons (Fig. 5.3A) allowed us to test the specific 
predictions of the three responsibility models compared here, to better understand how 
group composition affected compensations. Pairwise comparisons revealed that the 
participants compensated less in the 2-0 and 3-0 conditions than in 1-0 (1-0 – 2-0: t(3737) 
= 3.40, p = 0.0034; 1-0 – 3-0: t(3737) = 4.81, p < 0.001). Additionally, compensations 
in 3-0 were lower than 2-1 (t(3737) = 3.32, p = 0.0036). (All p-values Holm-Bonferroni-
corrected.) However, there was no significant difference in compensation between 
1-0 and 2-1, 2-0 and 2-1, and 2-0 and 3-0. These observations reveal a general trend 
whereby compensation is greater in a small group (1-0 > 2-0 > 3-0). As such, they 
are consistent with diffusion of responsibility over errors and counterfactual responsibility. 
However, these observations also reveal that group size is not the only important factor 
for compensations, since compensation was significantly lower in 3-0 than in 2-1. This 
suggests that diffusion of responsibility over agents model cannot accurately account for 
the responsibility experienced by our participants in the Reparations Game.
Group composition affects subjective responsibility
In addition to actual compensation behavior, the group composition was also predicted 
to influence the subjective responsibility of the participants in the Reparations Game. 
To be able to test this, all participants self-reported their subjective responsibility in each 
condition of the task, after the experiment (see Methods). This self-reported subjective 
responsibility form as an additional source of data to arbitrate between the diffusion 
over errors and counterfactual diffusion models. To compare these two accounts, we ran a 
mixed-effects regression of self-reported responsibility on the same four conditions as in 
the previous analysis (1-0, 2-0, 2-1 and 3-0). This revealed a significant main effect of 
condition (F(3,521) = 94.7, p < 0.001), but not of partner’s bonus or their interaction. 
Post-hoc pairwise comparisons (Fig. 5.3B) between the levels of the condition factor 
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revealed that subjective responsibility was greatest in the 1-0 condition (1-0 –  2-0: 
t(521) = 7.78, p < 0.001; 1-0 – 2-1: t(521) = 5.47, p < 0.001; 1-0 – 3-0: t(521) = 16.53, 
p < 0.001); greater in 2-0 than in 3-0 (t(521) = 8.76, p < 0.001); greater in 2-1 than in 
2-0 (t(521) = 2.30, p = 0.021; and greater in 2-1 than in 3-0 (t(521) = 11.06, p < 0.001) 
(all p values Holm-Bonferroni-corrected). Although these findings are more in line 
with the diffusion over errors account than with the other candidate interpretations, they 
additionally reject the hypothesis that subjective responsibility should be equal between 
2-0 and 2-1, as the diffusion over errors model would predict. This suggests that neither 
the number of agents contributing to the decision, nor the number of errors, nor the 
counterfactual responsibility of a decision-maker can accurately capture the subjective 
responsibility of participants in the Reparations Game.
Figure 5.3. Behavioral results.
Effects of the four responsibility conditions on compensation behavior (A) and self-reported responsibility (B), 
corrected for the effect of harm level and for random subject intercepts. Significance markers are from post-hoc 
pairwise comparisons between the levels of the condition factor in a mixed-effects regression model with fixed effects 
for partner’s bonus, condition and their interaction, and random subject intercepts. Error bars denote 95% confidence 
intervals. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, all Holm-Bonferroni-corrected.
Left temporoparietal junction tracks the participant’s responsibility for harmful 
decisions
To test which brain systems might track the participant’s responsibility for harmful group 
decisions in the Reparations Game, we compared the BOLD signal during the feedback 
screen, at which time the participants learned whether or not the selected answer was 
incorrect and the partner would thus be harmed. At this screen, the participant already 
knows the responsibility condition (1-0, 2-0, 2-1, or 3-0), and we would predict that 
the brain integrates this knowledge of personal responsibility with the incoming error 
signal (X) to assign responsibility-for-harm to the self. To test this prediction, we ran 
a 2-way repeated measures ANOVA (feedback by responsibility condition) on whole-
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brain BOLD activity during the feedback screen. Th is analysis revealed a signifi cant 
interaction between feedback and responsibility in one region: the left temporoparietal 
junction (TPJ; cluster p(FWE-corrected) = 0.011). Th is region showed a consistent 
reduction in BOLD activity when an incorrect/harmful decision was made, and the 
shape of this deactivation refl ected the shape of compensations and self-reported 
responsibility across the four conditions (fi gure 5.4). Pairwise comparisons confi rmed 
that the deactivation of lTPJ in response to harm (i.e. correct – incorrect group decision) 
was greater in 1-0 than in 3-0 (t(47) = 2.29, uncorrected p = 0.026), in 2-1 than in 2-0 
(t(47) = 2.16, uncorrected p = 0.036) and in 2-1 than in 3-0 (t(47) = 3.62, uncorrected 
p < 0.001). Although the other pairwise comparisons were not signifi cant, the overall 
trend of BOLD activity in left TPJ is in line with the observed compensation behavior 
and responsibility self-report, and again follows the predictions of the diff usion over 
errors model with the clear exception of the 2-1 condition.
Figure 5.4. Interaction between error and responsibility condition in left temporoparietal 
junction.
Whole-brain cluster p(FWE) = 0.011, peak at MNI [x,y,z] = [-52, -56, 28], visualized at MNI [-63, -48, 32]. * p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.001, all uncorrected.
Self-responsibility signal in left TPJ predicts compensation behavior
If the left TPJ assigns responsibility to the self in the Reparations Game, we would 
predict that this region’s activity is read out to make appropriate compensation decisions, 
and thus that trial-by-trial fl uctuations in LTPJ activity are predictive of trial-by-trial 
fl uctuations in the magnitude of compensations. To test this prediction, we extracted 
the mean activity of the LTPJ cluster (as defi ned on the feedback screen) during the 
decision screen of each trial, and added this hypothetical self-responsibility signal to 
our mixed-eff ects regression model of compensatory behavior. Th e other predictors 
remained in this model: fi xed eff ects for condition (1-0, 2-0, 2-1, or 3-0), partner’s loss 
(continuous), and the condition-by-loss interaction, as well as random subject intercepts. 
Th is analysis revealed that LTPJ activity at the time of decision was indeed predictive of 
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compensation: trials with greater LTPJ activity had significantly lower compensations 
(LTPJ t(3736) = -2.32, P = 0.021; table 1; chi-square test on the residual sums of squares 
of model 1 and 2: P = 0.021). The direction of this finding corresponds to that of the 
LTPJ effect on the feedback screen, where greater deactivation in LTPJ activity reflected 
greater self-responsibility for error.
Model 1: compensation ~ harm + condition + harm * condition + (1 | subject)
Model 2: compensation ~ harm + condition + harm * condition + LTPJ + (1 | subject)
  Model 1 Model 2
Effect d.f. F t p d.f. F t p
Harm 1, 3737 1855.05 -20.65 < 0.001 *** 1, 3736 1853.95 -20.64 < 0.001 ***
Condition 3, 3737 8.90 < 0.001 *** 3, 3736 8.69 < 0.001 ***
Harm*condition 3, 3737 1.12 0.34   3, 3736 1.11 0.34
LTPJ activity     1, 3736 5.36 -2.32 0.021 *
Log-likelihood -8132.6 -8129.9
Table 5.1. Mixed model ANOVA table (type 3 tests, Kenward-Rogers degrees of freedom).
Comparison between mixed-effects regression of compensation behavior without (left) and with (right) the trial-by-
trial activity in left TPJ as predictor. Harm is defined as a negative integer, e.g. €-8, so the negative parameter estimate 
reflects greater compensation for greater harm.
A new model of diffusion of responsibility for group decisions
Across three converging lines of evidence – self-report, behavior, and brain activity – we 
confirm the predictions of social impact theory (Latane, 1981) in three of the four task 
conditions (1-0, 2-0, 3-0) according to the diffusion over errors model for responsibility. 
The fourth condition (2-1), however, poses an interesting riddle. Why is subjective 
responsibility higher in 2-1 than in 2-0 or 3-0, even though these comparisons control 
for group size (2-1 vs 3-0) and the number of errors made (2-1 vs 2-0)? To provide an 
answer to this question, we propose a simple extension to Latané’s (1981) social impact 
equation. In the original version, Latané proposed that the impact of a social event on 
an individual who is part of a group shrinks in proportion to some power of group size: 
I ∝ N-t. Since Latané and others found the value of t to be around 0.5 (Lewenstein et al., 
1992), we can write this formula as I ∝ N-0.5 or as I ∝ N1
0.5/N2 for N1 and N2 of equal 
size. While N1 and N2 refer to the same group in many cases, including Latané’s original 
helping experiments, we propose that they are in fact conceptually different. Consider, 
in an example inspired by Latané’s experiments, the case where an individual drops 
some pens in front of 10 people. The likelihood of one group member to help pick up 
the pens is proportional to 1/100.5 = 0.32, as Latané and Dabbs (1975) showed across 
4,813 subjects. But what if 8 out of the 10 bystanders are elderly persons on crutches? 
We would not expect these people to pick up pens from the floor, so the total burden 
of responsibility lands on the remaining 2 individuals. These 2 individuals likely feel a 
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responsibility proportional to a number greater than 1/100.5, and likely greater than the 
1/20.5 that would be the case if the 8 elderly people were not present at all. We propose 
that in this case, I ∝ N1
0.5/N2 , with N1 = 10 and N2 = 2. That is, N1 refers to the total 
number of people at the scene, while N2 refers to the number of people for whom it is 
socially appropriate to help, and the collective responsibility of the entire group (N1
0.5) 
diffuses evenly over candidate helpers. In the context of the Reparations Game, N1 is the 
number of agents involved in the decision, and N2 is the number of errors (those who 
made a harmful mistake). Thus, compensations ∝ agents0.5/errors. This model predicts 
the pattern of responsibility, compensations and brain activity that we observed in this 
experiment: higher in 2-1 than in 2-0 and 3-0, but lower than in 1-0 (figure 5.5). We 
conclude that this extension of social impact theory, which we call the responsibility stakes 
model, can explain behavior in situations in which not all bystanders can be expected 
to help, as well as compensation behavior after harmful group decisions where not each 
group member was responsible for the harm caused.
Figure 5.5. Task predictions of the responsibility stakes model.
Discussion
We here presented the results of an fMRI experiment on the Reparations Game. 
Across self-report, task behavior, and neural activity, we found converging evidence 
that responsibility diffuses over multiple agents involved in a harmful group decision. 
However, the shape of the diffusion effect followed none of the three models of 
responsibility diffusion derived from existing theory. The condition that falsified the 
predictions of the diffusion of responsibility over errors model was the 2-1 condition, in 
which one of the three agents involved in the group decision was not responsible for 
its harmful outcome, since they had voted against the selected decision. Our adapted 
version of Latané’s (1981) social impact theory can account for such deviant cases, by 
explicitly modeling the number of responsible agents and total number of agents as two 
separate terms.
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Our findings suggest that disagreement within a group can induce greater subjective 
responsibility in people voting with the majority. This is potentially important, since 
group decision-making is ubiquitous throughout society, and greater subjective 
responsibility may lead to better decision-making. There are two ways of creating 
disagreement within a unanimous group: by one member’s changing their opinion (e.g. 
going from a 3-0 case to 2-1), and by adding a group member who disagrees (e.g. from 
2-0 to 2-1). Our data suggest that in both cases, the two majority votes in the new 
group (2-1) feel more responsible than in the initial group composition. These findings 
could potentially help groups make better decisions by inducing increased subjective 
responsibility in majority decision-makers.
 In the brain, we found that the left temporoparietal junction integrated harm 
information with own responsibility into a responsibility-for-harm signal, which at 
the time of decision was predictive of compensations. These TPJ findings are in line 
with Buckholtz et al. (2008), who showed significant deactivations in TPJ when 
assigning culpability for harm to another individual. Our evidence suggests that the 
same function of TPJ might also operates on the self. As such, our findings suggest 
that a moral mechanism based on self-perception might be at play. Following Bem 
(1967), self-perception consists in ‘interpersonal judgments in which the observer and 
the observed happen to be the same individual’. It is possible that, in the same vein, the 
psychological and neural mechanisms used to morally judge others might sometimes 
be applied to the self. However, much more research is needed to test whether such 
similarities in the neural systems used to judge others and oneself occur in a variety of 
moral decision settings, and might therefore reflect a general organizing principle of the 
neural mechanisms of social judgment. Additionally, future work could elucidate the 
role of moral self-judgment in psychopathologies such as obsessive-compulsive disorder 
and depression (Higgins, 1987; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992; Webb, Heisler, 
Call, Chickering, & Colburn, 2007).
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Summary of experimental chapters
This thesis started with a simple question: why are people nice to each other? Over 
the course of four chapters, I have attempted to contribute to answering this question 
from the perspectives of psychology, behavioral economics, and cognitive neuroscience. 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 dealt with one specific type of ‘nice’ behavior: reciprocating another 
person’s trust. In chapter 2, I introduced the Hidden Multiplier Trust Game (HMTG), a 
laboratory paradigm that can expose two categorically different motives underlying the 
reciprocity behavior of the ‘Trustee’ player: guilt aversion (GA) and inequity aversion 
(IA). Using a computational utility model that integrated these two motives, I recovered 
each participant’s most likely reciprocity motive from their behavioral data. This revealed 
that reciprocity motives differ from person to person, not just on the trade-off between 
prosocial and proself tendencies, but also on the guilt-inequity domain.
 In chapter 3, the Hidden Multiplier Trust Game was presented to participants in a 
3-Tesla functional MRI experiment. A third moral strategy was observed in a significant 
number of participants, namely moral opportunism (MO), by which the participant 
switched between inequity aversion and guilt aversion depending on the task condition, 
always choosing the most lucrative of the two strategies. I adapted the computational 
model from chapter 2 to incorporate this strategy, and mapped the geometry of 
participants in the two-dimensional parameter space of this model directly onto the 
brain using inter-subject representational similarity analysis. 26 brain regions were 
found where participants with a similar moral strategy (as indexed by the model) also 
had similar multi-voxel activity patterns, even in a task condition where the behavioral 
output of the different strategies was indistinguishable. Further analysis yielded brain 
maps of regions with specific activity patterns for guilt aversion, inequity aversion, 
and moral opportunism. The moral opportunists’ multivariate brain representations 
switched between the activity patterns linked to guilt aversion and those linked to 
inequity aversion, precisely in line with their alternating behavioral strategy. These 
results suggest not only that the activity patterns I associated with GA and IA are indeed 
functionally relevant for those two strategies – since the MO participants upregulated 
them in the task conditions where they used the corresponding strategy – but also that 
moral opportunists truly have multiple behavioral and neural response templates at their 
disposal, between which they can alternate to maximize their task payoff in a social 
decision-making task.
 In chapter 4, I presented two follow-up experiments on HMTG reciprocity. Here, 
two variations of the HMTG were used to test how stable moral strategies are over time. 
Specifically, I aimed to test whether the relatively low prevalence of guilt aversion in 
chapter 3 could be accounted for by financial pressure forcing GA participants toward 
MO (study 1) or by the saliency of the inequity aversion strategy in the original HMTG 
(study 2). Neither of the two manipulations were effective at increasing the prevalence 
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of guilt aversion. Instead, the relative prevalence of the four main strategies (GA, IA, 
MO, and greed) was strikingly similar between study 1, study 2, and the fMRI study in 
chapter 3. This implies that the relative prevalence of the four strategies might reflect a 
stable distribution in the population, which suggests that moral strategy may have trait-
like features. Additionally, in chapter 3 I found that moral strategy is highly stable over 
time within subjects, and that the greed component of each participant’s moral strategy 
is strongly tied to other individual differences, including social value orientation, 
dispositional greed, and gender. Lastly, I showed that the self-reported motives of my 
participants significantly differed between the four identified moral strategy groups. 
Taken together, this evidence suggests that moral decision strategy might be a personal 
trait, rather than a behavioral pattern haphazardly constructed by participants in a 
laboratory experiment.
 Chapter 5 was focused on a different driver of nice behavior: the experience of 
subjective responsibility. I argued that while responsibility is key for amends-making, it 
is often unclear to which degree members of a group feel responsible for decisions made 
by the entire group. To test this, participants took part in an experimental task where 
they made perceptual decisions in a group of varying composition. Incorrect group 
decisions caused financial harm to a third party, and the participants could alleviate 
this harm by sending some of their own money to the third party. Converging evidence 
from self-report, compensation behavior, and neural activity showed that responsibility 
decreases as the number of decision-makers increases, but that responsibility is increased 
if there is internal disagreement within the group. I proposed an adapted version of 
Latané’s (1981) classic social impact theory, in which the total number of agents is 
modeled separately from the responsible number of agents, to account for this deviant 
case. The findings in chapter 5 suggest that group decision processes may be improved 
by the mere presence of disagreement within the group. Additionally, we found initial 
evidence for overlapping neural systems for judgment of others and judgment of the self, 
which warrants further research.
Moral strategies – or moral phenotypes?
In chapters 2 through 4, I observed significant between-subject differences in moral 
decision strategy. These differences showed themselves spontaneously, as I exposed 
each subject to identical experimental instructions and stimuli. The differences were 
also stable over time. These findings, while new and potentially impactful, are in fact 
not very surprising given what we already know about social choice behavior. After all, 
individual differences in moral principles are at the core of many real-world interactions, 
such as political debates. Additionally, computer simulations of social interactions 
in game-theoretic models often predict a stable mix of strategies in the population 
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(Axelrod, 1980; Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Bergstrom & Godfrey-Smith, 1998; Boyd 
& Richerson, 1992; Feldman & Thomas, 1987; Houston & McNamara, 1991; Santos 
et al., 2018; Smith & Price, 1973; Taylor & Jonker, 1978; Thomas, 1984). And in 
social psychology, it has long been known that individual differences on personality 
traits like agreeableness are relatively stable (Caspi, Roberts, & Shiner, 2005; Cobb-
Clark & Schurer, 2012) and covary with social choice behavior (Evans & Revelle, 2008; 
Graziano & Eisenberg, 1997).
 In light of these diverse strands of evidence, my findings raise the important 
question what causes different people to use different moral decision strategies. The 
same question has been asked in evolutionary biology as well. It has long been open for 
discussion whether an ‘evolutionarily stable mixed strategy’ takes the form of strategy 
polymorphism (multiple individuals consistently assuming a different strategy) or 
mixed/conditional strategies (one individual switching between strategies over time, 
either with a fixed switch probability (mixed) or based on fixed environmentally cued 
switch points (conditional) (Bergstrom & Godfrey-Smith, 1998; Tomkins & Hazel, 
2007). Formal game theory models do not distinguish between these two possibilities, 
since they usually assume that each new interaction is with a random individual in the 
population. For example, in the Hawk-Dove game (Smith & Price, 1973) it makes no 
difference whether a Hawk agent twice interacts with an agent who first plays Hawk 
and then Dove, or once with a stable Hawk agent and subsequently with a stable Dove 
agent. Psychologically, however, these two accounts are vastly different (Bergstrom & 
Godfrey-Smith, 1998).
 The findings in this thesis provide strong evidence for the conditional strategy 
account, as the moral opportunists clearly show strategy switching based on fixed 
switch points (the task condition). MO is definitely not a mixed strategy, since the 
strategy switching is not probabilistic but deterministic. My data also provide evidence 
for strategy polymorphism, since some participants were stably guilt-averse and others 
stably inequity-averse. One might object to this conclusion by arguing that my GA/IA 
participants could follow a different strategy in other tasks or contexts. This, however, 
would imply that these participants also follow a conditional strategy, but with a 
different environmentally cued switch point than the moral opportunists – and diversity 
of switch points is a form of strategy polymorphism in its own right (Tomkins & Hazel, 
2007). Indeed, if multiple moral strategies are available to all of us, all the time, then the 
contextual position of our strategy switch points becomes the defining characteristic of 
our social personality.
 A final objection might be the following. If we see moral opportunism as a single 
(but complex) stable strategy rather than a conditional strategy, it could be argued that 
my participants probabilistically select one of the four strategies at the start of each new 
experiment, and that the likelihood of each strategy’s being selected is fixed throughout 
the population. If true, this would be a remarkable discovery. However, this explanation 
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is contradicted by my findings in chapter 4 that moral strategy is significantly predicted 
by age, gender, social value orientation, and dispositional greed. If individual differences 
predict moral strategy, it cannot be true that everyone has the same likelihood of selecting 
a given strategy in an experimental task. Moreover, chapter 3 shows that there was 
significant overlap in the neural implementation of reciprocity decisions between moral 
opportunists and guilt-/inequity-averse participants, which rules out the possibility that 
MO is implemented as a single, entirely separate psychological process.
 Therefore, the evidence presented here converges on the interpretation that each 
individual has a specific mapping between environmental cues (e.g. task parameters) 
and moral decision strategy. Some people are inequity-averse in more environments 
than others; for some, the switch point between guilt aversion and inequity aversion 
lies in between the x2 and x6 conditions of the Hidden Multiplier Trust Game. If the 
mapping from environment to moral strategy is stable over time, this would suggest 
that each individual has a ‘moral phenotype’: the specific set of environmentally cued 
strategy switch points determining their moral behavior. The average strategy over all 
possible environments (weighted by the commonness of each environment) may reflect 
an individual’s general agreeableness or other unidimensional personality traits, but 
the geometry of context-dependent switch points will reveal much more about their 
idiosyncratic moral values.
 If we accept that moral behavior indeed has trait-like features, this raises the 
obvious question what determines our moral phenotype. Given previously literature on 
personality traits (Caspi et al., 2005; Jang, Livesley, & Vemon, 1996) and social choice 
behavior (Cesarini et al., 2008), it is likely that moral phenotype is jointly predicted by 
heritable and environment-related factors. It would be useful to quantify the heritability 
of moral phenotype by comparing twins reared together to twins reared apart. 
Additionally, the influence of culture and socioeconomic status on moral phenotype 
could be studied by comparing college students (as tested here) to other demographic 
groups. Previous work has already shown that moral foundations differ vastly between 
WEIRD (white, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic) students and other 
groups (Haidt, 2012), and that social choice-affecting traits like aggressiveness might be 
linked to regional cultural differences (Nisbett, 1993), so this would be a promising line 
of research.
 Future work could also investigate the development of moral phenotypes across the 
lifespan. Prior work has suggested that fairness preferences change in adolescence (Almas 
et al., 2010) alongside the development of perspective-taking in reciprocity decisions 
(Van den Bos et al., 2011; Van den Bos, Westenberg, Van Dijk, & Crone, 2010), which 
implies that people construe moral decision problems differently as they grow older. This 
may be accompanied by a shift in moral phenotype over time, although a developmental 
change in the relative influence of guilt and inequity aversion has, to my knowledge, not 
been investigated before (indeed, this is raised as an open question by Van den Bos et 
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al. (2011)). Moreover, since moral opportunism likely requires perspective-taking and 
sensitivity to social judgment by others, it would be interesting to study at which age it first 
manifests. More generally, longitudinal evidence has shown that changes in personality 
are more likely to happen early in life (Caspi et al., 2005). If moral phenotype is linked to 
personality, moral phenotype changes may preferentially occur in early life as well.
Reconciling guilt aversion, inequity aversion, moral opportunism, and 
greed
One of the most reliable observations throughout the first three chapters of this thesis 
was the relatively low prevalence of guilt aversion. This finding does not imply that 
my participants were unaware of the Investors’ expectations. On the contrary, the 
many moral opportunists illustrate that Investor expectations were often used to guide 
reciprocity behavior (namely in the x6 condition of the HMTG). Rather, it seems like 
disappointing the Investor on 25% of trials (in the x2 condition) was not a big problem 
for IA and MO participants. Indeed, in self-report during post-experimental debriefing, 
inequity-averse participants justified the disappointment of their game partner via moral 
licensing (Blanken, Van de Ven, & Zeelenberg, 2015): they would often report that the 
disappointment they had caused in x2 was ‘made up for’ in the x6 condition, where they 
returned more than the Investor expected, even though they knew that only one trial 
would be paid out (and not the sum or average over multiple trials or conditions). And 
moral opportunists reported that they did not mind returning less than the expectation 
in x2, since they would not find it fair to go home with less money than the Investor 
(which is what guilt aversion in x2 would require).
 These self-reports illustrate a general finding: participants could justify their actions. 
Let us not forget that all participants, in all studies incorporated in this thesis, could 
have simply taken all experimental tokens for themselves – as about 10% of participants 
consistently did. Instead, most subjects consistently behaved prosocially to some 
meaningful degree, and crafted a narrative to justify their behavior when probed by 
the experimenter. This observation is in line with Tetlock’s view of people as ‘pragmatic 
politicians’, who need to account for their behavior to their social environment (Haidt, 
2007; Tetlock, 2002) – and the choice heuristics that develop under such social scrutiny 
in everyday life may generalize to anonymized laboratory experiments (Rand, Greene, 
& Nowak, 2012). In this light, moral opportunism can be seen as a prime adaptation to 
social life: it allows decision-makers to maximize their payoff while still always able to 
justify their behavior according to some moral rule. In other words, moral opportunism 
is the maximization of justifiable free-riding.
 The observed flexibility of moral behavior contradicts the age-old view that morality 
stems from fixed guidelines, which may range from preferences for specific outcomes of 
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one’s decisions (consequentialism; Bentham, 1789; Mill, 1863), specific duties or types 
of reasoning (deontology; Kant, 1788), or specific sentiments (sentimentalism; Hume, 
1739; Smith, 1759). Rather, it appears that humans have all these different strategies 
at their disposal, and can switch between them based on the demands of the current 
environment. The question whether deontology, consequentialism, or sentimentalism 
is the best description of human moral choice behavior therefore becomes irrelevant: 
they are all part of the moral decision system in our mind. The question which of the 
three ought to be used most often is best left to moral philosophers and, perhaps, the 
voting public of a democratic country. And the challenge that remains for psychology 
is to better understand the geometry of contextual switch points between the different 
strategies, and map the individual differences that might exist at this level of moral 
phenotypes.
 Interestingly, not all switching between moral strategies is purely voluntary and 
goal-directed. Precommitment, for example by having made a promise to a friend, can 
often force us in the direction of certain behavior, even if we are no longer interested 
in that behavior at all. That is, making a promise can be understood as the voluntary 
establishment of a contextual strategy switch point: after you have made the promise, you 
are more likely to choose the promised moral strategy in the corresponding environment. 
So, why do people often keep these promises? In everyday life, promise-keeping may be 
tightly linked to reputation concerns, which are known drivers of social choice behavior 
(Knoch et al., 2009; Phan, Sripada, Angstadt, & McCabe, 2010). However, laboratory 
experiments have shown that even when making a promise to an anonymous stranger 
you will never meet, promises drive behavior (Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006). This 
has been explained by reasoning that promises affect beliefs about interaction partners’ 
beliefs: if you make a promise, you induce a precise expectation in the mind of the 
other person. This is the context in which ‘guilt aversion’ was first proposed, since it was 
found that these beliefs about others’ beliefs affect social decision-making (Charness & 
Dufwenberg, 2006; and see Ederer & Stremitzer (2017) for a well-controlled extension). 
In this light, moral opportunism may arise through self-serving biases in second-order 
expectation estimation. In the x2 condition of the Hidden Multiplier Trust Game, I 
can simply reason that only a naive Investor would expect to receive twice his investment 
from me. Since I do not believe many Investors to be naive, I can then tell myself that 
I am in fact not disappointing anyone if I return less than half the multiplied amount. 
This implies that moral opportunists might not only justify their behavior in x2 based 
on fairness concerns (as observed in post-experimental self-report), but that they also 
license their behavior through a self-serving bias in their estimation of second-order 
beliefs. Imprecise second-order beliefs are therefore adaptive, since they lend plausible 
deniability to the guilt-averse decision-maker. It would be an intriguing question for 
future research whether promises can reduce the prevalence of moral opportunism.
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An integrative model of social choice
While chapters 2 through 4 of this thesis revolved around individual differences in moral 
strategy, chapter 5 focused on a shared mediator of social choice: subjective responsibility. 
Under conditions of reduced responsibility for a group decision, participants were on 
average less willing to pay reparations to their anonymous ‘partner’ who was harmed in 
the group decision. Since the partner was blind to the responsibility condition of the 
participant’s group decision, we can safely assume that the partner’s preferences nor his 
expectations differed between the conditions. Therefore, both guilt aversion and inequity 
aversion would predict identical reparations behavior across the conditions – but in fact 
the level of reparations differed significantly. We can account for this observation by 
incorporating subjective responsibility into a psychological model of moral decision-
making. For example, it may be the case that a violation of one’s social preferences 
(e.g. increased inequity or disappointment of a game partner) is felt less strongly by 
a decision-maker if he is less responsible for this violation. In fact, this is likely to be 
true, since in daily life we make an important distinction between inequity that we have 
caused ourselves (e.g. by accidentally damaging a friend’s car) and inequity that simply 
exists ‘out there in the world’ (e.g. a stranger’s damaging another stranger’s car).
 We can mathematically describe the influence of responsibility on social choice by 
adding a mediator parameter to the social preference term(s) of a utility model. Such 
a model would then contain ‘sources’ of utility (e.g. payoff, inequity, guilt), subject-
level parameter weights (cf. theta and phi in the Moral Strategy Model in chapters 3 
and 4), and trial-level ‘mediator’ parameters, which can temporarily reduce or increase 
the influence of any of the sources of utility. For example, it has been shown that for 
individuals with prosocial preferences, profits gained from harming others are less 
valuable than profits gained from harming the self, both at the level of behavior and 
in terms of striatal brain responses (Crockett et al., 2017). That is, ‘dirty money’ is 
worth less than clean money, which could be modeled as a trial-level mediator on the 
payoff term of a utility model. Similarly, moral transgressions (like guilt or inequity) for 
which one is only partly responsible may have less impact on one’s decision utility than 
transgressions for which the entire burden of responsibility is borne. Future work could 
elucidate whether such a source-mediator model of moral choice is better capable of 
describing a wide range of social choice behavior than simpler models.
Social choice in the brain
Chapters 3 and 5 of this thesis were focused on the neural underpinnings of social 
choice behavior. In chapter 3, specific patterns of neural activity were found for the 
psychological processes of guilt aversion, inequity aversion, and moral opportunism. 
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Interestingly, the anterior insula was implicated in both guilt and inequity aversion. 
This is in line with previous literature, as it has been suggested that the anterior insula 
facilitates a guilt response when not living up to another person’s expectations (Chang 
et al., 2011), but also that it facilitates an emotional response to unfair treatment which 
in turn motivates costly punishment (Chang & Sanfey, 2013; Sanfey et al., 2003). 
The common thread between these findings is an emotional response to the violation 
of a social preference. In my data, however, there were also interesting differences 
between guilt and inequity aversion. While both engaged the ventroanterior pole of 
the AI, guilt aversion was additionally uniquely associated with its ventral surface, 
while inequity aversion was uniquely associated with the left dorsoanterior insula. 
Previous meta-analytic evidence has suggested a tripartite functional parcellation of 
the insula, in which the ventroanterior component is most strongly linked to emotion, 
while the dorsoanterior parcel is associated with cognitive control-related functions 
like switching and inhibition (Chang et al., 2013). The involvement of dorsoanterior 
insula in inequity aversion, therefore, might reflect the recruitment of cognitive control-
related processes for this moral strategy, which would match the inequity aversion-
specific activity patterns I observed in regions like the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex 
and the intraparietal sulcus. This would imply that emotional and control processes 
both contribute to the inequity aversion signal in the anterior insula. However, the 
time course of these two signals might differ, with the emotional response diminishing 
gradually as the decision-maker reduces inequity through monetary transfers, and the 
control response remaining stable throughout the decision. Future work could attempt 
to discern these signals based on their time course, using magnetoencephalography or 
even intracranial electroencephalography, and thereby elucidate the neural processes 
underlying inequity aversion.
 Chapter 3 also highlighted a role for ventromedial prefrontal cortex in inequity 
aversion. The involvement of this region may be related to its role in reward processing 
(Bartra, McGuire, & Kable, 2013), as the resolution of inequity has previously been 
associated with a reward response in the same region (Tricomi et al., 2010). However, a 
second cognitive mechanism might be at play here. In recent work, the medial orbital 
gyrus has been suggested to maintain a ‘cognitive map’ of task space, including a 
flexible representation of currently goal-relevant information that is hidden from direct 
perception (Schuck, Cai, Wilson, & Niv, 2016). The region of interest highlighted in 
this work coincides with that reported by Tricomi and with the inequity-averse MPFC 
region in chapter 2 of this thesis. This is particularly interesting given that social norms 
(which include inequity aversion) have previously been described similarly to ‘hidden 
task states’, namely as unobservable manipulations of the payoff structure of a social 
environment (Bicchieri, 2006). That is, social norms manipulate the utility of various 
possible behaviors in a social setting. It may be the case, therefore, that inequity-averse 
MPFC activity does not represent the reward felt when behaving in line with a social 
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norm, but rather the norm itself (i.e. the current position in ‘social task space’). One way 
to test this would be to run an experiment in which social norms change over time, and 
to test whether it is possible to decode the current norm from the MPFC, even if this 
norm has nothing to do with equity or even monetary payoff. If a more general role of 
MPFC in social norm-driven behavior is found, this could help understand societally 
relevant phenomena such as social conformity. Indeed, prior work has linked medial 
prefrontal activity to social conformity, but has not interpreted this finding in light of 
social norms (Stallen, Smidts, & Sanfey, 2013).
 The experimental data in chapter 5 revealed a role for the left temporoparietal junction 
(TPJ) in tacking one’s own responsibility for another person’s harm. Interestingly, a 
similar role for TPJ was found in processing the responsibility of another person for 
a third party’s harm (Buckholtz et al., 2008, 2015; Buckholtz & Marois, 2012). This 
raises the possibility that the neural systems underlying the judgment of others may also 
be applied to judgment of the self. In fact, such convergence at the psychological level 
has been proposed decades ago (Bem, 1967) – but neural evidence for or against this 
proposition has, to my knowledge, not been reported. In neuroimaging, there has been 
a long-standing debate on the similarities between feeling pain and observing another 
person’s pain. The start of this debate was a paper reporting overlapping activation 
clusters in the human anterior insula and anterior cingulate cortex for somatic (first-
hand) and vicarious pain (Singer et al., 2004). More recent work, however, has applied 
fine-grained multi-voxel pattern analyses to fMRI recordings of somatic and vicarious 
pain, reporting that the two are separable with very high accuracy (Krishnan et al., 
2016). This has raised questions regarding the ‘neural repurposing’ of pain centers in the 
brain for social cognition. In general, it is important to note that neither spatial overlap 
nor conceptual overlap implies neural reuse (Parkinson & Wheatley, 2015). Still, a 
similar approach to the pain literature could be applied to studies of social judgment, to 
further elucidate the neural underpinnings of voluntary social behavior.
Limitations of this work
There are several important limitations to the work presented in this thesis. One relates 
to the distinction between Marr’s levels of analysis (Marr & Poggio, 1976). Following 
Marr, a psychological computation may be described at the computational level (the 
overarching function of the computation, i.e. the mapping from input to output), the 
algorithmic level (through which steps is the input transformed into the output?) and the 
implementational level (how are these steps implemented in the neural substrate of the 
brain?). In chapters 2 through 4, I have attempted to describe multiple moral strategies 
at the computational level. Guilt-averse, inequity-averse, morally opportunistic, and 
greedy participants all transformed the same input (stimuli) into different output 
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(behavior). However, it is unclear what the algorithm of each different strategy might 
be. In this general discussion, I have discussed several possible algorithms for moral 
opportunism (including ‘return the expectation except under disadvantageous inequity’ 
and ‘return the expectation, which I believe to be lower in the x2 condition than in x4’), 
but I cannot arbitrate between these potential algorithms based on the data collected 
so far. Similarly, the neural measurements in chapter 3 do not elucidate the algorithm 
through which guilt-averse and inequity-averse decisions are made. It is actually an 
advantage of the inter-subject representational similarity approach that it is not required 
to know the algorithm, since this method allows the researcher to nonetheless map 
specific computations onto the brain – but the obvious downside is that the algorithms 
themselves have not been elucidated, let alone their neural implementation. Future work 
could use more traditional trial-level computational modeling to pull out algorithm-
specific components of the guilt-averse and inequity-averse brain response within the 
brain regions highlighted in chapter 3 (in an approach similar to e.g. Hampton et al. 
(2008)).
 A second limitation of this work concerns the taxonomy of moral strategies. In 
this thesis, I have distinguished guilt aversion, inequity aversion, moral opportunism, 
and greed; and I have additionally considered responsibility a mediating factor in these 
moral strategies. However, other work has focused on five ‘moral foundations’ (care, 
fairness, loyalty, authority, and purity) that shape our moral judgments (Graham et al., 
2009; Haidt, 2012). It is unclear how these different subdivisions of moral processing 
relate to one another. Possibly, the fairness foundation relates to my inequity aversion 
strategy, and the care foundation might be reflected in concern for the feelings of 
interaction partners, which suggests a connection to guilt aversion. But where does 
moral opportunism fit in? And how do loyalty, authority, and purity tie in with my 
four moral strategies? We can conjecture that a person who has strong purity concerns 
might also have high preference for consistency in his moral actions and the justification 
thereof, which would drive him away from moral opportunism and toward moral 
consistency. But this remains conjecture. In the same vein, loyalty and authority might 
set contextual strategy switch points (just like promises do), inducing an agent to always 
follow a group’s or a superior’s moral strategy. But again, this remains speculative.
A third limitation concerns the external validity of behavior in the tasks used here. A 
recent study combining laboratory and field experiments reported poor correspondence 
between economic game behavior of subjects in the lab, altruistic behavior of the 
same subjects upon leaving the lab, and self-reported past social behavior (Galizzi & 
Navarro-Martinez, 2018). The low correspondence between lab and field behavior is an 
obvious threat to the implicit goal of decision neuroscience and behavioral economics to 
understand the behavior that shapes our real-world social environment. An important 
part of the reason for this low correspondence, however, is that real-world behavior is 
shaped by many more contextual factors than heavily controlled laboratory paradigms 
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(Levitt & List, 2007). This interpretation is in line with prior work attesting to the 
influence of e.g. time constraints (Rand et al., 2012), social scrutiny (Milinski, Semmann, 
& Krambeck, 2002), participant mood (Kirchsteiger, Rigotti, & Rustichini, 2006), and 
cognitive load (Schulz, Fischbacher, Thöni, & Utikal, 2014) on social decision-making. 
The low correspondence between lab and field, therefore, may be due to the inherent 
complexity (and thus noisy measurement) of real-world social decision problems. While 
it is important to remember that this limits the direct extrapolation of behavior from 
the lab to everyday life, there is a way forward: the new task of behavioral economics is 
to understand the contextual influences that guide humans through the rich portfolio 
of moral decision strategies available to them.
Societal implications of this work
If you care about human welfare, moral behavior matters. Better understanding where 
moral behavior comes from can help predict what will happen to our welfare in the future. 
As these two rather vague claims suggest, the work presented here has no immediate 
practical use. However, in the long run, a better grasp of moral reasoning may inspire 
mutual understanding between morally opposed groups in society (in politics), and may 
help us better understand psychiatric disorders related to social behavior (in medicine).
In politics, an interesting example of moral reasoning is the morality of populist political 
parties, like the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV; ‘Party for Freedom’) in the Netherlands. 
Such parties have grown in popularity throughout Europe over the past 15 years 
(Mudde, 2013), and they are known, among other things, for their harsh stance on 
immigration. Interestingly, however, the PVV is also known for its defense of animal 
rights and care for the elderly. It is clear, therefore, that the PVV does not lack empathy; 
it merely applies this moral strategy in different contexts than other parties. In terms 
of the discussion above, the PVV’s strategy switch points are anchored to different 
environments than those of e.g. GroenLinks (the green party) or VVD (conservatives). 
Possibly, we can account for this difference by combining the idea of moral phenotypes 
with moral foundations theory: the PVV’s reliance on the foundation of in-group 
loyalty sets its strategy switch points such that sentimentalist empathy is directed at 
the elderly, while a harshly consequentialist decision strategy is applied to immigration, 
which supports the ulterior motive of promoting the welfare of the in-group relative to 
the out-group. It may seem like reframing a political party’s moral phenotype in this way 
is a purely academic exercise. However, the advantage of this approach is that it allows 
us to get to the core of the PVV’s arguments. Once we realize that PVV supporters are 
empathic, but (like many others) opportunistically so, we can attempt to elicit their 
empathy in contexts where we believe it ought to be displayed. And even if this does not 
work, being curious about our opponents’ morality will help us maintain a workable, if 
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competitive attitude towards them, rather than an outright hostile one. To see someone’s 
moral phenotype is to see their values, fears, and future, and is to see where influence or 
collaboration may still be possible.
 In medicine, a promising recent line of research has been that of computational 
psychiatry. This branch of psychiatry attempts to better understand the affected neural 
computations in psychopathology using computational modeling, and link these 
computations to the brain using a variety of neuroimaging analysis tools (Huys, Maia, 
& Frank, 2016; Montague, Dolan, Friston, & Dayan, 2012). Several early studies in this 
direction have focused on conditions with an important social aspect, such as autism 
spectrum disorder (De Martino, Harrison, Knafo, Bird, & Dolan, 2008; Pellicano & 
Burr, 2012) and psychopathy (Brazil, Van Dongen, Maes, Mars, & Baskin-Sommers, 
2016). This work is in line with previous studies on autism and psychopathy using a 
battery of social decision-making tasks, including economic games (Izuma, Matsumoto, 
Camerer, & Adolphs, 2011; King-Casas & Chiu, 2012; Vieira et al., 2013). For such 
studies, it is crucial that the motives and psychological strategies underlying the social 
behavior of the clinical population can be accurately characterized. To reach this goal, a 
more fine-grained understanding of the motives underlying social behavior, as facilitated 
by this thesis, could be of use. In fact, the first study using the Hidden Multiplier 
Trust Game in combination with the assessment of sub-clinical psychopathy is already 
underway. In the long run, therefore, this work may make a small contribution to the 
understanding, diagnosis, and treatment of psychiatric disorders with a social dimension.
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Nederlandse samenvatting
Sociaal gedrag is de lijm en de olie van de maatschappij. Door rijkdom met elkaar te 
delen stijgt de welvaart; vertrouwen en betrouwbaarheid maken handel mogelijk; en 
wie verantwoordelijkheid neemt stimuleert rechtvaardigheid. Deze verbanden zijn door 
economen, politicologen en rechtsgeleerden krachtig onderbouwd. Bovendien kunnen 
we zelf wel aanvoelen dat het leven beter is met een beetje naastenliefde. ‘We zijn toch 
op de wereld om elkaar te helpen, nietwaar?’ Toch hebben we vrij weinig verstand van 
hoe sociaal gedrag nu eigenlijk tot stand komt. Hoe beslist een mens hoeveel hij met 
een ander wil delen? Wat bepaalt wanneer we wel of niet betrouwbaar zijn? En hoe kan 
het dat we ons soms wel, en soms niet verantwoordelijk voelen voor onrecht om ons 
heen? Hoewel ieder mens ervaringsdeskundige is in de psychologie –  zelfs Descartes 
ontkwam niet aan het hebben van een bewuste geest – is het moeilijk om op deze vragen 
een bruikbaar antwoord te geven. Dat is ook niet gek, want onze psyche is geen ster 
in zelfinzicht. We hebben bijvoorbeeld zelden door waarom we ineens onze aandacht 
verliezen tijdens het autorijden. Of denk aan iemand met een depressie: die beseft vaak 
niet dat zijn of haar gedachtes niet voor altijd zo onaangenaam zullen blijven. En kunt 
u mij vertellen hoe u gisteravond in slaap bent gevallen?
 Om objectief greep te krijgen op onze geest is de cognitieve neurowetenschap in het 
leven geroepen. Cognitief neurowetenschappers combineren onderzoekstechnieken uit de 
psychologie, de biologie en de geneeskunde om te begrijpen hoe cognitieve functies (zoals 
aandacht, geheugen en taal) tot stand komen in het brein. Over de afgelopen decennia 
zijn zo grote stappen gezet in ons begrip van bijvoorbeeld het geheugen en het visuele 
systeem. Ook snappen we steeds beter hoe mensen (en andere dieren) beslissingen maken. 
Bij dat laatste doel komen ook economische modellen goed van pas, omdat je hiermee 
keuzegedrag precies kunt omschrijven. Via de cognitieve neurowetenschap kunnen we 
menselijk gedrag dus beter begrijpen, en daarmee onze maatschappij als geheel. 
 In dit proefschrift heb ik geprobeerd om via cognitief-neurowetenschappelijk 
onderzoek inzicht te krijgen in de sociale keuzes van mensen. In het bijzonder heb 
ik onderzocht hoe mensen omgaan met het vertrouwen van een ander tijdens een 
economische transactie (hoofdstuk 2, 3 en 4). Stel bijvoorbeeld dat je een nieuwe auto 
gaat kopen. Je hoopt dan dat de verkoper je eerlijk vertelt wat de zwakke plekken zijn 
van iedere auto, maar je kunt niet zeker weten dat hij dat zal doen. De verkoper bezit 
dus een vorm van macht, en je zult hem moeten vertrouwen. Sommige verkopers zijn 
ook te vertrouwen, terwijl andere je vertrouwen schaden door je een slechte auto aan 
te smeren, waar je pas weken later achter komt (op vakantie in Frankrijk, op een steile 
helling). Waarom gaan mensen zo verschillend om met het vertrouwen van een ander?
 Een eenvoudige simulatie van zo’n economische situatie (met de cruciale elementen 
van vertrouwen en macht) is de zogenaamde ‘trust game’. In deze laboratoriumtaak 
mag de ene proefpersoon (de ‘Investor’) geld investeren in de andere proefpersoon (de 
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‘Trustee’), die de investering (plus een flinke rente) vervolgens weer kan delen met de 
investeerder – of juist de winst voor zichzelf kan houden. Al bij de eerste experimenten 
met de trust game, in de jaren ’90, werd duidelijk dat een Trustee de winst meestal 
deelt met de Investor, terwijl dat niet hoeft. Maar het was lang onbekend welke 
motivatie aan dit sociale gedrag ten grondslag ligt. Wat drijft iemand om tijdens een 
laboratoriumexperiment geld te delen met een wildvreemde? Het antwoord op deze vraag 
kan inzicht bieden in allerlei sociaal gedrag in de echte wereld, zoals de betrouwbaarheid 
van een autoverkoper.
 Volgens sommige economische theorieën zijn sommige Trustees gul omdat ze een 
eerlijke verdeling van geld intrinsiek waardevol vinden. Zij zijn dus daadwerkelijk blijer 
als ze een bedrag precies verdelen met een ander, dan als ze het hele bedrag voor zichzelf 
houden (dat noemen we inequity aversion). Maar er is ook een andere verklaring mogelijk: 
Trustees geven geld aan de Investor omdat ze het onprettig vinden om een ander teleur 
te stellen (guilt aversion). Inequity aversion en guilt aversion zijn verschillende ‘morele 
strategieën’ waarmee je sociale keuzes kunt maken: denk je vooral aan wat eerlijk is, 
of aan wat een ander van jou verwacht? Voordat ik aan mijn onderzoek begon wist 
niemand welke van de twee de beste verklaring was voor winstdeling in de trust game. 
Bovendien berusten beide economische theorieën op de aanname dat mensen consistent 
zijn in hun morele keuzestrategie - en die aanname bleek in mijn onderzoek niet stand 
te houden.
 Het grote probleem bij onderzoek naar inequity en guilt aversion is dat in veel gevallen 
de verwachtingen van een ander (guilt aversion) samenvallen met eerlijk gedrag (inequity 
aversion). Daarom hebben mijn mede-onderzoekers en ik een nieuwe experimentele taak 
ontwikkeld – de ‘hidden multiplier trust game’ (HMTG) (hoofdstuk 2) – waarmee deze 
twee motivaties van elkaar te onderscheiden zijn. In de HMTG zorgen we ervoor dat 
de Investor denkt dat de Trustee over meer of juist minder geld beschikt dan de Trustee 
daadwerkelijk heeft. Een inequity-averse Trustee zou zich over die verwachtingen niet 
druk moeten maken, en zich alleen moeten richten op wat objectief eerlijk is, terwijl 
een guilt-averse Trustee zijn gedrag aanpast aan de verwachtingen van de Investor. Wat 
bleek? Onder de meer dan 200 Nijmeegse studenten die we hebben getest was inequity 
aversion de dominante keuzestrategie: ongeveer 40% van de deelnemers gebruikte 
steevast deze motivatie. Daarentegen was slechts 10% van de deelnemers stabiel guilt-
averse. 10% van de deelnemers was ‘greedy’: die hielden bijna al het geld zelf.
 En de resterende 40%? Die vertoonden een patroon dat nog nooit eerder in het 
lab was waargenomen: ze wisselden tussen guilt aversion en inequity aversion, en 
kozen altijd de morele strategie die op dat moment het goedkoopst was. Dit noem ik 
‘moreel opportunisme’. Deze Trustees zijn niet immoreel, want ze houden lang niet al 
het geld voor zichzelf, maar ze zijn ook niet consistent in hun morele keuzestrategie. 
Kortom, moreel gedrag komt niet altijd voort uit één stabiel principe, de modellen van 
economen ten spijt. Sommige mensen beschikken over meerdere manieren van moreel 
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denken, en kunnen de morele strategie kiezen die nu even van pas komt. Dit soort 
moreel opportunisme zie je overal in de echte wereld, als je weet waar je op moet letten. 
Kijk bijvoorbeeld naar een talkshowgesprek over Zwarte Piet in de laatste maanden 
van het jaar: daarbij wisselen sommige mensen zonder enige moeite tussen argumenten 
over vrijheid van meningsuiting en argumenten over een ‘kinderfeest’, hoewel die 
argumenten soms met elkaar in strijd zijn. Blijkbaar voelen mensen een sterke behoefte 
om hun sociale gedrag te kunnen uitleggen, maar maakt het voor sommigen niet uit dat 
de inhoud van die uitleg van moment tot moment verschilt.
 De verschillende morele strategieën die onze Nijmeegse studenten aannamen in de 
hidden multiplier trust game boden nieuwe kansen voor interessant hersenonderzoek. Er 
was in het verleden namelijk wel onderzoek gedaan naar hoe inequity aversion en guilt 
aversion in de trust game door ons brein worden geproduceerd – maar zoals ik eerder zei 
lijken deze twee motivaties vaak veel op elkaar, omdat de Investor meestal verwacht dat 
de Trustee eerlijk zal delen. Wat zie je op een hersenscan als je deze twee motivaties van 
elkaar onderscheidt? In hoofdstuk 3 beschrijf ik het antwoord op deze vraag. Ik laat daar 
zien dat guilt aversion en inequity aversion gepaard gaan met verschillende patronen van 
hersenactiviteit, zelfs wanneer deze twee verschillende manieren van denken resulteren 
in precies hetzelfde keuzegedrag. En de moreel opportunisten? Die wisselen niet alleen 
tussen twee keuzestrategieën, maar ook in hun patronen van hersenactiviteit. Sterker 
nog, geef mij een hersenscan van een moreel opportunist in de hidden multiplier trust 
game, en ik kan met 90% nauwkeurigheid voorspellen welke keuze deze proefpersoon 
gaat maken.
 Dit neurowetenschappelijke bewijst biedt een betere biologische onderbouwing 
van inequity aversion en guilt aversion dan eerder mogelijk was. En het laat zien dat 
mensen die wisselen tussen morele strategieën ook daadwerkelijk wisselen tussen de 
bijbehorende hersenfuncties, in plaats van een volledig nieuw cognitief mechanisme 
op te tuigen. Tot slot laat ons onderzoek duidelijk zien dat je bij studies naar sociaal 
keuzegedrag goed moet letten op verschillen tussen de motivaties van je proefpersonen: 
als we de traditionele ‘trust game’ hadden gebruikt, hadden guilt aversion, inequity 
aversion, en moreel opportunisme precies hetzelfde gedrag veroorzaakt, en hadden we 
de verschillen tussen deze drie morele strategieën dus nooit kunnen waarnemen. Een 
nieuw wiskundig model, dat we in hoofdstuk 3 introduceren om het gedrag van onze 
proefpersonen te beschrijven, kan helpen om de verschillende strategieën van elkaar te 
onderscheiden.
 In hoofdstuk 4 repliceren we de verdeling van strategieën uit hoofdstuk 3 (40%-
40%-10%-10%), en laten we zien dat deze verdeling niet makkelijk te verschuiven 
is door de aandacht van de proefpersonen te verschuiven naar guilt aversion. Dit zou 
kunnen betekenen dat deze verdeling van strategieën een goede weergave is van de 
morele motieven van de populatie van Nederland. Vervolgonderzoek zal moeten testen 
of dit klopt, en zo ja, wat dan bepaalt welke van de vier strategieën een mens aanneemt. 
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Genen of opvoeding kunnen hierbij een rol spelen. Het is ook een belangrijke volgende 
stap om te onderzoeken of de vier morele strategieën die ik in dit proefschrift beschrijf 
te herkennen zijn in alledaags moreel gedrag, in plaats van in een experimentele setting.
 In hoofdstuk 5 buig ik me over een andere vorm van sociaal gedrag, namelijk het 
nemen van verantwoordelijkheid. Het is een bekend effect uit de sociale psychologie dat 
mensen in een groep minder snel zullen helpen bij bijvoorbeeld een overval dan mensen 
alleen – dat noemen we het bystander effect of diffusion of responsibility. In het dagelijks 
leven komen zulke situaties echter weinig voor – hoe vaak staat u op straat in een groepje 
toe te kijken bij een vechtpartij? Wat veel vaker voorkomt is een situatie waarin we zelf 
behoren tot de groep die een (goedbedoelde) fout maakt. Neem bijvoorbeeld een team 
van dokters dat besluit om een bepaalde operatie uit te voeren. Als deze operatie misgaat, 
voelt een van de dokters zich dan minder verantwoordelijk dan als zij in haar eentje de 
keuze had gemaakt om de operatie uit te voeren? En hoe bepaalt je brein eigenlijk hoe 
verantwoordelijk je bent voor een fout?
 Om dit te onderzoeken heb ik 53 proefpersonen in de MRI-scanner een experimentele 
taak laten uitvoeren waarbij ze alleen óf in een groep beslissingen moesten maken. Bij 
een verkeerde beslissing werd er geld bij een andere proefpersoon weggenomen – men 
was dus soms verantwoordelijk voor het verlies van een ander. Mijn proefpersonen 
voelden zich minder verantwoordelijk voor dit verlies wanneer de beslissende groep 
groter werd. En in een grotere groep waren proefpersonen ook minder bereid om een 
deel van hun eigen verdiensten te delen met het slachtoffer. Eén experimentele conditie 
vormde echter een uitzondering op dit patroon, en dat was de conditie waarin binnen 
de groep onenigheid bestond. Proefpersonen die hadden gepleit voor de verkeerde 
beslissing voelden zich meer verantwoordelijk als een andere proefpersoon het tegendeel 
had bepleit, dan als de beslissing unaniem was geweest. Als we in het dagelijks leven 
verantwoordelijkheid willen stimuleren, kan het dus helpen om ervoor te zorgen dat er 
in een groep die belangrijke beslissingen neemt niet alleen maar ja-knikkers zitten.
 De eigen verantwoordelijkheid van de proefpersoon hing samen met hersenactiviteit 
in een gebied van het brein dat we de temporoparietal junction noemen. Dit is een 
interessante bevinding, omdat al eerder is aangetoond dat dit gebied betrokken is bij het 
bepalen van de schuld van een ander voor bijvoorbeeld crimineel gedrag. Het is dus goed 
mogelijk dat onze eigen verantwoordelijkheid voor fouten door hetzelfde hersensysteem 
wordt bepaald als de verantwoordelijkheid die we een ander toedichten. Dat weerspiegelt 
een algemeen idee over het brein, namelijk dat sociaal-cognitieve functies – zoals als het 
empathisch meevoelen met andermans pijn –  slechts een nieuwe toepassing zijn van 
oudere, basale hersenfuncties – zoals het voelen van je eigen pijn. Maar aangezien dit idee 
recent ter discussie is komen te staan (met de komst van preciezere hersenscanmethodes), 
is verder onderzoek nodig. 
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Jeroen van Baar was born in Apeldoorn on April 27, 1990. After graduating from high 
school at Gymnasium Apeldoorn in 2008, he moved to University College Utrecht to 
pursue a BSc in Liberal Arts & Sciences (2011, cum laude). He spent the summer of 2011 
in the rural town of Kianyaga, Kenya, where he wrote his bachelor thesis on the health 
effects of household electrification in this developing region. Returning to Utrecht for his 
MSc in Neuroscience & Cognition, he worked with dr. Ineke van der Ham, dr. Mathijs 
Raemaekers, and dr. Yoad Winter to study how the brain processes syntax in music and 
language, using 7-Tesla functional magnetic resonance imaging. He also completed a 
research internship at the Ecole Normale Supérieure in Paris, France, working with 
dr. Catherine Tallon-Baudry and dr. Hyeong-Dong Park on detecting heartbeat-evoked 
brain potentials in the intracranial encephalogram. Back in the Netherlands in fall 2013, 
Van Baar joined 25 other recent graduates in the Nationale DenkTank, a 4-month 
full-time think tank about the health care system in the Netherlands. In January 2014, 
he published De prestatiegeneratie: Een pleidooi voor middelmatigheid, an opinionated 
popular psychology book on the culture of overachieving among young people in the 
Netherlands. Over the course of the following years, he gave invited lectures about 
this book at high schools, student associations, government agencies, companies, and 
conferences, as well as a TEDx talk at Amsterdam University College, to contribute to 
the ongoing debate about pressure and stress in modern society.
 Inspired by a lecture by dr. Giorgio Coricelli in the Parisian cognitive neuroscience 
department, Van Baar joined the lab of dr. Alan Sanfey at the Donders Institute in 
Nijmegen to pursue a PhD in decision neuroscience. From February 2014 to March 
2018, he worked with dr. Sanfey on the research that culminated in this thesis. Aside 
from fundamental research, he was involved in organizing colloquia, writing and editing 
for the general-audience weblog Donders Wonders, and giving talks for visiting high 
school classes. In 2015, Van Baar reached the national finals of science communication 
contest FameLab. Furthermore, he joined the BKB Academie 2015-2016 for a year-long 
extracurricular fellowship program on politics and activism, which included a trip to 
the presidential election primaries in New Hampshire and Washington D.C. In 2017, 
Van Baar returned to the United States to spend three months in the lab of long-time 
collaborator dr. Luke Chang at Dartmouth College. In the summer of that year, he 
was invited to join the Kavli Summer Institute in Cognitive Neuroscience (endearingly 
called ‘Brain Camp’) at the University of California, Santa Barbara. After finishing his 
dissertation work back in Nijmegen, he moved to Brown University in August 2018 
for postdoctoral research on social decision-making under uncertainty with dr. Oriel 
FeldmanHall.
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Donders Graduate School for Cognitive Neuroscience
For a successful research Institute, it is vital to train the next generation of young 
scientists. To achieve this goal, the Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour 
established the Donders Graduate School for Cognitive Neuroscience (DGCN), which 
was officially recognised as a national graduate school in 2009. The Graduate School 
covers training at both Master’s and PhD level and provides an excellent educational 
context fully aligned with the research programme of the Donders Institute. 
 The school successfully attracts highly talented national and international students 
in biology, physics, psycholinguistics, psychology, behavioral science, medicine and 
related disciplines. Selective admission and assessment centers guarantee the enrolment 
of the best and most motivated students.
 The DGCN tracks the career of PhD graduates carefully. More than 50% of PhD 
alumni show a continuation in academia with postdoc positions at top institutes 
worldwide, e.g. Stanford University, University of Oxford, University of Cambridge, 
UCL London, MPI Leipzig, Hanyang University in South Korea, NTNU Norway, 
University of Illinois, North Western University, Northeastern University in Boston, 
ETH Zürich, University of Vienna etc.. Positions outside academia spread among the 
following sectors: specialists in a medical environment, mainly in genetics, geriatrics, 
psychiatry and neurology. Specialists in a psychological environment, e.g. as specialist in 
neuropsychology, psychological diagnostics or therapy. Positions in higher education as 
coordinators or lecturers. A smaller percentage enters business as research consultants, 
analysts or head of research and development. Fewer graduates  stay in a research 
environment as lab coordinators, technical support or policy advisors. Upcoming 
possibilities are positions in the IT sector and management position in pharmaceutical 
industry. In general, the PhDs graduates almost invariably continue with high-quality 
positions that play an important role in our knowledge economy.
 For more information on the DGCN as well as past and upcoming defenses please 
visit:  http://www.ru.nl/donders/graduate-school/phd/

